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Abstract 
 
This research programme investigates the subjective utility of monetary 
outcomes and applies the existing knowledge base regarding the quantification 
and description of risk preferences to German charitable trusts. Results are 
discussed on the basis of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and Prospect Theory 
(PT) with a focus on the “Fourfold Pattern (4FP)” of PT. The description of risk 
preferences of trusts enables investors, advisors and portfolio managers to 
optimise their investment strategies for this specific target group disposing of an 
estimated asset base of about € 100bn.  
 
The subjects of this study, German charitable trusts, are restricted in their 
investment decisions by a given legal framework and therefore prone to deviate 
in their preferences from the subjects that have been examined in prior academic 
studies. The thesis aims at filling this research gap by applying the knowledge 
base of decision theory to German charitable trusts using an original set of 
representative data which was generated as part of this study. 
 
Firstly, regarding the general investment risk preferences of trusts, the study 
finds risk aversion predominating in the domain of gains and observes loss 
aversion, both analogous to prior research on private individuals. The PT pattern 
of risk-seeking behaviour for losses can only partly be asserted. In contrast to PT, 
no evidence is found for the subjective overweighting of small probabilities. 
Secondly, the study identifies and discusses characteristics of trusts which are 
associated with risk preferences: Equity investments, expected external growth 
of assets, age of the investment decision makers, type of donor and involvement 
of the donor in investment decisions. 
 
As a contribution to decision theory, the author proposes a utility function 
representing the preferences of trusts based on decision theoretical 
backgrounds. As a contribution to practical investment implications, the author 
proposes to redefine the question of “safe investments” and to focus on 
distributable yields generated by a higher equity portion in trust portfolios. 
  iii 
Dedication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Anja 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iv 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
The author wants to thank Prof. Anthony Berry for the supervision of this thesis 
and Prof. Neil Kay for his support during the mentoring stage. 
 
The researcher is indebted to the participants of the survey and the interviews. 
This empirical study would not have been possible without their kind participation. 
 
The author also wants to thank the many people who have supported this thesis 
by their comments and information, in particular Dr. Rupert Graf Strachwitz who 
provided the representative sample for the survey from the data base of 
Maecenata Institute, Humboldt University, Berlin. The researcher also received 
very helpful comments and information from the association of German trusts, 
Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen, Berlin, in particular from Dr. Hermann 
Falk. For the discussion and his comments regarding decision theory, the 
researcher wishes to thank Prof. Marc Oliver Rieger from University of Trier.  
 
Furthermore, the author wants to thank 
Peter Anders 
Dr. Antje Bischoff 
Denis Friess 
Dr. Stefan Junglen 
Dr. Marlene Kotzur 
Dr. Robert Münschener 
Prof. Berit Sandberg 
Christian Schreier 
 
 
The author wants to express his particular gratitude to his wife Anja and his little 
daughter Katharina who have patiently tolerated his frequent absences from 
family life due to the work on this thesis. 
  v 
 
ACADEMIC REGISTRY 
Research Thesis Submission Document 
 
Name: LENDORF, Frank 
School/PGI: Edinburgh Business School 
Version:  (i.e. First, 
Resubmission, Final) 
Final Degree Sought 
(Award and 
Subject area) 
Doctor of Business 
Administration 
Subject area: Finance 
 
 
Declaration  
 
In accordance with the appropriate regulations I hereby submit my thesis and I declare that: 
 
1) the thesis embodies the results of my own work and has been composed by myself 
2) where appropriate, I have made acknowledgement of the work of others and have made 
reference to work carried out in collaboration with other persons 
3) the thesis is the correct version of the thesis for submission and is the same version as any 
electronic versions submitted*.   
4) my thesis for the award referred to, deposited in the Heriot-Watt University Library, should 
be made available for loan or photocopying and be available via the Institutional 
Repository, subject to such conditions as the Librarian may require 
5) I understand that as a student of the University I am required to abide by the Regulations of 
the University and to conform to its discipline. 
* Please note that it is the responsibility of the candidate to ensure that the correct version of 
the thesis is submitted.  
 
Signature of 
Candidate: 
 
Date: 06/05/2013 
 
 
Submission  
 
Submitted By (name in capitals): LENDORF, FRANK 
 
Signature of Individual Submitting: 
 
Date Submitted: 
 
06/05/2013 
 
For Completion in the Student Service Centre (SSC) 
 
Received in the SSC by (name in 
capitals): 
 
Method of Submission  
(Handed in to SSC; posted through 
internal/external mail): 
 
 
E-thesis Submitted (mandatory for 
final theses) 
 
Signature: 
 
 Date:  
  vi 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................... ii 
Dedication .......................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................ iv 
Research Thesis Submission Document ............................................................ v 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................... vi 
List of Tables...................................................................................................... xi 
List of Figures ................................................................................................... xii 
Glossary of Key Terms .................................................................................... xiv 
List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................ xvii 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 1 
2 German Charitable Trusts and the Legal Investment Framework ................. 3 
2.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF GERMAN CHARITABLE TRUSTS AND THEIR MEANING FOR THE 
INVESTMENT STRATEGY ...................................................................................................... 4 
2.1.1 The Legal Structure of Trusts in Germany .............................................................. 5 
2.1.2 Types of Trusts in Germany .................................................................................... 6 
2.1.3 Organisational Structures within Trusts .................................................................. 8 
2.1.4 Trends in Number and Assets under Management .............................................. 10 
2.1.5 The Importance of Returns from Capital and Typical Investment Strategies........ 12 
2.2 THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE (BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH, BGB) AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON 
INVESTMENTS BY CHARITABLE TRUSTS ............................................................................... 14 
2.2.1 The Statutes of the Charitable Trust as the Basis for all Activities ....................... 14 
2.2.2 The Claim for Durable and Sustainable Fulfilment of the Purpose ....................... 15 
2.2.3 Personal Liability of Board Members..................................................................... 18 
2.3 THE FEDERAL STATES´ LAWS (LANDESSTIFTUNGSGESETZE, LSTIFTG) AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS ON INVESTMENTS BY CHARITABLE TRUSTS ................................................... 20 
2.3.1 The Connected Questions of Capital Preservation and Time Horizon ................. 20 
2.3.2 The Need for Yield and Distributable Returns Without Speculation ..................... 26 
2.3.3 The Role and Potential Influence of the Supervisory Authority ............................. 27 
2.4 THE GERMAN FISCAL CODE (ABGABENORDNUNG, AO) AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON INVESTMENTS 
BY CHARITABLE TRUSTS ................................................................................................... 29 
2.4.1 The Building of Reserves and the Tax-Exempt Status ......................................... 29 
2.4.2 Losses on Investments and the Tax-Exempt Status ............................................. 31 
2.4.3 Commercial Asset Management in a Trust and the Tax-Exempt Status .............. 33 
  vii 
2.5 PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR OF GERMAN CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS ........................................................................................................................... 33 
2.6 INVESTMENTS OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT .......... 37 
2.7 SYNTHESIS / CONCLUSIONS OF CHAPTER 2 ....................................................................... 39 
2.7.1 The Definition of a Reference Point and Loss Aversion ....................................... 41 
2.7.2 Investment Risk Preferences in the Domain of Gains........................................... 42 
2.7.3 Investment Risk Preferences in the Domain of Losses......................................... 43 
2.7.4 Individual Characteristics to be examined ............................................................. 44 
3 The Power of Decision Theory as a Normative and Descriptive Tool for 
Investment Decision Making ............................................................................. 47 
3.1 THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEM OF MEASURING THE PERCEIVED UTILITY OF 
INVESTMENT RETURNS ..................................................................................................... 47 
3.2 OVERVIEW OF IMPORTANT THEORETICAL CONCEPTS IN DECISION THEORY ......................... 48 
3.2.1 Expected Utility Theory (EUT) as the Standard Normative Approach .................. 48 
3.2.2 Inclusion of Behavioural Phenomena in Decision Theory ..................................... 50 
3.2.3 Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) as the Most Influential Descriptive Theory ... 52 
3.2.4 The Fourfold Pattern (4FP) of Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion ..................... 56 
3.3 GROUP DECISION MAKING ................................................................................................ 58 
3.3.1 Social Choice Theory as a Normative Attempt to Capture Group Behaviour ....... 59 
3.3.2 Empirical Findings on Group Decisions ................................................................ 60 
3.3.3. Implications of Group Decision Making as a Limitation to the Study .................... 61 
3.4 SYNTHESIS / CONCLUSIONS OF CHAPTER 3 ....................................................................... 61 
4  Synthesis of the Literature Review: Applying Decision Theory to the 
Investment Behaviour of German Charitable Trusts ......................................... 63 
4.1 TESTING THE RISK PREFERENCES OF GERMAN CHARITABLE TRUSTS FOR THE FOURFOLD 
PATTERN (4FP) OF PROSPECT THEORY AND LOSS AVERSION ............................................ 63 
4.2 TESTING FOR THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN RISK PREFERENCES OF TRUSTS AND THEIR 
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS .......................................................................................... 65 
4.3 CAPTURING THE POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY .................................................... 69 
4.3.1 Potential Differences between Group and Individual Decisions ........................... 69 
4.3.2 Potential Non-Comparability of Trusts in the Sample ........................................... 69 
4.4  RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES .......................................... 70 
5  Pilot Study Report ...................................................................................... 72 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 72 
5.2 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION ........................................................................................ 73 
5.3 CONSTRUCTION OF A QUESTIONNAIRE ............................................................................... 74 
5.3.1 Elicitation of investment preferences .................................................................... 74 
5.3.2 Questions on Trusts´ Characteristics .................................................................... 75 
5.3.3 Categorisation of Questions .................................................................................. 75 
5.4 RESULTS OF THE PILOT STUDY ......................................................................................... 76 
5.4.1 Technical Comparison of Online vs. Mail Survey .................................................. 76 
5.4.2 Analysis of Data and Consequences for the Main Study ...................................... 80 
5.5 PILOT STUDY SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................... 82 
5.6 AMENDMENTS AFTER THE PILOT STUDY FOR FINE-TUNING ................................................. 83 
5.7 SYNTHESIS OF LITERATURE REVIEW AND PILOT STUDY RESULTS ....................................... 84 
  viii 
6 Main Study Methodology ............................................................................ 86 
6.1 OVERVIEW OF THE MIXED METHODS RESEARCH DESIGN ................................................... 86 
6.2 THE METHODS OF MEASURING RISK PREFERENCES IN DECISION THEORY .......................... 89 
6.2.1 General Categorisation of Methods to Measure Risk Attitudes ............................ 89 
6.2.2 Discussion of Methods used by other Researchers in Decision Theory ............... 91 
6.2.3 Conclusions with Regard to the Research Questions of this Study ...................... 93 
6.3 QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION ..................................................................................... 95 
6.3.1 Questionnaire ........................................................................................................ 96 
6.3.2 Type and Selection of Subjects to Participate ....................................................... 99 
6.3.3 Size of the Sample and Participation Rate ............................................................ 99 
6.3.4 Procedure of the Online Survey .......................................................................... 100 
6.4 QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS ....................................................................................... 101 
6.4.1 Analysis of Overall Risk Preferences .................................................................. 101 
6.4.2 Analysis of Associations of Characteristics with Preferences ............................. 101 
6.5 CONNECTING QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE PHASES ................................................... 102 
6.5.1 Selecting Interview Participants based on the Quantitative Survey .................... 102 
6.5.2 Developing Interview Questions based on the Quantitative Survey ................... 102 
6.6 QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION ..................................................................................... 103 
6.6.1 Questions ............................................................................................................ 103 
6.6.2 Type and Selection of Subjects to Participate ..................................................... 104 
6.6.3 Size of the Sample and Participation Rate .......................................................... 104 
6.6.4 Procedure of the Telephone Interviews .............................................................. 104 
6.6.5 Ethical Issues in Interviews ................................................................................. 105 
6.7 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS ......................................................................................... 105 
6.7.1 Implications of the Transcription Method for Analysis ......................................... 106 
6.7.2 Categorisation of Data ......................................................................................... 106 
6.7.3 Interpretation of Data ........................................................................................... 107 
6.8 INTEGRATION OF THE QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE RESULTS ...................................... 107 
7 Results and Analysis of the Survey Data .................................................. 108 
7.1 OVERALL RISK PREFERENCES ........................................................................................ 108 
7.1.1 Results ................................................................................................................. 108 
7.1.2. Risk Preferences for Gains with High Probabilities ............................................. 109 
7.1.3 Risk Preferences for High Gains with Low Probabilities ..................................... 110 
7.1.4 Risk Preferences for Losses with High Probabilities ........................................... 111 
7.1.5 Risk Preferences for Large Losses with Low Probabilities ................................. 112 
7.1.6 Risk Preferences for Mixed Outcomes / Loss Aversion ...................................... 113 
7.1.7 Comparison of the Choices for Gains vs. Losses at High Probabilities .............. 116 
7.1.8 Comparison of the Choices for Gains vs. Losses at Low Probabilities ............... 117 
7.1.9 Comparison of the Choices for the Mixed Questions .......................................... 119 
7.2 TESTS OF ASSOCIATIONS WITH TRUST CHARACTERISTICS ................................................ 120 
7.2.1 Results ................................................................................................................. 120 
7.2.2 Investments in Equities ....................................................................................... 124 
7.2.3 Expected Asset Growth from External Sources .................................................. 124 
  ix 
7.2.4 Person of Donor (Natural vs. Legal Persons) ..................................................... 125 
7.2.5 Position of the Interviewee in the Trust ............................................................... 126 
7.2.6 Age of Decision Makers in the Trusts.................................................................. 127 
7.2.7 Donors´ Influence ................................................................................................ 128 
7.2.8 Sources of Funding ............................................................................................. 129 
7.2.9 Size ...................................................................................................................... 130 
7.2.10 Inter-Correlations between Trust Characteristics ................................................ 130 
7.3 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS FROM THE ONLINE SURVEY ................................................ 132 
7.3.1 Findings with regard to the 4FP of PT and to EUT ............................................. 132 
7.3.2 Findings with regard to the Association of Characteristics to Risk Preferences . 133 
8 Qualitative Assessment of Survey Results by Interviews .......................... 134 
8.1 OVERALL RISK PREFERENCES ........................................................................................ 136 
8.1.1 Risk Preferences for Gains with High Probabilities ............................................. 139 
8.1.2 Risk Preferences for High Gains with Low Probabilities ..................................... 140 
8.1.3 Risk Preferences for Losses with High Probabilities ........................................... 141 
8.1.4 Risk Preferences for Large Losses with Low Probabilities ................................. 143 
8.1.5 Risk Preferences for Mixed Outcomes / Loss Aversion ...................................... 144 
8.2 ASSOCIATIONS WITH TRUST CHARACTERISTICS ............................................................... 146 
8.2.1 Rationales for the Associations found in the Quantitative Part ........................... 148 
8.2.2 Rationales for Non-Association of Characteristics .............................................. 149 
9 Integration of Results and Conclusions ..................................................... 151 
9.1 ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS ....................................................................... 151 
9.2 CONCLUSIONS WITH REGARD TO THE APPLICABILITY OF PT AND EUT TO THE PREFERENCES OF 
GERMAN CHARITABLE TRUSTS ........................................................................................ 153 
9.2.1 Conclusions with Regard to PT, the 4FP and Loss Aversion ............................. 153 
9.2.2 Conclusions with Regard to EUT ........................................................................ 155 
9.2.3 Adapting the Existing Theories to Trust Preferences .......................................... 156 
9.3 CONCLUSIONS WITH REGARD TO THE SUITABILITY OF INVESTMENT PRODUCTS ................. 158 
9.3.1 Investment Preferences and Evidence of the Past ............................................. 159 
9.3.2 Investment Preferences, Risk Management and Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) ... 
  ............................................................................................................................. 162 
9.3.3 Asymmetric Risk-/Return- Profiles ...................................................................... 164 
9.3.4 Investment Preferences and Institutional Risk .................................................... 165 
9.3.5 The Importance of Trust Specific Characteristics and Agency Theory ............... 166 
9.3.6 Consequences for Future Investment Practice ................................................... 168 
9.3.7 Summary of Contributions and Limitations of the Study ..................................... 170 
9.3.8 Ideas for Future Research ................................................................................... 173 
References...................................................................................................... 175 
 
 
  x 
APPENDIX ...................................................................................................... 194 
APPENDIX A: COVER LETTER (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) .............................................................. 194 
APPENDIX B: PS QUESTIONNAIRE (MAIL VERSION, ENGLISH TRANSL.) ........................................ 195 
APPENDIX C: INTERNET SURVEY QUESTIONS (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) ....................................... 197 
APPENDIX D: EXAMPLE OF A CHI SQUARE TEST FOR ASSOCIATION .............................................. 209 
APPENDIX E: EXAMPLE OF A T-TEST FOR DIFFERENCE OF MEANS................................................ 210 
APPENDIX F: SEMI-STRUCTURED TELEPHONE INTERVIEW STANDARDISED TEXT AND PROTOCOL 
SHEET (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) ...................................................................................... 211 
APPENDIX G: CHARACTERISTICS OF TELEPHONE INTERVIEW PARTNERS VS. SAMPLE OF THE 
QUANTITATIVE PART ....................................................................................................... 217 
APPENDIX H: RISK PREFERENCES OF TELEPHONE INTERVIEW PARTNERS VS. SAMPLE OF THE 
QUANTITATIVE PART (Q. 1A-5B) ...................................................................................... 218 
APPENDIX I: RISK PREFERENCES OF TELEPHONE INTERVIEW PARTNERS VS. SAMPLE OF THE QUANT. 
PART (QUESTION 5C) ..................................................................................................... 219 
APPENDIX J: CALCULATION OF CONFIDENCE LEVELS FOR RISK PREFERENCE QUESTIONS 1A) – 5B)
 220 
APPENDIX K: CALCULATION OF CONFIDENCE LEVELS FOR SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF MIRROR QUESTIONS .............................................................................. 221 
APPENDIX L: CALCULATION OF CONFIDENCE LEVELS FOR SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF NEIGHBOUR QUESTIONS ........................................................................ 222 
APPENDIX M: CALCULATION OF CERTAINTY EQUIVALENTS AND DECISION WEIGHTS USING THE 
PARAMETERS OF TVERSKY AND KAHNEMAN (1992) .......................................................... 223 
APPENDIX N: CALCULATION OF THE IMPLIED LOSS AVERSION PARAMETER USING THE PARAMETERS OF 
TVERSKY AND KAHNEMAN (1992) ................................................................................... 224 
APPENDIX O: DEFINITION OF CLUSTERS FOR THE TRUST CHARACTERISTICS AND NUMBER OF TRUSTS 
PER CLUSTER ................................................................................................................. 225 
APPENDIX P: INTER-CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TRUST CHARACTERISTICS .................................. 227 
  
 
xi 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Technical results of the pilot study online survey ................................ 77 
Table 2: Technical results of the pilot study mail survey ................................... 78 
Table 3: Comparison of online vs. mail survey in the pilot study ....................... 80 
Table 4: Answers to the risk preference questions ......................................... 108 
Table 5: Association of trust characteristics with risk preferences .................. 122 
Table 6: t-tests for differences in the means for loss aversion question 5c), ... 123 
Table 7: Validation of quantitative results, portion of subjects´statements 
categorised by structured assessment ............................................................ 135 
Table 8: Categorisation of key terms and issues, number of mentions with regard 
to gains / losses / mixed outcomes ................................................................. 138 
Table 9: Categorisation of key terms and issues, number of mentions with regard 
to trust characteristics ..................................................................................... 147 
Table 10: Average composition of trust portfolios by asset classes ................ 159 
 
  
 
xii 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Example for organisation of a trust, similar to von Holt/Koch (2004) ... 9 
Figure 2: Curves for preference types under EUT ............................................ 50 
Figure 3: A typical value function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) ................... 53 
Figure 4: Estimates of the probability weighting functions in the domains of gains 
and losses separately (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) .................................... 55 
Figure 5: Overview of research design, analogous to Ivankova et al. (2006) .... 88 
Figure 6: Portion of risky choices for the respective questions ....................... 109 
Figure 7: Distribution of stated answers to question 5c); n=76 ....................... 114 
Figure 8: Safe and risky choice for questions 1a) and 3a) .............................. 116 
Figure 9: Safe and risky choice for questions 1b) and 3b) .............................. 117 
Figure 10: Safe and risky choice for questions 2a) and 4a) ............................ 118 
Figure 11: Safe and risky choice for questions 2b) and 4b) ............................ 119 
Figure 12: Safe and risky choice for questions 5a) and 5b) ............................ 120 
Figure 13: Portion of trusts opting for the risky choice sorted by the criterion of 
owning equity positions in their portfolios ........................................................ 124 
Figure 14: Portion of trusts opting for the risky choice sorted by the criterion of 
expected asset growth from external sources ................................................. 125 
Figure 15: Portion of trusts opting for the risky choice sorted by the criterion of the 
nature of donors .............................................................................................. 125 
Figure 16: Stated minimum returns for X=? with p=0.5, if (1-p) means -3% return, 
sorted by the nature of donors ........................................................................ 126 
Figure 17: Portion of trusts opting for the risky choice sorted by the criterion of the 
position of the interviewee in the trust ............................................................. 127 
Figure 18: Portion of trusts opting for the risky choice sorted by the criterion of the 
age of decision makers ................................................................................... 127 
Figure 19: Stated minimum returns for X=? with p=0.5, if (1-p) means -3% return, 
sorted by the characteristic of age of decision makers ................................... 128 
Figure 20: Position of trusts opting for the risky choice sorted by the criterion of 
donors´ influence on investment decisions ..................................................... 129 
Figure 21: Portion of trusts opting for the risky choice sorted by the criterion of the 
sources of funding ........................................................................................... 129 
  
 
xiii 
Figure 22: Stated minimum returns for X=? with p=0.5, if (1-p) means -3% return, 
sorted by the characteristic of size .................................................................. 130 
Figure 23: Potential shape of a “typical” utility curve for German charitable trusts
 ........................................................................................................................ 156 
Figure 24: Nominal and real bond yields and inflation for German 10-year 
government bonds .......................................................................................... 160 
Figure 25: Bond yields vs. dividend yields 09/1997 – 09/2012 ....................... 162 
Figure 26: Probability density of returns following a Gaussian distribution 
(Wikipedia, 2012) ............................................................................................ 163 
  
 
xiv 
Glossary of Key Terms 
 
Abgabenordnung (AO) 
German Fiscal Code 
 
Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen (BDS) 
Federal Association of German Charitable Trusts 
 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) 
The German Civil Code explicitly deals with trusts in its articles §§ 80 – 88 and 
sets the basic definitions and rules for trusts. Other regulations of the BGB can be 
relevant for trusts as well. 
 
Certainty Equivalence Method (CEM) 
Method for the elicitation of utility curves (Farquhar, 1984) 
 
Decision Theory  
Superordinate term, including all concepts, normative as well as descriptive ones 
(see below), that deal with human decision making (Peterson, 2009) 
 
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) 
Predominant normative decision theory which prescribes behaviour based on 
axioms of economic rationality but fails to explain various phenomena in actually 
observed behaviour (von Neumann/Morgenstern, 1947) 
 
Fourfold Pattern (4FP) 
In Prospect Theory, typically observed pattern of preferences: 1) risk aversion 
with high probability gains, 2) risk-seeking for low probability high gains, 3) 
risk-seeking for high probability losses, 4) risk aversion for low probability high 
losses (Kahneman/Tversky, 1979) 
 
 
 
  
 
xv 
Landesstiftungsgesetz (LStiftG)  
The 16 German Federal States each have laws that set the framework for trusts. 
They add to the general regulations of the BGB and are per definition 
subordinated to the BGB. 
 
Loss Aversion 
Observed phenomenon that losses loom larger than gains of the same absolute 
magnitude (Kahneman/Tversky, 1979) 
 
Lottery 
Common method to elicit the utility of outcomes, where the subject has to state 
preferences for sets of potential outcomes with different probabilities (Farquhar, 
1984) 
 
Lottery Equivalence Method (LEM) 
Method for the elicitation of utility curves (McCord/De Neufville,1986) 
 
Probability Equivalence Method (PEM) 
Method for the elicitation of utility curves (Farquhar, 1984) 
 
Prospect 
List of consequences with associated probabilities (Starmer, 2000) 
 
Prospect Theory (PT) / Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) 
Predominant descriptive decision theory which describes typical human 
behaviour, dividing between utility in the domain of gains and losses and 
accounting for subjective (instead of objective, as in EUT) decision weights 
(Kahneman/Tversky, 1979; Tversky/Kahneman, 1992) 
 
Rank Dependent Expected Utility Theory (RDEUT) 
Utility theory taking into account ranks in decision weights (Quiggin, 1982; 
Schmeidler, 1989) 
 
 
  
 
xvi 
Tradeoff Method (TOM) 
Method for the elicitation of utility curves (Wakker/Deneffe,1996) 
 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (VNM) 
Authors who made essential contributions to Expected Utilities Theory (von 
Neumann/ Morgenstern, 1947) 
 
  
 
xvii 
List of Abbreviations 
 
4FP  Fourfold Pattern 
 
AO  Abgabenordnung [German Fiscal Code] 
 
BDS Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen [Federal Association of 
German Charitable Trusts] 
 
BFH Bundesfinanzhof [German Supreme Tax Court] 
 
BGB  Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [German Civil Code] 
 
CEM  Certainty Equivalence Method 
 
CPT  Cumulative Prospect Theory 
 
CSI  Centre for Social Investment, University of Heidelberg 
 
EUT  Expected Utility Theory 
 
K.O.  Knock-out (with respect to questions discarding subjects from the  
  study) 
 
LStiftG Landesstiftungsgesetz [German Federal State´s Trust Law] 
 
LEM  Lottery Equivalence Method 
 
PEM  Probability Equivalence Method 
 
PT  Prospect Theory 
 
RDEUT Rank Dependent Expected Utility Theory 
 
TOM  Tradeoff Method 
 
VNM  von Neumann and Morgenstern 
 
  
 
1 
1 Introduction 
 
Previous research in the field of decision theory has developed mathematical 
techniques to quantify and to describe the risk preferences of individuals and 
groups of people. Decision theory is applicable to investigate preferences in a 
broad variety of decisions in human life which have to be made under risk, i.e. 
with given probabilities for the potential outcomes, or under uncertainty, i.e. 
without a complete set of these parameters. Decisions may include essential 
questions concerning health like “Does a person accept a medical treatment 
which can cure her disease at a probability of 50% but will lead to immediate 
death otherwise?” as well as questions concerning potential investment 
outcomes like “Does a person prefer a safe annual yield of 3% over a 50/50 
chance on 8% or nothing?”.  
 
This research programme deals with the latter kind of questions and investigates 
the subjective utility of potential monetary outcomes. It applies the existing 
knowledge base regarding the quantification and description of risk preferences 
to German charitable trusts, which have not yet been subjects of this kind of 
investigation, in order to address this research gap.  
 
Firstly, the study aims at general findings regarding the investment risk 
preferences of decision makers acting on behalf of German charitable trusts 
which are restricted in their decisions by a given legal framework. This particular 
framework is the reason why the study focuses on Germany exclusively. 
Secondly, the research wants to make a contribution with respect to testing for 
the association of certain trust characteristics with stated investment risk 
preferences. 
 
The researcher works under a predominantly positivist paradigm using a mixed 
methods sequential explanatory approach. The quantitative first part of the study 
is realised by an internet survey that embeds as a core component the 
well-established method of lottery questions to elicit risk preferences. In prior 
studies on private individuals, a fourfold pattern (hereafter: 4FP) of risk attitudes 
  
 
2 
and loss aversion has been found. The study investigates whether this pattern 
can also be observed for the investor group of German charitable trusts and what 
trust specific circumstances cause behaviour that deviates from the group´s. 
The programme contains in its subsequent part a qualitative assessment of the 
results of the quantitative part which are generated by semi-structured interviews. 
The conclusions of the study are twofold: As a contribution to decision theory, the 
author proposes a utility function representing the preferences of trusts based on 
decision theoretical backgrounds. As a contribution to practical investment 
implications and with particular regard to the current capital market environment, 
the author proposes to redefine the question of “safe investments” and to focus 
on distributable yields generated by a higher equity portion in trust portfolios.  
 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the main characteristics of German charitable 
trusts and puts them into context with the investment strategy. The legal 
framework is analysed for its direct and indirect limitations to the investment 
policy and resulting implications on risk preferences of the decision makers 
acting on behalf of the trusts. Chapter 3 describes and discusses the tools of 
decision theory, with a strong focus on the descriptive works of Prospect Theory 
(PT) / Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) and particularly its 4FP, for their 
potential as a theoretical backbone of the study to describe the risk preferences 
of trusts. A synthesis of the preceding two chapters is given in chapter 4, leading 
to conjectures for investigation which are then formulated as initial research 
questions, aims, objectives and hypotheses. The subsequent chapter 5 deals 
with the pilot study that was conducted as a survey with trusts in order to test the 
methodology and to confirm the author´s interpretation of the theoretical 
background. Chapter 6 discusses and defines the mixed methods sequential 
explanatory approach to be chosen for the main study. Chapter 7 provides the 
quantitative results of the survey and the analysis of the collected data. The 
qualitative assessment and triangulation of results by telephone interviews with 
trusts follows in chapter 8. Chapter 9 closes the thesis with the integration of 
quantitative and qualitative results, making conclusions by providing a utility 
curve for trusts and discussing the implications on investment practice. 
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2 German Charitable Trusts and the Legal Investment 
Framework 
 
Despite the theoretically eternal life-time of German charitable trusts, which might 
point to a high risk bearing capability, its decision makers are constrained in their 
investment decisions and at least partly short-term oriented. They must abide by 
the legal framework, justify their decisions in front of authorities and have to 
consider cash flow needs to finance their activities.  
 
This study focuses solely on charitable trusts in Germany. The legislation with 
regard to German trusts is specific and is assumed to be influential on investment 
preferences. It differs substantially for example from the USA, where an annual 
distribution of 5% on the trust capital is mandatory and may direct decision 
makers to a more growth oriented investment policy.1 In the UK, the guidance by 
the authorities towards riskier investments is much more pronounced than in 
Germany and will be discussed in section 2.6. 
 
In Germany, the basic legal framework is set by the German Civil Code 
(Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) in its §§ 80 - 88, the law of the respective 
federal state (Landesstiftungsgesetz, LStiftG) in which the charitable trust is 
domiciled and the German Fiscal Code (Abgabenordnung, AO) in its §§ 51 - 68. 
All the articles have in common that they contain only guidelines, some 
limitations, but no concrete specification of how to invest the trust´s capital. 
Dedicated federal state-run bodies, the supervisory authorities 
(Stiftungsaufsicht), approve and supervise the trusts that are a legal entity 
concerning their abidance by the BGB and LStiftG, whereas the fiscal authorities 
are able to award a tax-exempt status on the basis of acknowledging charitable 
status according to the AO. 
 
The trusts´ capital (“Kapitalstock” or “Grundstockvermögen”) is central to this 
research study. It is defined as the capital that is constituent of the trust according 
                                                          
1
 Tax Reform Act, 1969 
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to § 81 (1) BGB (“Vermögen”, wealth) for the durable and sustainable fulfilment of 
the purpose. It includes all additions that can potentially be made after the 
foundation of the trust (“Zustiftungen”) and the building of dedicated capital 
reserves. Returns from the trust´s capital, donations that are not dedicated to the 
trust´s capital and other income that is to be used directly in the sense of the 
purpose of the trust as an expense, are explicitly not included to the definition of a 
trust´s capital. 
 
The literature on German charitable trusts and their investments is dominated by 
interpretations of the legal framework. Additionally, descriptive empirical studies 
mainly analysing the diversity of the landscape of trusts have been conducted. 
Some authors put emphasis on the demand for an enduring and sustainable 
optimal realisation of the purpose of the trust, while others concentrate on the 
restrictions for investments. The challenge for the trusts, after all, is to fulfil their 
purpose in compliance with the legal framework which may in particular require to 
reach certain yields for distribution and to avoid losses on their capital base. 
 
2.1 Characteristics of German Charitable Trusts and their Meaning for 
the Investment Strategy 
 
German charitable trusts are institutions which are founded to pursue certain 
individually defined purposes. An essential characteristic of a charitable trust are 
its initial assets (the trust´s capital as defined above) which usually serve as the 
basis to generate income. Typically, trusts distribute these returns from capital to 
a large extent as well as other funds that can be raised in order to fulfil the 
purpose of the trust. 
 
A trust, under the German Civil Code (BGB) §§80 - 88, can be founded by any 
person that is willing and able to capitalise it. Even though the laws do not 
prescribe a certain minimum amount, it can be argued that a lack of sufficient 
capital must automatically question the sustainability of the trust. Schwalme 
(2010) proposes a minimum of € 50k. The authorities of the federal states which 
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are responsible for the approval of trusts may accept also a lower initial capital 
(e.g. € 25k in Rhineland-Palatinate). The only main other restriction is that the 
purpose of the trust must not endanger common welfare. If the trust aims at 
following goals listed in a catalogue of the German Fiscal Code (AO), it will qualify 
to be regarded as charitable and enjoy the benefits of the tax-exempt status. The 
relevant catalogue of §§ 52-54 AO comprises purposes like the promotion of 
science and research, religion, healthcare, welfare, art and culture, education, 
protection of the environment or sports. These charitable trusts are the ones to be 
examined in this study.  
 
2.1.1 The Legal Structure of Trusts in Germany   
 
The term “Stiftung” (translated as “trust”) in the German language refers to a 
variety of sometimes similar, but often different organisations. For the study, it is 
important to distinguish between the various kinds of trusts and to define criteria 
for inclusion in the study.  
 
The first general distinction between trusts can be made according to their legal 
capacity. A trust with legal capacity is a self-contained estate with its own legal 
personality. A trust without legal capacity, called fiduciary trust, comes into 
existence by donation of assets to a natural or legal person with the requirement 
to use them for the purpose named by the donor. Trusts without legal capacity 
are not subject to the regulation of the LStiftG and to the approval and control 
procedure of the supervisory authority. 
 
The study will concentrate on trusts with legal capacity only. 
 
The second distinguishing criterion is the question whether a trust was founded 
under private (BGB) or public (Öffentliches Recht, ÖR) law. The main differences 
between the two concern the establishment of the trust and the purpose. A trust 
under private law is based on articles §§ 80-88 BGB, whereas a trust under public 
law is usually established by a dedicated foundation law and takes 
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responsibilities of public administration.  
 
The study will concentrate on the trusts founded under regulation of BGB only. 
 
The third distinguishing mark that can be made concerns the charitable status 
according to the Fiscal Code (AO) in its articles §§ 52-54. Organisations that are 
named “trusts” but are used as a vehicle to follow private welfare purposes only 
will be excluded from the study as these trusts may rather represent the 
investment behaviour of private persons.  
 
For the study, only those trusts acknowledged as charitable by the fiscal 
authorities according to the Fiscal Code will be included. 
 
2.1.2 Types of Trusts in Germany   
 
The literature distinguishes between various basic types of trusts, the compilation 
below partly follows the classification of Von Holt/Koch (2004): 
 
a) “Financial Aid”: Simple trusts for the promotion of a purpose (Einfache 
Förderstiftung), without any operational activity, restrict themselves to investing 
the trust´s capital and allocate the returns in accordance with the purpose. 
b) “Operational”: Trusts with an operational activity (Operativ tätige Stiftung) fulfil 
the purpose of the trust not only by allocating to others but also by proprietary 
operational activities. These activities can either be of idealistic nature without 
aiming at material income for a service or they represent a business which 
includes income like from providing a home and education for disabled people. 
c) “Financial Aid and Operational”: Mixed trusts that contain the elements of both 
a) and b) 
 
It can be expected that the “Financial Aid” trusts rely to a higher degree on 
income from capital because they lack income from operational activities and 
may therefore exhibit investment risk preferences different from those trusts of 
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the other two categories. 
 
With regard to the donors and the surrounding of the trusts, the literature names: 
 
a) Trusts founded by natural persons 
b) Civic Trusts (Bürgerstiftung), which are in many cases characterised by a high 
number of co-donors for purposes that concern common interest like the 
maintenance of local institutions like libraries, which are no longer financed by the 
state. 
c) Ecclesiastical trusts (Kirchenstiftung) can serve the criteria of having legal 
capacity, being established under private law and considered charitable under 
the Fiscal Code. These trusts need additional approval of the respective 
ecclesiastical authorities. Under these restrictions, they can be included in this 
study. 
d) Municipal trusts (Kommunalstiftung), which are usually administered by the 
bodies of the regional authorities. 
e) Trusts with ownership of companies (Unternehmensstiftung) may generate 
income from activities that possibly do not directly serve the original purpose of 
the trust, but use the generated income for donations to the trust. 
f) Other forms of trusts exist, which do not match exactly to the descriptions 
above, e.g. where the founder is a registered association 
 
The donor could be of relevance for investment preferences insofar as personal 
involvement and public attention are concerned. 
 
Some special types of trusts are listed below: 
 
a) Family trusts (Familienstiftung) serve the purpose of supporting family 
members. They only have the chance to receive the fiscal status of a charitable 
trust if they use a maximum of 1/3 for the family and the rest for activities 
considered charitable. 
b) Trusts with a predefined life time (Verbrauchsstiftung), where the consumption 
of capital is intended, will be excluded from this study as their time horizon is 
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limited. In many cases, they are founded just for one dedicated purpose like the 
renovation of a church building.  
c) As a substitute for a trust under the regulations of BGB, trusts with a deviating 
legal form can be founded. These organisations may call themselves trusts as 
well, but are not subject to the full regulatory impact. They will be excluded from 
this study. 
 
Conjectures for investigation: 
Trust specific: There is an association between the type of trust (with respect to 
its activities) and investment risk preferences. 
Trust specific: There is an association between the type of donor and investment 
risk preferences. 
 
2.1.3 Organisational Structures within Trusts 
 
Regarding the internal organisation of a trust, the law, §86 BGB in combination 
with §26 BGB, requires only a management board (Vorstand) which may consist 
of only one person. The management board represents the trust in all matters. 
Depending on the size of the trust and the individual needs, the organisation of 
the trust can expand far beyond these minimum requirements and establish more 
bodies. 
 
Von Holt/Koch (2004) describe a variety of possibilities in structuring the 
organisation of a trust. A rather complex example illustrated in figure 1 includes a 
number of bodies starting with the Congregation of Donors (Stifterversammlung), 
consisting of all the donors, which advises and possibly sends delegates to the 
Board of Directors (Kuratorium, Stiftungsrat). The Board of Directors may 
preferably take duties in all strategic matters of the trust and receive, if needed, 
additional advice concerning specific topics from experts in Advisory Councils 
(Ausschuss, Beirat). The Board of Directors can appoint, advise and control the 
Management Board (Vorstand) which is supposed to take care of all operational 
issues. The Management Board may hire a manager and other employees to do 
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the day-to-day business in the trust. All the afore mentioned participating persons 
may take their responsibilities on a honorary or on a professional basis.  
 
The segregation of duties and power is also an expression of good trust 
governance and gains importance with the size of the trust (Pues/Scheerbarth, 
2008). The cooperation of the Management Board and the Board of Directors will 
in many cases be of superior importance for the functioning of organisation of the 
trust (Schuhen, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Example for organisation of a trust, similar to von Holt/Koch (2004) 
 
With increasing complexity of organisational structures, the task for the 
researcher to find appropriate addressees gets more demanding and the position 
of persons and responsibility in the trust must be assessed. With regard to the 
complexity of the organisation, it could be of importance for investment decisions, 
how many people are directly involved, their age and their gender 
(Eckel/Grossmann, 2008; Borghans et al., 2009; Palsson, 1996; Gächter, 2007). 
The donor can be in an accentuated position, virtually controlling all important 
decisions in the trust, even if other formally responsible bodies exist. Schwalme 
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(2010) points to the danger of potential principal-agent2 problems in trusts as 
board members might abuse their power in the trust to pursue their aims instead 
of following the will of the donor, a topic that may especially concern financial 
decisions. The study will therefore also address the question of donor 
involvement in investment decision making.  
 
Conjectures for investigation: 
Trust specific: There is an association between the involvement of the donor in 
investment decisions and investment risk preferences. 
Trust specific: There is an association between the number of investment 
decision makers and investment risk preferences. 
Trust specific: There is an association between the age of investment decision 
makers and investment risk preferences. 
Trust specific: There is an association between the gender of investment decision 
makers and investment risk preferences. 
 
2.1.4 Trends in Number and Assets under Management  
 
The number of charitable trusts in Germany has risen sharply within the last 
decade. Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen (BDS) counts about 19,000 trusts 
as of the end of 2011 (BDS, 2012) and approximately 900 new trusts per year in 
average for the last ten years, with the lowest figure being 774 in 2002 and the 
highest one 1,134 in 2007. This means that the number of trusts founded within 
the last ten years equals almost 50% of all trusts existing at the end of 2011. One 
reason for the increasing numbers can be found in the legal reforms of the years 
2000/2002 and 2007 which additionally encourage donors, for example by giving 
them higher tax incentives than before. Assets under management grow with 
asset price appreciation and the rising number of trusts. It can be estimated that 
the total volume of assets of all German charitable trusts as of end 2010 reaches 
about €100 bn. (BDS, 2011a). 
 
                                                          
2
 The classic principal-agent conflict between an owner and the top management of a company is described 
by Jensen/Meckling (1976). It refers to deviating personal goals of the two parties. 
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The size of the single trusts varies substantially. The largest ones are estimated 
to have assets with a net worth of several billion € (BDS, 2012), whereas a high 
number of small trusts does not even reach € 100,000. Sprengel/Ebermann 
(2007) point to huge difficulties in comparing the size of trusts for the reason of 
the non-existence of consistent standards of measurement which is an issue that 
has not been solved yet. Knowing that precise comparable data will not be 
available, the researcher nevertheless categorised trusts for their size measured 
by their capital base as this may be an important, maybe even the single most 
important factor that determines investment behaviour. Very large trusts on the 
one side of the scale, having a professional management, can be expected to 
rely on more expertise in financial matters than small ones with limited human 
resources and specific financial know-how on the other side of the scale. 
 
The rationale behind the decision to establish a trust can be varicoloured for the 
founder. Von Holt/Koch (2004) see philanthropy only as one possible reason. 
Others include personal motives like prestige, vanity, and even a kind of search 
for eternity. Becoming a founder can also be caused by a lack of inheritors and 
the existing tax incentives for donors. The list of potential triggers is long. Timmer 
(2005) gives an overview. This in combination with an ageing society gives 
reason to assume that the number of charitable trusts in Germany is set to rise 
further in coming years. 
 
The future will reveal what kind of trusts will really be able to survive for the 
intended long time period. It can be questioned (Benke, 2006) whether especially 
the trusts with a low capital base and those which depend heavily on the personal 
commitment and work of their founders, will be able to persist in a meaningful 
way following their original goals. Furthermore, the administrative costs can 
make up a high portion of the returns of the trust´s capital leaving less or even no 
room for the sustainable fulfilment of the purpose. 
 
Especially the high number of young trusts will have to prove that they can fulfil 
their mission in a sustainable way. They may encounter challenges, also in 
investing their capital, different from the ones that older trusts have. The study will 
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therefore also analyse whether the investment preferences of these trusts are 
different from the established ones. The study will also ask the trusts for the 
prospect of potential donations dedicated to the trusts´ capital within coming 
years and investigate the influence on risk attitudes. Trusts which expect further 
substantial donations may have a different financial planning and with it also 
different investment preferences. 
 
Conjectures for investigation: 
Trust specific: There is an association between the size of trusts and investment 
risk preferences. 
Trust specific: There is an association between the age of trusts and investment 
risk preferences. 
Trust specific: There is an association between prospective growth of the asset 
base and investment risk preferences. 
 
2.1.5 The Importance of Returns from Capital and Typical Investment 
Strategies 
 
In order to finance their projects, German charitable trusts need income. This 
income may stem from different sources, the most important ones usually are 
income from investment of the trust´s capital, donations, sponsoring, own 
activities and public sources (Sandberg, 2007). Asset management can be seen 
as one of the economically crucial points for the success of a trust. Byallas (2004) 
states that securing the assets of the trust must be seen as a superior goal even 
in comparison to the work on the purpose of the trust because it is the returns 
from assets (and other income if applicable) which make it possible at all to 
pursue the purpose of the trust. Carstensen (2005) argues that aiming at returns 
from investment activity must be seen as the centre point of the economic target 
system because higher yields increase the effectiveness of the trust. It can be 
objected that trusts may for example concentrate on fund raising instead and the 
relative importance of asset management for the effectiveness of a trust could be 
substantially reduced by fund raising activities. This  may have a significant effect 
on investment risk attitudes.  
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The literature usually discusses two main aims of investment management in 
trusts which are not always compatible: the preservation of capital and the need 
for yield leading to a sufficient distribution of returns to fulfil the purpose of the 
trust. The preservation of capital is widely described as a fundamental principle 
for the investment policy of trusts (e.g. Carstensen, 2005; Waiblinger, 2008). 
Anders (2009) states that loss aversion gains importance, which finds its 
expression in the demand for absolute return strategies. The exact meaning of 
“capital preservation” and its implications are nevertheless subject of discussion 
as will be analysed in the subsequent chapters of this text.  
 
Typical investment strategies of German charitable trusts can be derived from 
dedicated mutual funds for this target group (“Stiftungsfonds”) and the activities 
of Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft / Deutsches Stiftungszentrum 
(DSZ) as an asset manager. The three largest public mutual funds, of those 
which are dedicated investment vehicles for German charitable trusts, 
predominantly invest in €-denominated bonds and have limited their maximum 
equity exposure to 30% (Deka, DWS) and 35% (F&C HVB). Anders (2009) 
manages the capital of a few hundred trusts at DSZ with a strategic equity portion 
of 25% which can vary tactically. Their strategies aim at income from investment 
grade bonds and capital appreciation from the equity portion in the portfolio.  
 
The above comparison can be important as Benke/Maucher (2007) state that 
charitable trusts are also influenced in their decisions by comparing themselves 
with the investment behaviour of their peer group, i.e. other German charitable 
trusts. If this was the case, it could be expected that trusts show some conformity 
in their investment behaviour and therefore also exhibit similar risk preferences 
for investment outcomes. This could be expected for the portion of financial 
assets in the portfolio but does not necessarily take into consideration the overall 
asset allocation including immovable / intangible assets, shareholdings and other 
assets. It shall therefore be investigated whether the structure of assets in the 
capital stock influences risk attitudes.  
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Conjectures for investigation: 
General: Trusts are risk-averse in the domain of gains. 
General: Trusts are loss-averse. 
Trust specific: There is an association between the sources of funding and 
investment risk preferences. 
Trust specific: There is an association between the structure of the capital stock 
and investment risk preferences.  
 
2.2 The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) and its 
implications on investments by charitable trusts 
 
2.2.1 The Statutes of the Charitable Trust as the Basis for all Activities  
 
The donor needs to declare in the statutes of the charitable trust, according to 
§81 BGB, details concerning the 
- name of the trust 
- domicile  
- purpose  
- assets  
- board of directors. 
 
The statutes of the charitable trust are binding for the bodies of the trust 
according to §85 as they incorporate the will of the donor. This is important as it 
means that the power to make obliging specifications, also concerning 
investment guidelines, is left to the donor.  
 
The practical consequence is that wherever a donor decided to give precise 
specifications, these have to be obeyed and the investment activities may differ 
from what could later in this study be found as “typical” investment behaviour. If, 
for example, the donor declares that the rents from a specific apartment house 
shall be the only source of income for the trust, the question of asset 
management and investment preferences does not have to be answered by the 
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Management Board of the trust any more. In cases of restrictions that do not 
allow the responsible persons in the trust to take decisions over investments, the 
subjects will be discarded from the study. 
 
In contrast, a rather common restriction in the statutes of trusts, which partly has 
its roots in former legislation and deserves special attention in this study, is the 
demand for gilt-edged investment. 
 
The statutes can be supplemented by rules of procedure (Anlagerichtlinien), 
including more detailed information on operational issues which can have the 
advantage that they can be adjusted rather easily to changing conditions in the 
future without the need for approval by the authorities.  
 
The documents of the donation act (“Stiftungsgeschäft”) may in certain cases 
also contain relevant information that is to be treated analogous to the statutes 
(Fritz, 2009). 
 
Conjecture for investigation: 
Trust specific: There is an association between the (existence of explicit 
restrictions in the) statutes and investment risk preferences. 
 
2.2.2 The Claim for Durable and Sustainable Fulfilment of the Purpose 
 
The wording of the federal Civil Code in §80 BGB postulates the durable and 
sustainable fulfilment of the purpose of the trust. This can be interpreted as an 
implicit demand for a sufficient periodic return from the trusts´ capital. 
Hüttemann/Schön (2007) claim that there was a duty for the trust and its 
Management Board to aim for a yield from investments which would implicitly 
prohibit any investment strategy that can ex ante already be considered 
unprofitable or purely speculative. The demand for a return must always be seen 
in a portfolio context, so that the investment strategy may also contain volatile 
assets like commodities, hedge funds or derivatives, if they contribute to the 
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improvement of the overall risk-return relation. They point out that the appropriate 
investment strategy will first of all depend on the objective needs of the trust´s 
purpose, especially in terms of the desired payout and its periodicity, if the 
statutes do not prescribe concrete investment guidelines.  
 
Given that there is a desired payout, there is reason to suppose that also a target 
return from investments will exist. This point of target return may influence risk 
behaviour in the domain of gains. A yield of 0% can supposed to be an important 
anchor or reference point for assessing the utility of investment results. If an 
implicit demand for a return of whatever magnitude is assumed, this could mean 
strict avoidance of a zero return, possibly even leading to risk-seeking behaviour 
and accepting potential losses for the chance on a gain (if 0% is the safe 
alternative option; at the time of writing the nominal short term interest rates were 
close to 0%). 
 
Waiblinger (2008) does not only claim the need for a return, but even sees the 
maximisation of income to finance expenses as the main target of investment 
activity. Kohnke (2009) sees the maximisation of returns as well as the 
preservation of capital as an implicit demand in the BGB with regard to the 
durable and sustainable fulfilment of the purpose. He acknowledges that these 
aims will not harmonise and therefore sees the necessity to find a balanced mix 
of assets in practice. The authors mentioned afore do not discuss explicitly the 
question of time horizons for a maximisation of returns. This information would be 
valuable as for instance a short-term maximisation may conflict with long-term 
goals and a pure long-term view may reduce the capability to optimally finance 
potential current projects. Schwalme (2010) does not derive from the law a 
maximisation of income from capital but a perpetuation of returns. If achievable in 
practice, this would indeed help to increase the visibility of future financial flows 
and thus establish planning reliability. The latter could be regarded as an 
additional value itself as it would enable trusts to evaluate projects with a higher 
degree of certainty with regard to financing issues and potentially lead to an 
optimisation of the trusts` long-term strategies. Nevertheless, it must be 
questioned whether a perpetuation of returns would not necessarily lead to 
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suboptimal investment results which in turn would contradict a maximisation of 
returns independent of the time horizon. A creative way to the perpetuation of 
returns could be the building of reserves in good performance years and the 
reduction of these reserves, within the legal boundaries, in years with less than 
average returns. BDS (2011b) refer to the importance of reserves in years of 
crises. 
 
Waiblinger (2008) points to the fact that the durable and sustainable fulfilment of 
the purpose can only be reached if the performance capacity remains intact in the 
sense of an inflation adjusted capital base. Hüttemann/Schön (2007) agree and 
state that the need for returns can theoretically be regarded as unlimited. A trust 
would usually be able to find additional sponsoring-worthy projects which match 
its purpose. This may be true from a theoretical point of view, but it can be 
doubted whether an additional unit of return beyond the point of the target return 
will develop the same utility as the units of return to reach the target return.  
 
Depending on the purpose and the organisational structure of the trust, the yield 
might in practice have to reach at least a certain minimum level on a regular, e.g. 
annual, basis. A number of charitable trusts are involved in recurring obligations, 
for example in scholarships that are granted for a certain time period and are paid 
out in monthly instalments (Rodloff and Drabe, 2003). Another important block of 
costs can be of administrative nature like rents, salaries and other expenses 
related to the maintenance of a trust. In order to secure at least these foreseeable 
cash outflows, the respective trusts need a solid income from capital investment. 
Even though the intended life time of a charitable trust usually is of eternal 
duration, the investment strategy of many trusts can be expected to be avoiding 
high short-term volatilities in order not to endanger the payment of recurring 
obligations and therefore makes trusts prefer safe positive returns even if they 
are low.  
 
Losses on investments are not explicitly mentioned in the law, but they can have 
adverse consequences for the spending ability of the charitable trust. In extreme 
cases, where no reserves are available, this may even lead to a temporary stop 
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of charitable activities, which would then miss the above postulation of a durable 
and sustainable fulfilment of the purpose. The trusts need to gradually replenish 
at least the original nominal capital of the trust in order to restore the potential for 
a durable and sustainable fulfilment of the purpose before they will be able to 
continue their spending behaviour on a normal level. Nevertheless, a complete 
stop of all activities until the original capital is reached again cannot be derived 
from the legal framework (Rodloff and Drabe, 2003). 
 
The conjectures for investigation partly point to opposite directions because of 
the conflicts described above. 
 
Conjectures for investigation: 
General: Trusts are risk-averse in the domain of gains. 
General: Trusts are risk-averse for low-probability high gains. 
General: Trusts are loss-averse, but avoid 0% performance? Conflict. 
Trust specific: There is an association between the existence of reserves and 
investment risk preferences. 
 
2.2.3 Personal Liability of Board Members 
 
Personal liability of board members is regulated in §280 BGB. In the case of 
breach of duty, board members may be held personally responsible for 
compensation for losses suffered which potentially punishes losses but not (too) 
low positive returns. This may lead to a strong tendency for safe but low yielding 
investments instead of fully exploiting more volatile but higher return 
opportunities on capital markets. It may also lead to risk-averse behaviour 
concerning high losses with low probabilities. The supervisory authority monitors 
the reports of the trust on an annual basis and is supposed to take action in the 
case of irregularities.  
 
Schindler (2003) criticises the asymmetry of lacking inducement for high returns 
and potential sanctions in case of negative returns because a completely 
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risk-averse investment strategy can therefore be the most rational behaviour for 
the board members of the trust. The point Schindler makes is comprehensible in 
the sense that tendencies towards safe investments will most probably be 
encouraged by the regulation. On the other hand, he misses the point that the 
board of the trust is also responsible for the enduring and sustainable realisation 
of the trust´s purpose. Too low returns from investment activity due to a 
completely risk-averse investment strategy may therefore lead to irregularities as 
well, if for example the trust misses to meet its obligations for scheduled activities 
or is generally not able to fulfil its mission in a durable and sustainable way. 
 
Many authors (e.g. Schwintek, 2005; Kohnke, 2009; Hüttemann, 2009) agree 
that the legal framework grants some administrative discretion to board members 
which may restrict personal liability only to cases where the board members act 
intentionally in an inappropriate way. Schindler (2003) sees a personal risk for 
board members only if they invest beyond the traditional asset classes bonds, 
real estate and equities or miss to diversify a risky portfolio or use derivatives for 
speculative positions. Hüttemann (2009) goes a step further in his argumentation 
and claims that also no restrictions for certain asset classes can be derived from 
the legal framework. Roth (2010) stresses that due to the new § 31a BGB, 
introduced in 2009, liability for unpaid board members is limited to cases of 
deliberate intention and gross negligence. 
 
The trust, acting through its responsible bodies, may sue decision makers for 
their transactions, if the losses are realised or regarded as sustainable. Potential 
claims become time-barred already after three years on the basis of § 195 BGB, if 
the decision maker has not been discharged from liability before by the 
responsible body of the trust. 
 
Personal liability (at least the perceived one) of board members may potentially 
contribute to increased loss aversion. The perceived utility of higher gains may 
decrease, if the chance for higher returns is considered to be connected with 
higher volatility and its potentially negative implication, i.e. losses. Decision 
makers are prone to avoid high losses that could evoke liability. 
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Conjectures for investigation: 
General: Trusts are risk-averse in the domain of gains. 
General: Trusts are risk-averse for low-probability high gains. 
General: Trusts are loss-averse. 
General: Trusts are risk-averse for low-probability high losses. 
 
2.3 The Federal States´ Laws (Landesstiftungsgesetze, LStiftG) and 
their Implications on Investments by Charitable Trusts 
 
The states´ laws supplement the federal laws and regulate more details. In some 
points, they deviate from state to state. 
 
As an example, the federal state´s law of Rhineland-Palatinate 
(Rheinland-Pfälzisches Landesstiftungsgesetz, LStiftG RP) stipulates in its first 
article that the main purpose of the law is to secure the donor´s will and to ensure 
freedom of action and decision to the responsible bodies in the trusts. This 
stresses the super-ordinate meaning of the statutes of the trust as long as they do 
not conflict with the, for many issues, rather imprecise prescriptions of the legal 
framework. It also signals to the bodies of the trust that the lawmaker tends to 
refrain from interfering to the matters of the trust wherever possible.  
 
Even though other federal states are in some points less precise or less strict in 
the protection of the donor´s will, they all respect its superior importance. Fritz 
(2009) gives a good overview of the details of legal regulation in the various 
federal states. 
 
2.3.1 The Connected Questions of Capital Preservation and Time Horizon 
 
Almost all federal states, with the exceptions of Brandenburg and 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, contain the postulation of preserving the trust´s 
capital. The wording in the laws leaves much room for controversial discussion 
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about the topic of capital preservation. Hüttemann/Schön (2007) discuss several 
basic ways of interpretation. The first one prohibits any transactions and defines 
capital preservation as keeping the status quo of existing assets – a definition 
that is not shared by the majority of practitioners and even explicitly not supported 
in some of the LStiftG. It may rather be relevant in cases where the statutes 
stipulate no change in assets anyway. The second interpretation, which is 
currently the dominant one in the literature, reduces the demand for capital 
preservation to the preservation of the value, meaning that transactions are 
allowed to take place and just the value of the assets has to remain at least 
constant. This interpretation opens new discussions on how the term “value” 
should be defined, e.g. as a book value, time value or as another measure. The 
annual report of trusts that is to be submitted to the supervisory authority does not 
have to contain more than a simple summing up of assets with no concrete rules 
concerning the valuation approach. Hüttemann/Schön therefore reason that a 
duty for nominal capital preservation cannot be derived. This conclusion is 
debatable and will be discussed below. The third alternative, which is clearly 
favoured by Hüttemann/Schön, is an interpretation that focuses primarily on the 
enduring and sustainable fulfilment of the purpose of the trust and waives the 
traditional understanding of capital preservation to a certain degree. Among other 
recent authors, Fritz (2009) supports this interpretation and argues that the 
preservation of capital is no purpose of its own, but only derived from the demand 
for the fulfilment of the real purpose of the trust.  
 
Since inflation adjustment is not explicitly mentioned, the phrasing of the above 
mentioned LStiftG leaves room for interpretation as far as the question of nominal 
vs. real capital preservation is concerned. Some authors (e.g. Carstensen, 2005; 
Waiblinger, 2008) interpret the formulation in the LStiftG as a demand for the 
inflation adjusted preservation of purchasing power in order to keep the 
performance potential in any given time period. They point out that the ability to 
pursue the trusts´ original goals can only be kept on a sustainable level for the 
implicitly assumed eternal duration, if the capital basis grows at least with the rate 
of inflation. Schindler (2003) states that in practice, capital preservation in the 
sense of the LStiftG and its supervision by the authority concerns only the 
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nominal. Haase-Theobald (2009) supports the interpretation that the lawmakers 
only expect nominal capital preservation (with the exception of the state of 
Saxony), but sees most trusts striving for real capital preservation.  
 
When following the arguments of real capital preservation, it must also be 
discussed which rate of inflation should be applied. Waiblinger (2008) argues that 
the adjustment for inflation should be made according to the respective rate that 
applies to the promotion area of the trust instead of simply adjusting for the 
officially published rates of average private households. Schindler (2003) 
proposes to create a specific index by an appropriate composition of the publicly 
available inflation sub-indices, e.g. for wages and food. 
 
In the strict sense of keeping the performance potential, the appropriate 
adjustment can only be made on the back of price changes in the respective 
markets in which the charitable trust operates (Benke, 1997). For example, a 
German trust aiming at awarding scholarships to students in Romania would 
therefore better adjust for the living expenses for students in Romania converted 
into Euros instead of using a measure like the harmonised consumer price index 
(HCPI) of the Euro-zone which might be available more easily. Given the 
potential structural price changes in currencies which may trend for years or even 
decades like the appreciation of (former) hard currencies like the Deutschemark 
and later the Euro against many other currencies, even a gradual and long lasting 
deflation of the respective prices measured in Euros is imaginable. Would that 
allow the capital base in home currency to shrink? This question will in the vast 
majority of cases never have to be answered, but it shows that the question of 
inflation adjustment must by nature be highly individual. But even the precise 
knowledge of an appropriate inflation index would then lead to the next question 
of time deferred measurement and adjustment. Finally, it raises the question of 
how the appropriate inflation (if finally determined) could be controlled by the 
states´ supervisory authorities. 
 
The logic behind the concept of individual and specific inflation adjustment seems 
overwhelming from an academic point of view, but it seems more than only a 
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challenge to be “correctly” applied by the trusts, which may have substantial 
difficulties in determining their specific rate of inflation especially if they are small 
with regard to their asset base or have a variety of different sponsoring areas.  
The authorities would not easily be able to check the “correct” measure of 
inflation. It is even not always possible to assess the asset base in cases where 
assets are illiquid like most forms of real estate. These might be two important 
reasons why it is widely accepted to preserve the nominal capital base without 
making any adjustments for inflation and strengthens the case for 0% being the 
reference yield for most trusts.  
 
It is generally left to the prudence of the trusts whether they systematically 
provision for rising expenses and to what extent. It can be expected that many 
trusts are not able or not willing to do these extensive calculations and leave the 
specific inflation adjustment as an issue that influences investment decisions 
aside.  
 
Another very basic question, beyond a potential inflation adjustment, around the 
impetus of capital preservation needs to be discussed. It concerns the time 
horizon or the units of time that are to be applied to the topic. If there is demand 
for capital preservation, will it be applicable to any given time period or is there a 
definition of time frames to be looked at and which can be derived from the legal 
framework?  
 
The law is not precise in these matters. If capital preservation for any given time 
period was meant, it would necessitate an investment strategy that allows for no 
volatility at all. This seems not realistic as the risk free (money market) return can 
be expected to cover not much more than the inflation rate over long terms and is 
therefore not appropriate to finance the projects of the trust in an optimal way – a 
violation of the demand for durable and sustainable realisation of the trust´s 
purpose. Any kind of yield enhancement will on the other hand create volatility of 
returns and allow for at least temporary losses.  
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The regular periods that are monitored by the supervisory authority may be seen 
as a hint. The LStiftG stipulate annual periods for the reports which are to be 
presented to the supervisory authority. It can therefore be argued that any kind of 
capital preservation must be considered on the annual basis that coincides with 
the regular monitoring interval. This in turn would already allow at least for some 
volatility over the year. Given the low expected nominal and especially real 
returns of an investment strategy that aims at guaranteeing capital preservation 
on an annual basis, the conflict regarding the optimal return to finance projects 
can be considered only to a very low and unsatisfying degree as being solved. It 
is even possible that low yielding “safe” investments turn out to be capital 
destructive in a phase of rising inflation and therefore not appropriate. Some 
authors (Benke/Maucher, 2007; Fritz, 2010) argue that capital preservation 
cannot be reduced to looking at calendar years, but is a long-term consideration. 
 
The systematic conflict between the safety of investments measured as capital 
preservation on a predefined time horizon and the demand for yield to optimally 
finance the original goals of the trusts lead a growing number of authors (e.g. 
Hüttemann/Schön, 2007) to the idea of putting more emphasis on the return 
expectations. They argue that the fulfilment of the trusts´ purposes must be 
central to the question of capital investment. It can therefore be appropriate to 
seek risky but in the long term (>1y) higher yielding investments in order to be 
able to sustainably finance the needs of the trust. This complies with Hüttemann 
(2009) who sees no binding legal postulation, neither for real nor nominal capital 
preservation. 
 
A high degree of freedom is given to the management board in all investment 
matters combined with the overriding duty of following the goals of the trust. Even 
temporary losses on investments could therefore be acceptable, provided that 
they would not endanger the existence of the trust.  
 
Waiblinger (2008) points to the LStiftG of the federal state of Bremen 
(BremStiftG, §7) as far as the treatment of losses is concerned. The law 
recommends only in case of sustainable losses to accumulate future income to 
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restore the performance capability of the trust. This could imply, according to 
Waiblinger, that temporary losses could be regarded as acceptable and the 
moderate lower of cost or market principle may apply. 
 
All in all, the legislation leaves it very much in the hands of the boards how to 
invest the trusts´ capital, at least if there are no clear statements concerning the 
investment strategy in the statutes. A categorical need to preserve the nominal or 
even the real capital evaluated at market prices in every annual reporting period 
cannot unambiguously be derived, neither directly by the text of the law nor 
implicitly. As far as the investment strategy for a trust is concerned, the LStiftG 
limits themselves to basic principles of capital preservation and the enduring and 
sustainable realisation of the purpose which can at least partially be regarded as 
contradictory if a narrow time frame is set. 
 
The discussion shows that losses, at least to a certain extent and especially if 
they are no realised losses, seem to be acceptable for the annual reporting 
periods. This suggests that the claim for capital preservation by the law will not 
necessarily lead to complete loss aversion, i.e. to enter no investments with a 
loss potential even if the expected monetary value is very high. The study will 
look at risk preferences in the domain of losses and also examine loss aversion. 
 
Furthermore, the discussion shows that some trusts may see the need for 
inflation adjustment while others do not. In order to reach comparability, the 
results shall be normalised by asking the trusts to assume zero inflation when 
stating preferences for the study. 
 
Conjectures for investigation: 
General: Trusts are risk-seeking in the domain of medium-sized losses. 
General: Trusts are risk-averse for low-probability high losses. 
General: Trusts are loss-averse, but avoid 0% performance ? Conflict. 
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2.3.2 The Need for Yield and Distributable Returns Without Speculation 
 
Schindler (2003) points to the fact that the LStiftG of the single federal states do 
not explicitly claim for the maximisation of distributable returns, even though this 
could be regarded as the primary goal in order to fulfil the mission of the trust in 
an optimal way (Waiblinger, 2008; Kohnke, 2009). The laws (LStiftG) instead 
postulate general values like canniness and a focus on costs and economic 
efficiency which do not allow the trusts to derive concrete guidelines for 
investment decisions.  
 
Carstensen (2005) states that the LStiftG usually contain a formulation 
concerning current returns which could imply that the legislation rules out the 
possibility of investing in assets which are due to their nature not able to deliver a 
running yield like precious metals. On the other hand, one can argue that only a 
portfolio view should be adopted which does not primarily judge the single 
investments but rather looks at the overall characteristics in order to benefit from 
diversification effects. In such a portfolio also non-yielding assets like precious 
metals could play a role, if they optimise the expected risk/return profile of the 
portfolio or replace paper money as an alternative store of value. 
 
Fritz (2009) remarks that there seems to be a common agreement upon the 
denial of speculative investment of the trusts´ capital, but it is hard to find direct 
evidence in the literature about this point. Schwalme (2010) also mentions a 
generally accepted prohibition of speculation and discusses how the term 
“speculation” could be defined without reaching an economically sensible and 
distinct conclusion. Richter (2011) states that there is no standard definition of 
speculative investments and gives examples of potential speculative behaviour. 
These examples include uncertainty with regard to the fulfilment of the purpose, 
striving for high yields at the price of high risk and if the investment allows for a 
high return only in extreme cases but offers no higher overall expected value. 
Since there is no clear legislation on this issue, it can be expected that some 
trusts will avoid any kind of investment that could be regarded as speculative, 
leading to systematically risk-averse behaviour for all extreme (high and low) 
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outcomes. 
 
Conjectures for investigation: 
General: Trusts are risk-averse for low-probability high gains. 
General: Trusts are risk-averse for low-probability high losses. 
 
2.3.3 The Role and Potential Influence of the Supervisory Authority 
 
The supreme authority for the supervisory of trusts, according to the LStiftG, is 
the respective ministry of the federal state, in some cases depending on the 
purpose of the trust. The laws stipulate that the supervisory authority monitors 
that the administration of the trust remains in line with the statutes and the will of 
the donor. In case of non-observance of the legal regulations, the authority may 
use a number of enforcing measures to restore accordance to the law, reaching 
from the right for information to the appointment of a third person who 
empowered to implement the ruling of the authority. In a case of very serious 
neglect of duty, the supervisory authority may demand for the suspension of 
board members and enjoin persons from fulfilling the tasks in the trust. 
 
Von Holt/Koch (2004) state that the supervisory authority does not undertake an 
all-embracing examination of the management of the trust and that only massive 
irregularities and critical incidents that endanger the existence of the trust will 
lead to direct action by the authorities.  
 
The supervisory authority relies on the documents submitted by the trusts. The 
laws do not prescribe a certain way of financial reporting standards that give 
precise and binding information on the valuation of assets. The only relevant 
claim that can be found in the LStiftG demands for an annual calculation including 
an asset statement.  
 
In the LStiftG, the implicitly assumed time horizon for charitable trusts is unlimited 
if not the statutes deviate concerning this question. Nevertheless, the trusts have 
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to provide paperwork on the use of capital and the fulfilment of the purpose of the 
trust to the supervisory authority on an annual basis. This recurring duty can lead 
to the assumption that investment goals must be met not only for the potentially 
eternal life expectation of the trust but also for the one-year periods of time which 
can be assessed by the authorities. 
 
The supervisory authority is faced with a number of difficult issues in monitoring 
the trusts. The question of capital preservation is hard to answer for several 
reasons:  
 
- there are no binding standards of evaluation and presentation of assets for 
the reports 
- the value of assets is not in all cases obvious, e.g. it can be hard to 
determine the “correct” value of real estate 
- inflation adjustment cannot be checked since potential still reserves in the 
valuation of assets are not obvious and the trust specific inflation rate can 
hardly be calculated 
 
Schwalme (2010) states that in practice, trusts actively seek the discussion with 
the supervisory authorities for virtually all major decisions to take. This happens 
as a consequence of missing legislation and indirectly empowers the authorities 
which can use wide administrative discretion for their decisions. 
 
The supervisory authority seems to play an active role itself for the investment 
policy mainly in cases of serious losses, where it is empowered to take direct 
action. It can be expected that trusts will not only for this reason try to avoid 
reaching this point.  
 
Conjecture for investigation: 
General: Trusts are risk-averse for low-probability high losses. 
 
 
  
 
29 
2.4 The German Fiscal Code (Abgabenordnung, AO) and its Implications 
on Investments by Charitable Trusts 
 
German charitable trusts benefit from a tax-exemption status that is granted by 
the Fiscal Code in its §§ 51-68 AO in combination with § 5 
Körperschaftsteuergesetz (Corporate Tax Act). The status is linked to a number 
of rules that have to be followed. Failure to comply will lead to the loss of tax 
exemption which is a large motivation to follow the rules (Carstensen, 2005). 
Hüttemann/Schön (2007) state that a difficulty in the handling of the law is that it 
was not specifically made for trusts. It does not make concrete regulations on 
how to generate returns or to preserve the capital and it does not provide a frame 
for the reporting standards.  
 
The goals of the trust need to be compatible with the catalogue of charitable 
purposes defined in §§ 52-54 AO. According to §56 AO, the main guideline of a 
trust must be the fulfilment of its purpose. This supports the assumption that the 
purpose of the trust should guide the investment strategy. 
 
2.4.1 The Building of Reserves and the Tax-Exempt Status 
 
§ 55 AO stipulates the prompt use of resources for the purposes of the trust. All 
current income like the income from investments, donations to the trust or 
membership fees belong to the definition of “resources.” The capital stock that is 
used to generate income is not required to be distributed. 
 
A big challenge concerning the provisioning for inflation is the rule of § 58 Nr. 7 
AO which sets limits to the building of reserves. The Fiscal Code demands that a 
maximum of one third of the net income can be used to build a free reserve in 
order to keep the privilege of tax exemption. The net income can be defined as 
the ordinary income, from interest and dividends for example, minus the costs of 
managing the assets. Realised price increases of assets on the other hand are 
not regarded that way and can be used as reserves and treated like the capital of 
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the trust, at least if the strategy is not exclusively focused on price appreciation. 
Realised price increases are not for distribution, but to be put into a special 
reserve for gains from transactions which can in turn be used to cover potential 
losses of future transactions (“Umschichtungsrücklage”). Rising asset prices, of 
real estate or equities for example, would therefore not endanger tax exemption. 
 
Problems can arise for trusts that have invested a big portion of their assets in 
interest bearing securities in times of negative real yields. At the time of writing 
this study, the yields of German sovereign bonds with ten years to maturity trade 
at a level of about 1.5%. Under the assumption that this is the coupon, the “one 
third rule” will therefore only allow for building reserves of 0.5% which seems 
extremely low compared to realised inflation of historic standards. The inflation 
rate, be it an official consumer price index or a trust specific measure, will 
probably in many cases be higher. This implies that the trust´s capital could in 
these cases only be preserved in real terms, if the trust adopted an investment 
strategy that at least partially includes investments aiming at rising asset prices 
which are not relevant for distribution in the sense of the AO. Only a strategy 
containing solely investments that aim at price appreciation and not at the 
distribution of returns contradicts the legislator´s basic ideas of the tax exemption 
for trusts and may lead to liability for taxation.  
 
Lehmann (2010) argues that the tax law clearly answers the question of capital 
preservation which has been asked already in the chapters above, in favour of 
keeping the real capital and not only the nominal one because inflation 
provisioning could be seen as the reason for the regulation. He also states that 
small trusts will in many cases not be able to provision for inflation adjustment. 
Investing in volatile assets, like equities, that aim at price appreciation in order to 
strategically keep the real capital of the trust, means that the trust must also be 
willing to temporarily tolerate medium-sized losses. 
 
Charitable trusts that do not only rely on income from their capital but are partially 
funded by donations, have the advantage of being able to add up to ten percent 
of the sum of donations to the capital reserves and provide for real capital 
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preservation . 
 
The desirability of the tax-exempt status leads to the need to differentiate 
between “yield” and “distributable return” in practice. The study will simplify this 
issue for the elicitation of the utility curve and assume that the trusts are able to 
creatively manipulate how much of the attained yield can be used for distribution 
and how much allocated to the reserves. This simplification can be justified as it is 
not possible in the long-term to distribute more than the yield, if capital is to be 
preserved.  
 
This chapter also shows that the individual circumstances can make a big 
difference for the investment policy. Trusts with huge reserves from gains might 
fear potential losses less than trusts with no such reserves. Another individual 
circumstance is the ratio of income from capital vs income from other sources. 
 
Conjectures for investigation: 
General: Trusts are risk-seeking in the domain of medium-sized losses. 
Trust specific: There is an association between the existence of reserves and 
investment risk preferences. 
Trust specific: There is an association between the sources of funding and risk 
preferences. 
 
2.4.2 Losses on Investments and the Tax-Exempt Status 
 
Carstensen (2005) points at a circular on the application of the Fiscal Code 
(AEAO Nr. 9, § 55 AO) which gives reason to fear losses on investments as a 
threat to the charitable status of a trust. AEAO Nr. 8 assumes that losses arise 
from miscalculations and are supposed to be compensated within a time period 
of three years. If this is not possible, the charitable status may be in jeopardy.  
 
Some authors (e.g. Buchna, 2003) derive from the AO and court decisions that a 
charitable trust runs the risk of loosing its charitable tax-exempt status in the case 
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of substantial losses, whereupon the word “substantial” remains undefined in the 
context. Hüttemann/Schön (2007) reply that this kind of interpretation is not 
all-embracing because it misses the point that losses do not generally breach the 
rules of the AO. They argue that it is foremost the way of compensation for the 
losses which may constitute a violation of the law. Furthermore, they state that a 
loss on the invested capital cannot damage the tax status as the capital itself is 
not defined as current resources to be used to fulfil the purpose. So, punishing a 
loss on that capital by revoking the tax-exempt status could not be justified. 
Benke/Maucher (2007) share the opinion that losses do not generally lead to the 
denial of tax-exemption. 
 
The loss-bearing ability of a trust also depends on the amount of free reserves 
which have possibly been built in “good times.” After the surrogation principle 
(“Surrogationsprinzip”), capital gains from price appreciation have to be added to 
the reserves whereas losses must be deducted. On the one hand, a trust with 
high reserves may therefore fear losses to a lesser degree, since it is still possible 
to compensate them with the gains of earlier years. A trust that was not able to 
accumulate gains so far will on the other hand reach the point where the initial 
capital basis is threatened faster. It can therefore be reasoned that risk tolerance 
may again also depend on the amount of free reserves that has been built up in 
the past. 
 
More severe than the sheer occurrence of losses can be a situation where losses 
are experienced as a consequence of investing in a way where losses could have 
been expected. In this case, the problem of a fair ex-ante consideration at a later 
stage occurs. It can be expected that only intentionally produced losses can fairly 
be judged as losses that must have been expected. 
 
Conjecture for investigation: 
General: Trusts are risk-averse for low-probability high losses. 
Trust specific: There is an association between the existence of reserves and risk 
preferences. 
 
  
 
33 
2.4.3 Commercial Asset Management in a Trust and the Tax-Exempt Status 
 
The adjudication in a variety of cases made more or less clear to what extent trust 
are allowed to show trading activities without being marked as commercial asset 
managers and losing the tax-exempt status. The highest German court on tax 
affairs, the Bundesfinanzhof (BFH), judged (BFH, 1990) that transactions in fixed 
income securities cannot be regarded as compliant with a trust´s normal trading 
activities, if the securities are bought only with the intention of a later sale within a 
short period of time. The BFH considers such kind of behaviour as speculative 
and therefore characteristic of commerce rather than normal trust activity in asset 
management. This judgement amends to the former BFH (1980) sentence which 
defined commerciality as professional specifics such as maintaining an extra 
office or a dedicated organisation for the transactions. In 1998, the BFH 
acknowledges that even a greater number and amount of transactions can be 
regarded as non-commercial asset management and also transactions aiming at 
price appreciation are acceptable in that sense. BFH (2000) state that trades in 
options are not generally of commercial nature. 
 
The adjudication makes clear that charitable trusts are not expected to maximise 
their income by very active trading.  
 
2.5 Previous Empirical Research on the Investment Behaviour of 
German Charitable Trusts  
 
Previous empirical research has mainly concentrated on categorising trusts 
according to a multitude of criteria like size, legal form or distribution of assets 
under management. To the knowledge of the author, no attempt has yet been 
taken to investigate the trusts´ investment behaviour on the background of 
decision theory. Also on international level, no comparable study is available. 
 
Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen (BDS) is the largest collector and 
distributor of statistical data on German trusts. The annually published register of 
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trusts (BDS, 2011c) contains an extensive part on collected statistical data and 
analyses. Due to the large data base, BDS is able to give a representative 
overview on a variety of differentiating criteria of trusts on a regular basis.  
 
BDS is also the issuer of the annual publication StiftungsReport. The 2010/2011 
(BDS, 2011b) edition contains an empirical investigation on the capital 
investment of trusts, finding a statistically relevant association between the size 
of trusts (larger than € 1m vs. smaller than € 1m) and their investment results in 
two out of three years 2007-2009. This speaks in favour of heterogeneity in risk 
behaviour of trusts concerning this criterion. BDS suppose that the large trusts 
have rather diversified portfolios with higher portions of risky assets like equities, 
whereas the small ones have higher allocations in fixed income securities. This 
conjecture points to some association between risk preferences and the size of 
the trusts. It is supported also by the finding that the large trusts had significantly 
more depreciations on assets in 2008/09 (of all trusts that had depreciations). 
The realised losses amounted to about 6% in mean and 3-4% in median value in 
both of the years. Estimates for the aggregated book and realised losses are at 
about 6% in 2008 with respect to a sample of 431 trusts administered by 
Deutsches Stiftungszentrum (DSZ). The predominating asset class in the BDS 
study over all portfolios is fixed income securities (55%), followed by real estate 
(14%) and equities (7%). The rest of 24% is categorised as “other.” The BDS 
study finds that 56% of trusts have no financial reserves. This again is particularly 
a phenomenon to be observed with small trusts rather than large trusts.  
 
The 2012 survey of the Centre for Social Investment (CSI) at the University of 
Heidelberg (Then et al., 2012) that was conducted in cooperation with BDS ran 
parallel to the writing of this study. It focuses on the investment behaviour of the 
200 largest German trusts by donated capital. With regard to the bodies of trusts, 
the CSI study finds that the management boards have most influence on 
investment decisions. Furthermore, the financial crisis of recent years has had no 
impact on the investment behaviour of the majority of trusts. Some trusts stated 
to put more emphasis on financial management as a result of the crisis and 
reduced the risk in investments. Only about one third of the trusts in the study 
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stated to be able to invest without any restrictions, whereupon most of the 
restrictions were not imposed by the statutes or the authorities but by the bodies 
of the trusts themselves. The most frequently stated definitions of the investment 
strategy involve the specification of asset classes and the general aim of capital 
preservation. The CSI study also looks at Mission Investing, i.e. investments in 
organisations that support the purpose of the trust, and finds that it is used by 
30% of the largest trusts.3 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009) investigate the impact of the financial crisis on 
German trusts with a sample of 110 trusts which is not representative for all 
charitable trusts in Germany. They find that one third of the trusts have suffered 
from losses. These losses amounted to 1 to 10% in most of the cases, in 19% of 
cases losses exceeded 10%. The study finds that investment management is 
regulated in the statutes of almost every second trust and that investment 
activities have been checked by the respective supervisory authorities for about 
every third trust. 
 
Sandberg (2007) investigates the degree of economic orientation of trusts with 
asset management being one of six fields of interest. She finds that the size 
measured as the capital of trusts seems to be the decisive variable with respect 
to almost all questions, e.g. size is positively correlated with measures taken to 
avoid losses. In small trusts with an asset base of up to only € 50k, gilt-edged 
investments dominate. Other factors with particular relevance to the research 
question are the type of trusts with respect to the activity and the capital of the 
trust. In contrast to BDS (2011b), Sandberg (2007) does not directly provide an 
overall aggregated asset allocation of trusts. She names asset classes in trusts´ 
portfolios independent of their weights and their weight if allocated. Indirectly, this 
gives an overall asset allocation consisting of fixed income (38%), term deposits 
(14%), real estate (10%), and equities (8%). A residual of about 30% remains. 
Adding the figures of fixed income and term deposits, the allocation is very similar 
to what is found by BDS (2011b). 
 
                                                          
3
 A good overview on Mission Investing in German trusts can be found in Schneeweiß/Weber (2012) 
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Heissmann (2005) focus on the question of investing in assets that primarily aim 
at price appreciation instead of income on the background of low yields in the 
fixed income market. The study includes only trusts that have at least € 1m 
assets under management and/or expenses of at least € 100k per annum which 
limits the meaningfulness of the study for trusts in general. They find an overall 
asset allocation that is dominated by fixed income (58%), followed by equities 
(16%) and real estate (12%). Alternative investments like private equity (4%), 
hedge funds (0%) and structured products (0%) are of subordinated meaning. 
This again signals that trusts prefer the low volatility asset class, fixed income. 
The Heissmann study, which only contains large trusts, shows that in their 
sample equities are weighted much higher than in the other two studies with 
trusts of all sizes. This could indicate that large trusts are generally willing to take 
more risk. In Heissmann (2005), 94% of trusts state that the preservation of 
capital is a “very important” aim on a scale with five predefined answers reaching 
from “very important” to “very unimportant.” The achievement of risk-adjusted 
yields is considered “very important” only by 46% of subjects. Reaching a yield 
that covers the expenses is “very important” to 32% of trusts and “important” to 
another 37%. 62% of subjects see the avoidance of any kind of risk as a “very 
important” (33%) or at least “important” (29%) aim. The figures reveal that risk- 
and loss aversion seem to be considered super-ordinate in comparison to all 
other aims and being even more important than reaching yields to cover the 
expenses. This comes to a certain extent as a surprise as the fulfilment of the 
purpose is named in the literature (which is dominated by interpretation of the 
laws by jurists) most frequently as the real aim of a trust. Asked for a target yield 
on capital investments, trusts expect 5% per annum on average. It might be taken 
into consideration that the yield curves for fixed income securities were at a 
higher level (about 2 percentage points for German government bonds) 
compared to the time of writing of this study. 
 
Schäfer (2002) finds as main specific restrictions to the investment policy named 
by the trusts: “only gilt-edged investments” (60%), “only fixed income” (30%), “no 
equities” (22%). 
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Timmer (2005) mainly examines the donors and finds that they usually exhibit 
great involvement. This does not only need to concern the purpose of the trust 
but also capital investment. It might potentially cause differences also regarding 
the risk preferences in comparison to trusts without such involvement. 
 
The surveys show that trusts predominantly invest in financial assets. Among 
these, fixed income securities and cash are clearly favoured over equities. These 
findings point at a very conservative investment behaviour which exhibits a high 
degree of risk aversion, especially when considering that the trusts theoretically 
have an unlimited time horizon and could go for higher yielding but more volatile 
asset mixes. 
 
 
Conjectures for investigation: 
General: Trusts are risk-averse (in the domains of both gains and losses) 
Trust specific: There is an association between the size of a trust and investment 
risk preferences.  
Trust specific: There is an association between the existence of explicit 
restrictions in the statutes and investment risk preferences.  
Trust specific: There is an association between the structure of the capital stock 
and investment risk preferences.  
Trust specific: There is an association between the involvement of the donor in 
investment decisions and investment risk preferences. 
 
2.6 Investments of Not-for-profit Organisations in an International 
Context  
 
In the United Kingdom, the legal framework has long been criticised for its lacking 
adoption of academic research concerning modern portfolio theory (Dale and 
Gwinnell, 1995; Morris, 1995): (a) The Trustee Investment Act from 1961 as well 
as the guidance by the Charity Commission seemed to be too restrictive for an 
optimal long-term oriented allocation of funds. (b) An additional problem was 
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seen in the defensive mindset of trustees who were found reluctant to take risk. 
Thus, the analysis of trust investment in the United Kingdom in the 1990s shows 
to a certain degree similarities to the predominately low-risk and low-return 
investment approach that can be observed in Germany until today. 
 
Nowadays in the United Kingdom, the Charity Commission as the independent 
regulator of charities in England and Wales provides trustees with a guide on 
investment matters (Charity Commission, 2011). The contents of the guide are 
based on the legislation (Trustee Act, 2000; Trustee Investment Act, 1961; 
Charities Act, 2011) and give very concrete advice on the framework of investing. 
The guide encourages trustees to take investment risks in a diversified portfolio in 
order to use the performance potential given by the long time horizon that trusts 
usually have. UK charities are explicitly allowed to invest also in volatile asset 
classes like equities, hedge funds, commodities and to make use of derivatives, 
provided that risks are diversified. In its guide, the Charity Commission explicitly 
acknowledges the risk of inflation and proposes a balanced portfolio that may 
include high risk assets and take into account the long-term fulfilment of the 
purpose of the trust. Temporary losses are explicitly accepted due to the long 
time horizon.  
 
In the United Kingdom, the “Statement of Recommended Practice, Accounting 
and Reporting by Charities” (SORP, 2005) was developed by the Charity 
Commission for England and Wales and by the Scottish Regulator. It requires 
from trusts exceeding a certain size, inter alia, to present financial statements in a 
specific layout. It also requires a statement concerning risk management of the 
trust which can be regarded as a measure to increase the awareness of trusts 
regarding an appropriate understanding and management also of risks taken in 
investments. Bennett and Gage (2012) found in a study with a focus on risk 
management in charities that trustees have become more involved in risk 
management within the last decade and that the charity sector in the UK has 
developed its practice even before it became a requirement for the corporate 
sector. Nevertheless, they see further qualification of trustees as an important 
recommendation for the future. A survey by Wells (2008) shows that charities in 
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the UK have used their freedom also to invest in potentially volatile and illiquid 
asset classes like private equity and hedge funds. Wells finds the fear of volatility 
and risk as the trusts´ major concern. Both findings are perfectly compatible 
taking into account the overall risk decreasing effect for the trust portfolio which 
can be given by adding these alternative investments even though they may be 
regarded as risky if regarded separately without the portfolio context. 
 
The liberal governance through authorities that gives room to volatile investment 
strategies in countries like the United Kingdom and the United States also 
attracts critique. Charities which make use of their freedom of investing and suffer 
losses due to adverse movements of the capital market can be openly criticised 
in the public (Forbes, 2012). This exerts pressure on trustees who want to avoid 
any damage to the reputation of their charity and also of themselves. Trusts that 
are publicly questioned for their loss producing investment strategies may 
encounter difficulties in finding new sponsors and keeping the existing ones.  
 
2.7 Synthesis / Conclusions of Chapter 2 
 
The nature of German charitable trusts in combination with the given legal 
framework and prior empirical research leads to the assumption that the 
investment risk preferences may show typical commonalities between the trusts 
regarding some critical features. The conjectures are: 
 
1. A reference point exists which divides investment results in gains and losses, 
and trusts are loss-averse. 
2. Trusts are risk-averse in the domain of gains in general and also for 
low-probability high gains. 
3. Trusts are risk-seeking in the domain of medium-sized losses, but risk-averse 
for low-probability high losses. 
 
The conjectures for the domain of losses and loss aversion are not as clear as for 
the domain of gains. Regarding losses and loss aversion, the indications are 
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ambiguous as discussed in the chapter above and may depend to a high degree 
on the individual trust characteristics.  
 
The literature review makes clear that individual circumstances can play a vital 
role for the investment behaviour of trusts and must therefore be considered in 
parallel to and in combination with the elicitation of preferences for trusts in 
general.  
 
The characteristics found to be of potential relevance for investment risk 
preferences are: 
 
1. Size of the trust (measured in terms of asset base) 
2. Age of the trust 
3. Donor and donor´s influence on investment decisions 
4. Type of trust 
5. Structure of the capital stock 
6. Sources of funding 
7. Expected growth of the asset base 
8. Existence of reserves 
9. Statutes of the trust 
10. Number, gender and age of decision makers 
 
The list of criteria above to be examined cannot claim to be exhaustive. It is to a 
certain extent determined by the subjective rationality of the researcher.  
 
For later conclusions it may be valuable also to consider how trusts are guided by 
authorities in other countries like in the example of the United Kingdom which is 
described in section 2.6. 
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2.7.1 The Definition of a Reference Point and Loss Aversion 
 
The existence of a reference point for gains and losses can be expected in 
particular due to the widely accepted goal of capital preservation which is often 
described as a fundamental principle for the investment policy of trusts. Most 
LStiftG explicitly postulate to keep the capital of the trust “preferably 
undiminished.” Capital preservation is an implicit demand to distinguish between 
gains and losses from a reference point that depends on the definition of the term 
“capital preservation.” It can be argued that the LStiftG call for a real, i.e. inflation 
adjusted, preservation of capital which could be derived from the other claim 
concerning the sustainable realisation of the purpose of the trust. Other authors 
argue, and the experience with supervisory authorities indicates that nominal 
preservation can be accepted as well. Both concepts – nominal and real – capital 
preservation imply the existence of a reference point, no matter whether this is 
the original nominal value of the capital or the inflation adjusted one. Another 
question concerns the time horizon for which capital preservation is required. As 
the law is not precise in this respect either, indications can be sought in the 
reporting periods to the supervisory authority which demand for annual cycles. 
The author adopts the idea of looking at periods of one year for his study. The 
theoretically eternal time horizon of a trust must be divided into shorter periods in 
order to make the financial goals operationally usable. The time horizon can be 
regarded as a chain of annual performance periods because even in the case 
that the investment decisions may usually be taken for longer-term periods, the 
short-term consequences can be observed and must be acceptable for the 
investor and the supervisory authority.  
 
Losses may be more undesirable per unit than respective gains are desirable. 
Therefore loss aversion can generally be anticipated, although there may be 
trusts that would accept potential losses accompanied with some return potential 
in order to circumvent a 0% performance which makes impossible (already ex 
ante) the fulfilment of the purpose through returns from capital. 
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The topic of inflation adjustment may be of particular relevance regarding the 
reference point of the utility function, if the assumptions of Prospect Theory (PT) 
or a derivative of it are used to describe the investment behaviour. The author 
takes this into account for the design of the elicitation methods to be used. A 
strategy that aims at keeping the inflation adjusted capital will need higher returns 
and can be supposed to be forced to adopt a higher risk. The high degree of 
individuality in the question of inflation adjustment makes it difficult to compare 
nominal return targets expressed by the trusts. In order to achieve comparability, 
the study normalises the results by implementing the assumption of zero inflation 
for all trusts. 
 
2.7.2 Investment Risk Preferences in the Domain of Gains 
 
The perceived utility of investment returns in the domain of gains can be 
expected to have a concave shape, i.e. increasing returns are accompanied by 
positive but decreasing marginal rates of utility. The need for additional returns 
may only theoretically be unlimited. It can be doubted whether the Civil Code and 
the LStiftG implicitly call for a maximisation of returns. In contrast, the durable 
and sustainable fulfilment of the purpose is formulated explicitly. In practice, 
trusts will usually be limited not only due to money, but also due to time 
constraints of the people involved and other ordinary operational restrictions.  
 
Furthermore, the trust may require some objective minimum distributable return 
per unit of time (e.g. one year) in order to meet its recurring obligations like 
administrative costs and regular expenses like scholarships to fulfil the mission of 
the trust. This favours the view that the return units up to the point of reaching the 
minimum return will be perceived as more valuable than the additional return 
units which will be of use, too, but not that urgently be required. As the trust may 
additionally have a pipeline of promotion-worthy projects, there could be a 
targeted return needed to finance these projects which exceeds the point of the 
minimum return requirement. The marginal utility to finance these projects can be 
expected to be positive, but decreasing in comparison to the minimum returns. 
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The existence of the minimum return point and the targeted return point does not 
necessarily have to be given in every case. It will rather depend on the individual 
circumstances of each trust, where these points are located and whether they 
exist at all.  
 
The personal liability of board members and the implicit prohibition of speculation 
with trust capital may add to the concavity of the curve in the domain of gains. If 
there existed an asymmetry of lacking incentivation for high returns and potential 
sanctions in case of negative ones, the conclusion for investment decision 
makers would possibly be to avoid high return, i.e. high volatility, strategies in 
favour of low yielding investments.  
 
2.7.3 Investment Risk Preferences in the Domain of Losses 
 
Despite the claim for the preservation of capital in the LStiftG, temporary losses 
are undesirable, but cannot completely be excluded. The moderate lower of cost 
or market principle may be taken as a guideline to distinguish between temporary 
and durable losses. Only sustainable losses can imply that the capital base has 
to be replenished in order to keep the performance capability of the trust. In the 
worst case, this would mean a temporary stop of charitable activities. 
Furthermore, the supervisory authority may take action in case of massive 
irregularities that endanger the existence of the trust.  
 
With regard to taxes, charitable trusts do not generally breach the rules of the AO, 
if they suffer losses. They run the serious risk of loosing their tax-exempt status 
only in cases of substantial losses, whereupon “substantial” remains undefined.  
 
Since, especially in times of low yields in the bond market, the search for yield to 
fulfil the purpose of the trusts is connected with investment risk, i.e. volatility, 
moderate losses may be acceptable which supports risk-seeking behaviour in 
this area.  
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2.7.4 Individual Characteristics to be examined 
 
It is not in all cases obvious to name the relevant criteria for an investigation of 
potential differences due to a lack of research in that area. Sandberg (2007) 
states that the sector of German charitable trusts is under-researched regarding 
business themes whereas most of the literature concentrates on legal aspects 
and on taxation. She sees possible reasons in the heterogeneity of the sector and 
the bad data basis which does not even allow stating the precise number of 
trusts, not to mention their asset base.  
 
One exception is the criterion of “size” that is named frequently in the literature 
and has been tested for association with other variables (e.g. in BDS, 2011b). 
This indeed seems to be an important factor for a multitude of differences 
between trusts. Recommendations regarding the investment strategy often point 
to the size of the trust as the single most important criterion. Nonetheless, it has 
not been tested, yet, whether size is also responsible for significant differences in 
investment risk preferences. For the study, not only the current size, measured 
as volume of assets at market prices, of the trust is considered, but also 
additional inflows to the capital base that are foreseeable. 
 
Some criteria are added to the catalogue also for the reason that there is 
evidence from studies of private investors that these factors can be relevant. 
Among these are different behaviour of genders and age. The relevance of 
gender was examined by various researchers, generally coming to the 
conclusion that women are more risk-averse than men. A good overview of 
existing studies is provided in Eckel/Grossmann (2008). Later studies like 
Borghans et al. (2009) come to similar conclusions. An early study of Palsson 
(1996) finds that risk aversion was only systematically correlated with age. 
Gächter (2007) observes age as an important factor with regard to loss aversion. 
These factors can be operationalised regarding the composition of decision 
making bodies in trusts. As far as gender is concerned, the conclusions can be 
drawn from questions concerning the founder and the composition of women and 
men in the decision making body.  
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In the case of “age” not only the age of the decision makers, but also the age of 
the trust is tested for association with risk behaviour. Young trusts may have 
preferences different from old ones due to different goals at an earlier point of the 
life cycle or less experience of the decision makers. 
 
Income and wealth are factors that have also been influential on private 
investors´ risk behaviour (Hartog et al., 2002). Whereas wealth can potentially be 
translated into trust capital corresponding to the factor “size” again, for income, 
the sources of funding and the type of trust must be examined. A trust with high 
income from own operations or regular government funding and relying less on 
income from capital may have a different kind of risk perception than a trust of the 
same size (in trust capital terms) which fully depends on its returns from capital 
investments. Accordingly, the normal activities of the trust, e.g. simple promotion 
of the purpose, own operational activity like running a hospital, or both, may be 
relevant.  
 
The question of existing reserves could be influential, especially with regard to 
the loss-bearing capabilities of a trust. Reserves may allow for taking more risk in 
comparable situations.  
 
The most obvious factor that could influence risk preferences are the statutes of 
the trust. As described above, the statutes are the guiding light for every trust. 
They have to be obeyed and as they may include rules regarding the investment 
strategy, this can have tremendous implications for capital investment. 
 
Referring to the analysis in the chapters above, some circumstances that are 
suspect to potentially influence the investment behaviour are included. Beyond 
the question of gender, it can make a difference who the founder is: company 
trusts may act differently from trusts that have been initiated by churches for 
instance. Potential differences may exist regarding the question whether people 
act differently when making decisions on other peoples´ money. It could be that a 
donor, who is still active, considers the trust capital in a way as “his” money. 
Active participation and influence of the donor shall therefore be examined. 
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Finally, the structure of the capital stock can be expected to mirror investment risk 
preferences. 
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3 The Power of Decision Theory as a Normative and 
Descriptive Tool for Investment Decision Making 
 
3.1 The Theoretical and Practical Problem of Measuring the Perceived 
Utility of Investment Returns 
 
In this study, the preferences for monetary outcomes of investment decisions 
shall be investigated. Outcomes are defined as the results of investment activity 
and may be measured in absolute monetary terms or in percentage gains and 
losses. It is important to distinguish between the expected value of an outcome 
and its expected utility. The expected value is easy to calculate, if the 
probabilities of the potential outcomes are known, and does not depend on the 
individual preferences. In contrast, the perceived utility of an outcome is purely 
subjective by definition. It depends on the individual (or group of people) whether 
an investment result is perceived as more or less favourable in comparison to 
potential alternatives. 
 
Previous research (see Wakker, 2010, for an overview) has developed 
mathematical techniques to quantify and describe preferences by indirect 
elicitation which is the dominant approach in the literature. Direct assessment 
techniques which could alternatively be used were not adopted in this study. 
Analogous to previous research, the author divided the complexity of the 
parameter “utility” into small pieces being lotteries on easily understandable 
questions on investment return preferences. 
 
This study does not aim at the elicitation of a full utility curve or a probability 
weighting function which would additionally be needed to give a complete picture 
under PT. The researcher instead focuses instead on some characteristic parts, 
the so-called 4FP plus the question of loss aversion, and assesses the behaviour 
as risk-seeking or risk-averse which already includes both components: the utility 
curve and the probability weighting function. 
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3.2 Overview of Important Theoretical Concepts in Decision Theory 
 
Decision Theory has developed normative and descriptive concepts. The main 
findings from Expected Utility Theory to Cumulative Prospect Theory shall be 
discussed in order to apply the power of research on decision theory to the study. 
Particular attention is given to the so called “4FP” of PT. 
 
3.2.1 Expected Utility Theory (EUT) as the Standard Normative Approach 
 
Normative decision theory is not a new discipline in science. The beginnings of 
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) can be traced back to Daniel Bernoulli (1738) who 
solves the St. Petersburg Puzzle by distinguishing between “value” and 
“monetary value”. He proposes a logarithmic function to transform the pure 
monetary value of a lottery into value for human beings who usually experience a 
decreasing utility for any incremental monetary unit they receive.  
 
In modern times, von Neumann and Morgenstern´s (VNM) publication “Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior” in its second edition of 1947 was very influential. 
VNM state that decision makers (DM) should try to maximise expected utility and 
provide a normative solution of how DM ought to behave backed by the rationality 
of axioms on preference which they propose. The axiomatisation contains 
principles like completeness, transitivity, independence and continuity. The 
approach combines probabilities and consequences to provide a measure of 
utility expressed in a function with monotonic properties. Even though most 
researchers will probably agree with the rationality behind the axioms, the theory 
can be criticised upon the lack of practical applicability as a prescriptive decision 
rule.  
 
Critique has been directed against the axiom of completeness (Starmer, 2000). 
The axiom postulates that DM already do have well-defined preferences over all 
possible consequences before they take a decision. This may be the case for 
simple lotteries, where all possible consequences can be overlooked easily. The 
argument of completeness looses credibility, however, the more complex the 
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decision case is.  
 
The transitivity axiom has been criticised by Loomes and Taylor (1992). Their 
empirical tests show cyclical preference orderings which clearly contradict the 
validity of the transitivity axiom in practice. 
 
There has been much debate concerning the independence axiom. Allais (1953) 
for example was the first who showed in his famous paradox that a majority of 
people would violate the axiom if put into a decision situation and therefore not 
act according to EUT.  
 
The basic formula of EUT can be described by equation (1): 
 
U(a,b) = p u(a) + (1-p) u(b)       (1) 
 
U is the overall utility of a lottery, a and b are the potential outcomes, p is the 
probability of outcome a and u is the utility of an outcome.  
 
The typical EUT utility curve is concave as agents are usually considered to be 
risk-averse. EUT also permits risk neutrality (linear curve) and risk-seeking 
subjects (convex curve) as shown in figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Curves for preference types under EUT 
 
3.2.2 Inclusion of Behavioural Phenomena in Decision Theory 
 
Many researchers have proposed modifications of EUT based on their 
experimental findings. The discussion of behavioural phenomena in this section 
partly follows the logic of Starmer (2000) who extensively describes the 
developments in non-expected utility theory and states that in contrast to EUT 
none of the non-conventional theories can be reduced to a single preference 
function defined over individual prospects. 
 
Machina (1982) used a triangle (often referred to as the “Machina triangle”) to 
describe risk preferences of subjects. In his Generalized Expected Utility 
Analysis, he proposes local utility functions which allow indifference curves to be 
non-linear and also not parallel which accommodates the empirical observation 
that subjects tend to become more risk-averse the better the potential outcomes 
are. Chew and MacCrimmon`s (1979) Weighted Utility Theory paves a way to a 
weakened form of the independence axiom with indifference curves being linear 
without being parallel. Another weakened form of independence is the axiom of 
“betweenness” described by Gul (1991) and Neilson (1992). All the above 
approaches aim at healing the empirical shortcomings of EUT. They provide 
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solutions that can to a lesser extent be criticised for their theoretical concept but 
for their lack of practical applicability as descriptive models. They lack the 
intuition of a model that is originally built on empirical observation like Prospect 
Theory which is described later. Furthermore, they can be criticised for taking into 
account only objective probabilities and no subjective weightings of probabilities.  
 
Empirical studies in various disciplines of study show that human beings tend to 
have a subjective rather than an objective perception of probabilities (Pidgeon et 
al., 1992). Taking this into account, an additional subjective parameter can have 
an essential influence on the description of risk behaviour. On the one hand, it 
can help to better understand and describe decision problems. On the other 
hand, systematic problems may arise if the weighting of probabilities distorts the 
utility function. This can happen in cases, where for example many objectively 
low probabilities add up to a total subjective probability of more than p=1. Handa 
(1977) for example sees the misperception of objective probabilities by the DM 
and introduces a subjective weighting of objective probabilities  (p) which results 
in a probability weighting function (pwf). The consequence that monotonicity of 
that function is not necessarily given remains a problem for other theorists. 
Machina (1983) rejects any such theory violating monotonicity from a theoretical 
point of view, and also from a practical perspective any such concept is not 
deemed convincing for a consistent description of risk preferences.  
 
Quiggin (1982) and Schmeidler (1989) experience broad acceptance for their 
work on rank dependence in probability weightings. Rank Dependent Expected 
Utility Theory (RDEUT) is a solution to the problem mentioned afore, a probability 
transformation that ensures monotonicity of the function by ranking the potential 
outcomes before assigning decision and probability weights. RDEUT is an 
important milestone in decision theory and it is able to accommodate (Wakker, 
2010) Allais´ paradox because of its probability weighting features. Segal (1990), 
Wakker (1994), and Yaari (1987) provide axiomatisations of RDEUT. 
 
It must be noted that subjective probabilities carry information expressing risk 
attitudes. Risk aversion or -neutrality or -seeking must therefore be regarded as a 
product not only of preferences for outcomes but equally of probability 
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weightings. 
 
Bell (1982, 1985) as well as Loomes and Sugden (1982, 1987) follow a 
psychological approach without axiomatisation. They focus on the investigation 
of the factors “regret” and “disappointment” in their studies. The basic assumption 
is that subjects were disappointed if the outcome of a prospect was not as good 
as they had expected. Agents would therefore strive to take actions and prefer 
options that avoid disappointment. This generally favours and explains risk 
aversion. The theory can be criticised for not satisfying the common theoretical 
postulates of monotonicity and transitivity. It also does not explain why agents 
can be risk-averse for gains but risk-seeking in the domain of losses. 
 
Other researchers focus on the use of decision heuristics which takes into 
account the limited ability of subjects to objectively and completely analyse a 
complex decision problem. According to Payne et al. (1993), people have a 
tool-kit of heuristics and can apply the suitable one to the respective question. For 
predictive purposes, it unfortunately remains open, which heuristic will be used to 
answer the question. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also refer to heuristics to 
describe the “editing phase.” Furthermore, in the Asian disease problem, they 
show how minor changes in presentation can have a significant impact on 
choices of decision makers (Tversky/Kahneman, 1981). The framing of a 
problem can be expected to influence risk perception and preferences. 
 
3.2.3 Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) as the Most Influential Descriptive 
Theory 
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) criticise EUT as a descriptive model and propose 
prospect theory which is supposed to overcome the shortcomings of EUT in 
particular with regard to the violations of the independence axiom. They find the 
certainty effect showing that people are exhibiting risk aversion in the domain of 
sure gains and risk-seeking behaviour in the domain of sure losses. They show 
by the isolation effect that decision makers´ preferences depend on the 
presentation of the problem as a potential gain or a potential loss. As a 
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consequence, in PT, they replace the traditional utility scale which takes into 
account the total level of wealth only, by a coordinate system which distinguishes 
between gains and losses versus a reference point, so that gains and losses can 
be treated separately. The reference point is found in the editing phase using 
heuristics and coding potential outcomes as gains or losses. The value function 
they establish is concave for gains and convex and steeper for losses as shown 
in figure 34. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A typical value function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) define the value function v(x) that is divided into a 
gain and a loss section by 
 
     (2) 
with x as the outcome of a prospect. The parameter determines the shape of 
the value function for gains and  for losses. Both are found to equal 0.88 for 
                                                          
4
  The convention is to label the shape “concave” for a shape like the one shown for gains in figure 3 and to label it 
“convex” for a shape like the one shown for losses in figure 3. This convention is applied throughout this study. 
  
 
54 
Tversky and Kahneman´s data. For the description of the steepness of the 
function in the domain of losses, the researchers additionally introduce a loss 
aversion parameter  which is found to be 2.25 for their data. 
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) replace the objective probabilities used in EUT by 
decision weights based on the observation that people tend to overestimate small 
probabilities and underestimate objectively high probabilities. A weakness of this 
approach is that the sum of the applied decision weights does not necessarily 
equal 1 as in the objective approach of EUT. In the case of more than two 
potential outcomes, the principle of state dominance may therefore be violated: 
If the probabilities of each respective outcome are all low, the assigned value 
calculated by PT may be higher than the certainty equivalent which is not only 
counterintuitive but also violates the rule of in-betweenness. In their later version 
of PT, called Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
introduce a cumulative weighting function based on the ideas of RDEUT which 
resolves the aforementioned problem.  
 
Rieger and Wang (2006) address the same problem and offer an alternative 
solution named Normalised Prospect Theory, where decision weights are first 
added up and then normalised by dividing through the sum of the decision 
weights. 
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) describe probability weighting in the following 
functional form, 
(3) 
 
separating between the subjective probability weightings in the case of gains w+ 
(p) and losses w- (p) with p being the objective probability. For their data, they 
find = 0.61 and = 0.69. 
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This gives the following shapes for their probability weighting function as shown 
in figure 4: 
 
 
Figure 4: Estimates of the probability weighting functions in the domains of gains 
and losses separately (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) 
 
The value V of lotteries with two prospects A and B, where A > B, can then be 
computed by the equation  
 
V = w(p)v(A) + [1-w(p)]v(B)       (4) 
 
The main contributions of Kahneman and Tversky are first the introduction of 
reference dependence of outcomes instead of looking at the total wealth which is 
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intuitive and has been shown in their experiments. The second essential new 
feature is the demonstration of loss aversion which can only be shown with a 
given reference point. People tend to feel hurt more by a loss of X% than they feel 
happy by a respective gain of the same magnitude. That is why Kahneman and 
Tversky do not only divide the utility curve into two parts for gains and losses, but 
also introduce a loss aversion parameter for a better description of losses.  
 
The findings of CPT have subsequently been used by many researchers (see 
Wakker, 2010, for an overview) in different areas of research and not only in 
finance. 
 
3.2.4 The Fourfold Pattern (4FP) of Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion 
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992) found various phenomena in their research 
which have later on been confirmed by the empirical studies of numerous other 
scholars. With regard to risk preferences, their main observations can be 
formulated as the so called 4FP and loss aversion: 
 
1. Individuals exhibit risk aversion over high-probability gains 
2. Individuals exhibit risk-seeking behaviour over low-probability gains 
3. Individuals exhibit loss aversion, i.e. losses loom larger than respective gains 
4. Individuals exhibit risk-seeking behaviour over high-probability losses 
5. Individuals exhibit risk aversion over low-probability losses 
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) define low probability as p<=0.1 and high 
probability as p>=0.5. 
 
The question of risk aversion vs. risk-seeking behaviour can be considered in all 
the above cases as having two components, namely the utility or value function 
on the one hand and the probability weighting function on the other hand. As 
individuals tend to overweight small probabilities, e.g. by assigning a subjective 
10% probability to an objective 5% probability, this effect can overcompensate for 
the shape of the value function.  
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Figure 4 shows the estimated probability weighting functions in the domains of 
gains and losses on the basis of the data of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The 
perceived subjective decision weights w(p) can differ substantially from the 
objective probabilities p. Differences can also be observed between the 
weighting function w+ for gains and the function w- for losses. Only for medium 
probabilities of around 0.4, the perceived probabilities can be considered to be 
close to the objective ones. The steepness of the subjective curves close to p=0 
and the strong convexity close to p=1 are eye-catching.  
 
Probability weighting can explain why people may at the same time buy lottery 
tickets and insurance contracts, as an extreme example. For investment 
decisions, risk-seeking behaviour over low-probability gains (above: 2.) can be 
explained by probability weighting being a curve steep enough for the low 
probabilities to overcompensate the concavity of the utility curve for gains. In the 
domain of losses, risk aversion over low probability losses (5.) is accommodated 
by an overestimation of the low-probability risk that overcompensates for the 
convexity of the value curve.  
 
Most studies in the field confirm the finding of an inverse-S shaped probability 
weighting function (e.g. Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt/Pinto, 2000; Gonzalez/Wu, 
1999; Tversky/Fox, 1995), but some scholars find rather convex patterns of the 
curve. For instance, the median probability weighting function found in the 
experiments of Van de Kuilen et al. (2006) is, in contrast to Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992), convex as for most subjects and concave for 25% of 
participants. They find that risk aversion is driven as much by probability 
weightings as by utility.  
 
With respect to the value function, researchers overwhelmingly confirm concavity 
in the domain of gains (e.g. Laury/Holt, 2002; Baucells/Heukamp, 2006; 
Abdellaoui et al., 2007). Levy/Levy (2002) find contradictory results. 
 
In the domain of losses, convexity as in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is 
discussed more controversially based on differing empirical findings. Laury/Holt 
(2002) find risk-seeking behaviour only for imaginary losses. If real money is 
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involved, their subjects are risk-neutral on average. Abdellaoui et al. (2007) find 
concave utility also in the domain of losses, but preferences turn into risk-seeking 
behaviour due to probability weighting. Abdellaoui (2000) confirms convexity of 
the utility function for losses.  
 
Empirical research on private individuals found that losses loom larger than 
gains. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) determined a loss aversion parameter of 
2.25 based on their data. Other scholars came to similar conclusions: 
Schmidt/Traub (2002) find a loss aversion parameter of 1.43, Pennings/Smidts 
(2003) find 1.81, Abdellaoui/Bleichrodt/Paraschiv (2007) find a range of 1.53 – 
4.99 and Booij/van de Kuilen (2009) find 1.79 on their data.  
 
3.3 Group Decision Making  
 
Previous empirical studies, as in chapter 2.2, that were aiming at eliciting a utility 
curve have treated individuals only. In the case of German charitable trusts, the 
investment behaviour may depend on one key individual that takes the factual 
responsibility, e.g. due to reasons of superior financial education, particular 
knowledge or interest. In these cases it seems appropriate to identify and select 
the relevant individual as a proxy for the overall behaviour of the trust. 
 
It can as well be expected that investment decisions are in many trusts taken by 
groups of people rather than by individuals, i.e. by the trusts´ responsible bodies. 
It must therefore be considered whether and, if so, how and to what extent group 
behaviour may deviate from the behaviour of the individuals or incomplete bodies 
that are examined in this study. The author does not have the opportunity of 
directly examining the behaviour of the complete responsible body. It must 
therefore be analysed whether conclusions for the whole body can be drawn from 
examining single persons of the respective bodies also in trusts that usually rely 
on more one factual decision maker. The results will show the extent of potential 
limitations of the research study. 
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3.3.1 Social Choice Theory as a Normative Attempt to Capture Group 
Behaviour 
 
Analysing group decision making, Arrow (1951) stated in his Impossibility 
Theorem that there existed no generally valid social welfare function, e.g. a 
majority rule, to aggregate individuals´ preferences into group preference 
meeting his four conditions, i.e. of non-dictatorship, ordering, Pareto principle and 
the independence of irrelevant alternatives. This means that a social decision 
could never be rationally justified without violating at least one of the above 
conditions except for cases where the group consists of only one individual or 
there were fewer than three states to choose from.  Arrow´s axioms have been 
discussed and criticised by other scholars (e.g. Fishburn, 1973; Wilson, 1975; 
Binmore, 1994) especially the very strong assumption of the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives. Arrow used simple ordinal measures for utility and avoided 
cardinal scales which is different from the theoretical approaches, EUT and CPT, 
described above. 
 
Harsanyi (1979), in contrast, builds on the concepts of rationality of individual 
utility as in VNMs axioms which can be derived from preferences over lotteries 
and expressed on a cardinal scale. He introduces the idea of a “chairperson,” 
who has two parallel preference orderings, the personal one and a moral attitude 
for the group – a constellation that can also very well be imagined in a German 
charitable trust. The moral attitude can best be described as the weighted 
average of the individual group members´ preference orderings, where the 
weighting is a result of the respective moral weight the chairperson assigns to the 
orderings. In Harsanyi´s second theorem, the same weight is given to all 
individual orderings. This premise is a very strong assumption. It must be 
questioned whether a moral ordering would in practice not consider the specifics 
of the individuals, such as their expertise, experience, moral rank in the group or 
other factors. Furthermore, the ability to learn from other peoples´ reasoning and 
to change one´s initial opinion should be considered. Nevertheless, the main 
contribution of Harsanyi was to disclose a way of aggregation of individual 
preferences that follows the axioms of rationality of VNM. 
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Group preferences can most easily be derived, if they are a result of dictatorship 
or if there is only one individual or if there are less than three alternatives to chose 
from. In reality, in a trust, there could be indeed only one decision maker, 
decisions could be dominated by one dictator and the lotteries to be used in a 
study on decision theory may contain only two alternatives to chose from. 
Following Harsanyi´s ideas, the individual preferences can be aggregated in a 
consistent mathematical way to form the group´s preferences. 
 
3.3.2 Empirical Findings on Group Decisions 
 
In empirical studies, Stoner (1968) found that group decisions can be more risky 
(“risky shift phenomenon”) or more cautious (“cautious shift phenomenon”) than 
the average of the initial individual decisions. The trend of groups making more 
extreme decisions than the average of the individuals as a general phenomenon 
is referred to as “group polarization” (Myers and Lamm, 1976). Cheng and Chiou 
(2008) observed group polarisation in investment decisions under framing as in 
PT. 
 
Tindale, Kameda and Hinsz (2003) state that the finding of majorities being able 
to enforce their opinion was one of the more consistent and robust findings in 
previous research. Davis´ (1996) Social Judgement Scheme (SJS) weights 
preferences of the members of a group by the centrality of the opinion in 
comparison to other members´ opinions. The closer a member´s position is to the 
other members´ positions, the more weight is assigned. This also implies that low 
weight is given to outsider opinions. Empirical tests support the theory.  
 
The literature identifies some aspects of particularly high relevance that shall be 
exploited for the intended research programme. Kameda, Tindale and Davis 
(2002) describe “social sharedness” as the main driver for decisions. Kameda, 
Ohtsubo and Takezawa (1997) argue that centrality in the socio-cognitive 
network is a key aspect. Voting rules can play a role as well as binding 
mechanisms, belief clusters and group norms in the organisation. In some 
charitable trusts, “groupthink,” a phenomenon of avoiding conflicts and 
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maintaining unanimity, may prevail (Janis, 1972). Experts, group size and 
leadership can also play a role. The researcher therefore established criteria for 
the selection of subjects for the study. 
 
3.3.3. Implications of Group Decision Making as a Limitation to the Study 
 
From a purely normative point of view, following Harsanyi´s (1979) second 
theorem, looking at individuals instead of the complete decision making bodies 
could easily be justified. Given that all individual views can be aggregated having 
the same weight, a sufficiently high number of randomly selected decision 
makers of different trusts will be acceptable for a representative elicitation of 
preferences for the participating trusts. This is fully compatible with the axioms of 
rationality postulated by VNM and therefore perfectly matches the theoretical 
framework of EUT. 
 
Empirical studies have shown that group decisions can lead to results that are 
either more or in other cases less than the weighted sum of the individual 
constituents. Cheng/Chiou (2008) show in their study on polarisation in group 
investment decisions on the background of PT-like framing, which is the most 
related piece of research to this study as far as group decision making under PT 
is concerned, that group decisions exhibit stronger tendencies towards framing 
effects, i.e. risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk-seeking in the domain of 
losses, than individual decisions. On the basis of existing research, the 
researcher was unable to isolate and quantify the potential effects of group 
decisions. This is a limitation of the study. 
 
3.4 Synthesis / Conclusions of Chapter 3 
 
The literature on decision theory offers theoretical and practical concepts to 
measure utility. They reach from the early approaches of defining rational 
behaviour as a basis for decision making as in EUT to the more descriptively 
oriented concepts of CPT which are bound to capture also the seemingly 
irrational behaviour exhibited by human beings. The strength of the EUT concept 
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lies in its underlying rationality of the axioms. It has shortcomings in the 
description of real world behaviour. CPT has been developed to better describe 
human behaviour beyond the rationality of EUT. Its strengths are the 
characteristic features such as reference point dependence, loss aversion and 
probability weighting, which give more flexibility to the concept. Both concepts 
have commonalities in the way how utility is defined and presented, which is an 
advantage for the research programme as the results can be tracked against the 
theoretical background of both theories.  
 
Group decisions can deviate from the ones that individuals would take. This is not 
so much a problem in the normative world of EUT, where an aggregation of 
individual preferences on the basis of VNM axioms can be justified. The limitation 
is rather the assumption of full compatibility between CPT and the descriptive 
findings on group behaviour.  
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4  Synthesis of the Literature Review: Applying Decision Theory to 
the Investment Behaviour of German Charitable Trusts  
 
It can be expected that the research on the specific group of German charitable 
trusts as subjects which to the knowledge of the author has not been carried out 
before, may deliver results different from those of existing studies on the 
behaviour of students or the general public with regard to risk preferences. 
Previous research, also the descriptive works, has mainly been theoretically 
motivated and driven by the establishment of general assumptions on decision 
making. It offers normative solutions on the one hand and descriptions of real (or 
simulated) investment behaviour on the other. Normative theory exhibits the 
afore mentioned weaknesses in practical usage, whereas descriptive theory 
offers a “typical” value function as a result of the aggregation of individual utility 
perceptions of private persons which can empirically be measured, but may 
potentially show tremendous differences on the individual level. 
 
The literature review led to numerous conjectures for investigation. These 
conjectures can be divided into two groups. The first group of conjectures deals 
with the general risk preferences of German charitable trusts and is summarised 
in the following section 4.1. These conjectures will be treated by the first of the 
two research questions to be asked. 
 
The second group of conjectures concerns the individual characteristics of trusts 
and is summarised in section 4.2. These conjectures will be treated under the 
second research question. 
 
4.1 Testing the Risk Preferences of German Charitable Trusts for the 
Fourfold Pattern (4FP) of Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion 
 
The restrictive and binding legal framework for German charitable trusts may 
potentially affect decision making in such a massive way that these subjects will 
be much more of a homogeneous group than private individuals without these 
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restrictions can be and which have been subjects of prior research. 
 
CPT is based on empirical observations that support the assumption of 
decreasing marginal utility leading to risk aversion in the domain of gains and 
risk-seeking behaviour in the domain of losses. Given the need of certain 
minimum and targeted returns to finance the purpose of the trust, it can be 
expected that risk aversion will prevail in the domain of gains, similar to the shape 
of utility which has been established in previous studies using students, scientists 
or the general public as subjects. In the domain of losses, it seems most 
interesting to investigate risk preferences of trusts which need to strive for capital 
preservation, and compare them to what is known about natural persons from 
prior research. 
 
Special attention must be given to the question of loss aversion. The postulation 
of capital preservation speaks for risk aversion in mixed (gain/loss) situations. 
The study also tests whether –analogous to prior research – subjects are 
risk-seeking for small-probability high gains and risk-averse for small-probability 
high losses. Given the avoidance of gambling situations, it can be anticipated that 
trusts exhibit risk aversion for both cases. 
 
The conjectures regarding the generally prevailing preferences of trusts with 
respect to the 4FP of PT and loss aversion are: 
 
1. Risk aversion in the domain of gains. (analogous to prior PT observations) 
2. Risk aversion also in the special case of low-probability high gain 
situations (different from the overweighting of small probabilities in prior 
observations with private individuals which led to risk-seeking behaviour) 
3. Loss aversion (analogous to prior PT observations) 
4. Risk-seeking behaviour in the domain of small to medium-sized losses 
(analogous to original PT, but mixed results in other research) 
5. Risk aversion for the special case of low-probability high losses 
(analogous to prior PT observations) 
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Testing for the 4FP of PT allows the author also to compare the results to EUT 
prescriptions which would demand for a consistent pattern, e.g. risk aversion, for 
all questions. Theoretically, also consistent patterns of risk-neutral or 
risk-seeking preferences would be acceptable to EUT. In practice, it can be 
derived from the nature of trusts that of these three general patterns only risk 
aversion can have the potential to prevail for all questions. 
 
It is possible that the preferences are too heterogeneous so that no characteristic 
preferences for trusts in general can be found. A finding of this kind would also be 
valuable as it would oppose the idea of standardised products like specialised 
mutual funds, which already exist in the market, as an investment vehicle that can 
satisfy the risk preferences of all trust investors in the same way. 
 
4.2 Testing for the Association between Risk Preferences of Trusts and 
their Individual Characteristics 
 
The analysis of trust characteristics in chapter 2 gives reason to conjecture that 
the risk preferences of trusts may in certain cases systematically deviate from the 
general pattern. The circumstances that are suspect to cause deviating risk 
attitudes are listed below: 
 
1. Size of the trust (measured in terms of the asset base) 
2. Age of the trust 
3. Donor and donor´s influence on investment decisions 
4. Type of trust 
5. Structure of the capital stock 
6. Sources of funding 
7. Expected growth of the asset base 
8. Existence of reserves 
9. Statutes of the trust 
10. Number, gender and age of decision makers 
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The parameter values of these characteristics could be associated with 
differences in the preferences regarding one or more of the five PT features. 
 
Re 1. Size of the trust (measured in terms of asset base) 
The size of a trust measured by its total capital may play a role with regard to the 
perceived utility of investment returns and was named most frequently as a 
distinguishing factor in prior research. Large trusts are supposed to have more 
know-how and capacities to deal with investment risk. 
 
Conjecture:  
The bigger a trust, the more it will be able and willing to accept risks.  
 
Re 2. Age of the trust 
The age of a trust can be relevant for risk preferences for several reasons. The 
experience within an organisation can make a difference for risk attitudes. It may 
also have influence in an indirect way as old trusts had the opportunity to build 
reserves, a factor that will be discussed separately, for a longer period of time. 
 
Conjecture:  
The older a trust, the more it will be able and willing to accept risks.  
 
Re 3. Donor and donor´s influence on investment decisions 
The donor and the donor´s influence on financial decision making can evoke 
differences in risk attitudes. As an example, if public money is involved and public 
attention given to the trust, decision makers may be more risk averse than in 
other cases. A donor who is a natural person and still active and influential in 
decision making, may have a particularly strong commitment to the capital 
invested. 
 
Conjecture:  
Some types of donors will cause more risk-averse behaviour than others.  
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Re 4. Type of trust 
The type of trust can have a significant meaning for the investment strategy. A 
trust that is predominantly involved in running its operational activities to fulfil the 
purpose may depend to a lesser degree on the financial capital for that mission 
and therefore be willing to accept more investment risk. 
Conjecture:  
The more a trust is involved in operational activities, the more it will be able and 
willing to accept risks.  
 
Re 5. Structure of the capital stock 
The structure of the capital stock can already be an expression of risk 
preferences. Depending on the volatility of assets in the portfolio, risk attitudes 
can be derived.  
 
Conjecture:  
The higher the portion of volatile assets in the portfolio, the more these trusts are 
willing to accept risks.  
 
Re 6. Sources of funding 
The behaviour of trusts may depend on the degree they rely on income from 
investments. Trusts that finance their activities partly or even predominantly by 
donations or other sources could possibly show less risk aversion on investments 
than trusts without alternative source of income.  
 
Conjecture:  
The more trusts rely on income from capital, the more risk-averse can they be 
expected to be.  
 
Re 7. Expected growth of the asset base 
Trusts expecting to grow by external factors may have a different attitude towards 
risks on the existing capital base. Expecting a growing capital base may be 
associated with more risk-seeking behaviour. 
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Conjecture:  
Trusts that expect growth of assets through external factors will be more 
risk-seeking than others.  
 
Re 8. Reserves 
Reserves could be an important factor for risk preferences of trusts. Assuming 
that a trust usually has some fixed basis costs and potentially also recurring 
obligations, reserves can help to finance spending activities in times when 
current income from capital is low. Reserves can therefore allow for riskier 
investments. 
 
Conjecture:  
The more reserves are available in a trust, the less risk-averse will be their 
behaviour.  
 
Re 9. Statutes of the trust 
The statutes of the trust represent the will of the donor and have to be followed. 
Restrictions like “gilt-edged investments only” can therefore have significant 
consequences on preferences. 
 
Conjecture:  
Restrictions that are severely limiting risk like gilt-edged investment will be 
observable in risk-averse behaviour.  
 
Re 10. Number, gender and age of decision makers 
The number, gender and age of decision makers can be relevant for differences 
in risk attitudes as well. Evidence comes from research on private individuals. 
 
Conjecture:  
Risk aversion will increase with the number and age of decision makers and the 
involvement of female decision makers. 
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4.3 Capturing the Potential Limitations of the Study 
 
Limitations to the study have different origins. The main potential limitations that 
were addressed are the question of group vs. individual behaviour and the 
comparability of trusts in the sample. 
4.3.1 Potential Differences between Group and Individual Decisions 
 
In order to mitigate the potential effects of group versus individual decisions (as 
discussed in chapter 2.3), the researcher must put emphasis on a careful 
selection of participants. The researcher therefore needed to predefine criteria in 
the sense of minimum requirements concerning the appropriateness of the 
subjects as representatives of the trusts on the basis of empirical research on 
group decision making. The criteria are: 
 
1. Position of the subject within the trust 
2. Influence on investment decisions 
 
The author assumes that the careful selection of subjects by way of defining 
minimum requirements allowed for the elicitation of risk preferences that were 
characteristic of the respective charitable trusts and as an aggregate for German 
charitable trusts in general. 
 
4.3.2 Potential Non-Comparability of Trusts in the Sample 
 
Trusts were excluded from the study, if they did not meet the following 
requirements: 
 
1. Charitable status from the fiscal authorities 
2. Unlimited intended life time 
3. No restrictions in the guidelines of the statutes that make investment 
decisions redundant 
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4.4  Research Questions, Aims, Objectives and Hypotheses 
 
The literature review has identified research gaps with regard to the elicitation of 
risk preferences of German charitable trusts. This study therefore addressed 
these issues and investigated the investment risk preferences of decision makers 
acting on behalf of trusts based on decision theory, in particular on the 4FP of PT. 
The result is a description of the “typical” risk preferences of trusts in general 
concerning the 4FP and loss aversion. 
 
Additionally, the analysis in the literature review has brought up differences in the 
characteristics of trusts that were suspect to influence investment preferences. 
Thus, the characteristics of trusts were tested for association with the stated risk 
preferences concerning the 4FP and loss aversion. 
 
Research Questions: 
 
1. What investment risk preferences do decision makers acting on behalf of 
German charitable trusts exhibit with regard to the features of the 4FP of 
PT and loss aversion? 
 
2. Are there associations between the characteristics of German charitable 
trusts and their investment risk preferences concerning the features of the 
4FP of PT and loss aversion? 
 
Research Aims: 
 
1. To elicit the investment risk preferences of decision makers acting on 
behalf of German charitable trusts with regard to the 4FP of PT and loss 
aversion 
2. To elicit whether and which characteristics of German charitable trusts are 
associated with investment risk preferences concerning the features of the 
4FP of PT and loss aversion 
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Research Objectives: 
 
- To elicit and aggregate the preferences of all decision makers acting on 
behalf of trusts for the five features separately  
- To identify the characteristics of German charitable trusts which are 
influential on their risk preferences 
- To assess the most significant characteristics regarding their influence on 
risk preferences 
- To evaluate and enrich the findings by judgements of stakeholders 
(triangulation of results) 
 
 
Research Hypotheses: 
 
1. Hº: Decision makers acting on behalf of German charitable trusts do not 
exhibit investment risk preferences analogous to the 4FP and loss 
aversion typically found with natural persons by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992). 
Hª: Decision makers acting on behalf of German charitable trusts exhibit 
investment risk preferences analogous to the 4FP and loss aversion 
typically found with natural persons by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
2. Hº: The investment preferences of German charitable trusts are not 
associated with their characteristics. 
Hª: The investment preferences of German charitable trusts are 
associated with their characteristics. 
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5  Pilot Study Report 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The pilot study was conducted in order to confirm the research paradigm, which 
is positivist, the appropriateness of the initial research theory and to test the 
intended research methodology. It concentrated on the part of cross-sectional 
data collection from trusts by a questionnaire, the backbone of the whole study, 
and was supposed to cover the main content that is subject for the corresponding 
cross-sectional part of the main study. The researcher tested a traditional mail 
survey as well as an online survey.  
Addresses of trusts were selected from an official federal register.  
 
The second part for the main study of interviewing trusts and experts by 
telephone for a triangulation of results was not part of the pilot. Instead, some 
participating trusts were called and asked for their experience with the 
questionnaire and further remarks. 
 
The pilot study was conducted especially in order to …: 
 
- confirm the positivist research paradigm. 
- confirm the appropriateness of the initial research theory. 
- test the research methodology in general including also the technical 
aspects of feasibility. 
- test the absolute and comparative response rate in mail and online 
surveys. 
- test the understanding of questions by the respondents. 
- test the quality of data to be obtained. 
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5.2 Methods of data collection  
 
The pilot study included two methods of data collection, traditional mail and 
online, in order to allow for comparisons of advantages and disadvantages 
between the two. For the mail survey, 20 letters were sent out, including a cover 
letter, a letter of support from EBS, the one-pager questionnaire and a stamped 
envelope in order to facilitate response.5 One week after the mailing, a reminder 
postcard was sent. For the online survey, the text of the cover letter was used and 
a link embedded leading to the questionnaire. A reminder e-mail was sent four 
days after the initial e-mail. The questionnaire was created online on a scientific 
platform that is free of charge if used for scientific research work. The survey 
questionnaire can be found on the internet: 
https://www.soscisurvey.de/stiftungen 
password: 2012 
 
Questions were identical for both surveys. The only deviations were the form of 
presentation and a more detailed scale in question 13 due to less problems of 
space in the online survey in comparison to the one-sheet-only approach 
followed in the mail survey. A further difference was that the online survey used 
random walk in question 17 with regard of positioning the “safe” vs. the “chance” 
options left or right on the screen. In the traditional mail survey, the “safe” option 
was always placed on the left side. 
 
The trusts for this pilot study were selected by their expected size and age out of 
the official register of trusts in the federal state of Rhineland-Palatinate in order to 
include a variety of trusts. These criteria were applied because age is available in 
the official register and size could be anticipated due to entries in the directory 
itself or investigations on the homepages of the trusts if available.  
 
The geographical limitation on Rhineland-Palatinate´s trusts in the pilot was due 
to the easy availability of this official register. For the main study on German 
trusts in general, the researcher relied on Maecenata Institute´s data base to 
                                                          
5
 The cover letter and the one-pager questionnaire can be found in appendix A and appendix B. 
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avoid any potential bias caused by using a sample of one single state. The 
researcher expected no major shortcomings in using a geographically limited 
sample for the pilot study with regard to the issues being tested. It could be 
expected that the trusts in the pilot study have to a sufficient degree similar 
characteristics to those of the population of German trusts. 
 
5.3 Construction of a Questionnaire  
 
The questionnaire was constructed with the following objectives and under 
following propositions. 
 
5.3.1 Elicitation of investment preferences 
 
The researcher aimed at the basic elicitation of risk-averse vs. risk-seeking 
behaviour. Details on the shape of the utility curve were left out due to feasibility 
issues. Pre-tests by the researcher revealed that it would be hard to find a 
sufficient and representative number of trusts willing to participate in rather time 
consuming (approximately 1h) interviews answering a high number of questions 
(approximately 100) on their investment behaviour. This kind of methodology was 
used by other researchers in a similar way, but in the laboratory and mainly with 
students. However, it did not seem feasible with trusts in the field for this study. 
For that reason, there is no differentiation between probability weights and the 
utility curve. The answers to the questions revealed whether the subject is 
risk-averse or risk-seeking in the respective situation. No attribution was made 
regarding the contribution of the probability weighting and the utility curve. These 
issues are also interesting to elicit from an academic perspective, but were not 
essential to the research questions to be answered in this study. 
 
This simplification allowed the researcher to get along with only five questions 
intended to investigate the basic PT characteristics: 
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- risk-averse or -seeking behaviour for gains with balanced probabilities (Q 17.1) 
- risk-averse or -seeking behaviour for high gains with low probability (Q17.2) 
- determine loss aversion yes/no (Q 17.3) 
- risk-averse or -seeking behaviour for losses with balanced probabilities (Q 17.4) 
- risk-averse or -seeking behaviour for large losses with low probabilities (Q 17.5) 
 
5.3.2 Questions on Trusts´ Characteristics 
 
The researcher aimed at testing for association of certain distinguishing features 
of trust characteristics with their investment behaviour. The trust characteristics 
were identified in questions 1 – 16. These had been influenced by previous 
research questionnaires in the field of trusts (BDS, 2011; Sandberg, 2007; 
Heissmann, 2005). They had also been influenced by research on circumstances 
relevant for differing investment behaviour among private individuals like gender 
and age (Eckel/Grossmann, 2008; Gächter, 2007). Additionally, the questions 
had been influenced by the results of the literature review which pointed to some 
factors that might be relevant like the reserves of a trust. 
 
5.3.3 Categorisation of Questions 
 
The questions can be classified into five categories: 
Cat. A: Questions aiming at gathering information on trust characteristics only (9, 
two of them elicit two characteristics) 
Cat. B: “K.O. questions”6 to discard trusts that are not in the scope of the study 
and respondents that are considered to be not suited to answer the questions (3: 
Q4, Q5, Q13) 
Cat. C: Questions that contain elements of both, A and B, i.e. collect information 
but can potentially be K.O. (2: Q11, Q12) 
Cat. D: Questions to elicit the risk preferences (5: Q17.1 – Q17.5) 
Cat. E: 3 Optional questions asking for contact details for allowing further 
questions via telephone (collection of contacts for the triangulation interviews), 
                                                          
6
 K.O. stands for Knock-out and describes questions that were used to eliminate subjects from the study 
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comments to the study and asking for interest in receiving an executive summary 
of the study after completion. 
 
BDS as well as Prof. Sandberg were so kind to make available the results and the 
questionnaire used in their surveys for StiftungsReport 2010/11 (BDS, 2011) and 
Sandberg (2007). This gave important indications for the construction of the 
questionnaire and some questions were adopted. It also gave ideas about the 
potential distribution of criteria between trusts and was therefore helpful in 
defining clusters for tick-box questions like the ones used to identify the size of a 
trust. 
 
Dr. Graf Strachwitz, who is in responsible position at Maecenata Institute, 
Humboldt University Berlin, and very actively publishing in the field of German 
trusts (e.g. Strachwitz, 2010, 2011) as well as Dr. Münschener, a researcher from 
CSI, University of Heidelberg, who was running a study on trusts parallel to this 
pilot study (Then et al., 2012), gave very concrete and helpful comments on the 
construction of the questionnaire.  
 
As an expert on decision theory, Prof. Rieger from University of Trier, who 
publishes in the field of Prospect Theory (e.g. Rieger, 2011), gave comments in 
particular regarding the appropriateness of questions 17.1. – 17.5 to assess the 
risk behaviour of trusts. 
 
5.4 Results of the Pilot Study 
 
5.4.1 Technical Comparison of Online vs. Mail Survey 
 
In order to find the most appropriate method of data collection for the main study, 
mail and online pilot were compared. 
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Online Survey Statistics     
Invitations sent out:  20  
Clicks on the internet survey:  12  
Complete and usable questionnaires: 6  
Complete but discarded for K.O. questions:  0  
Incomplete and unusable:  1 (person left after p. 1) 
Click on the link and log-in only:  5  
Response rate:  30%  
Usable response rate: 30%  
Time for completion: average = 8 min. ; range: 5-12 min.  
 
Table 1: Technical results of the pilot study online survey 
 
Table 1 shows that the online response rate as well as the quality of complete 
answers was very good, with all questions answered. No subject had to be 
discarded for the reason of not meeting the researcher´ predefined criteria. The 
high number of log-ins without completion of the questionnaire could have had 
several reasons:  
 
- Subjects might have felt not attracted by the design or content and 
therefore quit early 
- Curiosity of subjects 
- Double counts: it could not be traced whether these subjects have 
completed the questionnaire at a later point of time 
- Forwarding to a more suitable addressee after having had a first glance on 
the kind of questions 
 
As a consequence, the researcher strived to optimise the design of the first page 
for the main study and also re-arranged the sequence of questions with “more 
attractive” questions appearing on the first page.  
The time range for completion was considered acceptable by the researcher. 
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Mail Survey Statistics     
Invitations sent out:  20  
Complete and usable questionnaires:  3  
Incomplete but usable questionnaires: 2  
Complete but discarded for K.O. questions:  2 no capital inv./low infl. 
Incomplete and unusable:  1 Q17.1-17.5 all left out 
Response rate:  40%  
Usable response rate: 25%  
 
Table 2: Technical results of the pilot study mail survey 
 
Table 2 shows that the response rate in the mail survey was high with a rate of 
40%, whereas the quality of responses was rather mixed: only three 
questionnaires were both complete and usable. The incomplete questionnaires 
had different questions missing (Q1, Q6, Q15 / Q8, 10, 14, 15) with the exception 
of Q 15. This pointed at no systematic problems with the missing questions. 
Question 15, asking for the average age of decision makers, seemed to be a 
particular challenge for two subjects and was not answered by them.  
 
The other questions left out by the two subjects did not coincide. So, it seemed 
less an issue of quality of the questions, rather arbitrary and subject specific. 
 
One subject missed to tick the preference questions 17.1 – 17.5. Reasons for this 
behaviour could be sought in a variety of potential fields: failure to turn the page 
(because these questions were placed on the back side of the sheet), questions 
too difficult to understand, no willingness to answer these questions, lack of time, 
or other reasons. 
 
The number of questionnaires that had to be discarded by the researcher for the 
criteria set in the study was high but not unexpected. It was on the other hand 
remarkable that most letters that were answered found an appropriate addressee 
within the trust.  
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Comparison (summarised in table 3): 
 
The response rate in both surveys was good and even very good in the mail 
survey. As far as the quality of answers is concerned, both methods delivered 
good results, online was better than mail. The online survey might have had 
some bias because not every trust had an e-mail address in the register of trusts. 
Mail addresses were available for all trusts.  
 
The researcher strived to reduce the number of questions to the trusts to a 
minimum in order to be able to achieve a high response rate with a 
one-sheet-only approach. As a consequence, space for open questions was 
limited. The online questionnaire did not encounter these problems. As a useful 
feature, the online survey additionally offered the possibility to alternate the 
positioning of answer alternatives for Q 17.1 – 17.5 which may have prevented 
subjects from ticking systematically only the safe options on the left side or the 
risky options on the right side. 
 
The expenses for the two pilot study surveys differed significantly. Whereas the 
online survey could be conducted without generating any costs on a platform for 
scientific studies that is free of charge, the traditional mail survey required: 
- postage: € 1.45 + € 0.75 for the return letter stamp + € 0.45 for the reminder 
postcard = € 2.65 per trust 
- copies of paper: ca. € 0.28  
- envelopes: € 0.05 
- postcards: € 0.10 
This summed up to expenses of ca. € 3.08 per invited trust. 
 
The time for the preparation of the survey would be shorter for online. Sending 
out standardised invitation e-mails is much less time consuming than handling 
with envelopes, stamps and paper. Time can also be saved, if the data is already 
available in a format to be processed by a computer. 
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Criterion Online Mail 
Potential bias / availability of addresses - + 
Response rate + ++ 
Quality of responses ++ + 
Layout / space for answers, e.g. for 
semi-open questions 
++ - 
Random walk questions possible 17.1 -17.5 ++ -- 
Time for preparation + - 
Cost efficiency ++ -- 
Time for structured analysis + - 
 
Table 3: Comparison of online vs. mail survey in the pilot study 
 
The researcher favoured the online version for data collection in the main study 
as a result of the above analysis. 
 
5.4.2 Analysis of Data and Consequences for the Main Study 
 
No obvious systematic differences in contents of the data had been detected 
between online and mail which would have made necessary a separate 
presentation of the analysis of data. Therefore the data of both collection 
methods was aggregated for further analysis. 
 
First of all, the answers in the risk preference section of the questionnaire (Q 17.1 
– 17.5) were analysed. 
 
Q 17.1 Domain of high probability (p=0.5) gains 
 
91% of subjects voted in favour of the safe alternative. This clearly shows risk 
aversion in the domain of gains with equal probabilities. This could be expected 
from the literature review. The result is so clear that it must be questioned 
whether the risky alternative should be made more attractive to get a more 
balanced result that gives room for analysing potential association of answers to 
the trusts´ characteristics. The researcher added a question with an increased 
favourable outcome of the “chance” alternative in the main study. The expected 
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value of the “chance” option was then higher. 
 
Q 17.2 Domain of low probability (p=0.05) high gains 
 
100% of the subjects voted in favour of the safe alternative, even the subject that 
chose the risky alternative in the first question. The question was implemented in 
order to investigate potential risk-seeking behaviour due to overweighting of 
small probabilities in a choice between alternatives with equal expected value. 
The result was so clear that the researcher tried an alternative question in a 
further pilot study to investigate this phenomenon that may to a certain degree 
also exist with trusts. It could be that trusts regarded the question as pure 
gambling which should be avoided under all circumstances, a behaviour well 
supported by the literature review. Another possible explanation for the result is 
that the utility curve of trusts is very steep for low positive returns (as 0.4%) and 
then flattens towards high returns (as 8%), so that even in the case of 
overweighting small probabilities, the effect is simply overcompensated by the 
comparatively high utility of the small gain.  
 
Q 17.3 Loss Aversion 
 
60% of the subjects voted in favour of the safe alternative, 40% chose the risky 
one. The postulation of capital preservation, elaborated in the literature review, 
speaks for the safe alternative. On the other hand, the preservation of capital is 
not a purpose of its own. In order to fulfil the will of the donor, the trust needs 
returns on its investment and may therefore opt for the risky alternative which at 
least offers a fair chance (50%) of a return. 
 
One subject who had answered 17.1 and 17.2 refused to answer this question as 
well as the two following ones, considering them as “nonsense”. This could 
indicate reluctance to deal with losses and an investment strategy that is limited 
to assets with no volatility like time deposits. 
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Q 17.4 Domain of high probability (p=0.5) losses 
 
50% of subjects answering the question decided in favour of the safe alternative, 
the other 50% chose the risky one. This supports the results from the literature 
review. It is not clear whether a trust should better realise losses early or rather 
wait and see for improvement of the situation. Risk-averse behaviour supports 
the avoidance of large(r) losses and is a step to protect the capital base. On the 
other hand, risk-seeking behaviour can be a rational option for a trust that wants 
to avoid write-downs on its assets that would incur with the realisation of losses. 
The risk-seeking option may, as a detailed analysis including a breakdown of 
asset classes would possibly show, be found more often with trusts that are used 
to invest in volatile markets like equities and know that they have to accept 
temporary book losses to some degree. For the main study, the researcher 
specified question 6 concerning “financial assets” to gather more detailed 
information (equities, bonds, derivatives for protection, etc.).  
 
Q 17.5 Domain of low probability (p=0.05) high losses 
 
The risk-averse option was favoured by 60% of the answering subjects, 40% 
chose the risky option. This question aimed at the willingness to buy protection 
against large losses and how trusts deal with low risk for large losses. This is 
particularly relevant with regard to investment decisions that involve at least 
some risk of large losses like equities and the willingness to buy protection, e.g. 
by a put option. Given the mixed picture, it was interesting to investigate in a 
detailed analysis whether certain trust characteristics are relevant for the 
decision on this question. Here again, the asset allocation on a more detailed 
asset class level could be helpful.  
 
5.5 Pilot Study Summary and Conclusions 
 
The positivist research paradigm was confirmed. Nevertheless, the pilot study 
also revealed that some qualitative elements – as intended for the main study – 
would help to understand results better and give explanations.  
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The initial research theory was considered appropriate. 
The research methodology worked in practice. Technical aspects of feasibility 
had been tested successfully. 
Online was considered to be the appropriate method of data collection for the 
main study after having conducted a comparison with traditional mail. 
The quantity as well as the quality of responses was good. Understanding of 
questions by the respondents was regarded as confirmed. 
 
Some open issues could be identified, meaning that questions should be 
modified and tested in another pilot study for fine-tuning. 
 
5.6 Amendments after the Pilot Study for Fine-Tuning 
 
The fine-tuning pilot studies had shown that the questionnaire could carry a few 
more questions without provoking a significantly declining response rate. These 
additional questions were mainly used for more lottery questions in order to be 
able not only to reach conclusions about risk-averse vs. risk-seeking behaviour 
but also to compare the results of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) on individuals 
with the preferences of trusts exhibited in this study.  
 
The more detailed question on the allocation of financial assets was tested 
successfully. 
 
Another question was successfully implemented asking for the investment results 
of the past five years. This gave a longitudinal element to the study, even if the 
question was not answered by all the participating subjects. 
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5.7 Synthesis of Literature Review and Pilot Study Results 
 
The literature review exhibited a variety of questions to be answered. These can 
be put into two categories. 
 
The first category of questions concerns the general investment preferences of 
trusts in the domain of gains, losses and for mixed outcomes. 
 
The conjectures derived from the literature regarding the generally prevailing 
preferences of trusts with respect to the 4FP of PT and loss aversion are stated 
as in chapter 4: 
 
1 Risk aversion in the domain of gains. (analogous to prior PT observations) 
2. Risk aversion also in the special case of low-probability high gain 
situations (different from the overweighting of small probabilities in prior 
observations with private individuals which led to risk-seeking behaviour) 
3. Loss aversion (analogous to prior PT observations) 
4. Risk-seeking behaviour in the domain of small to medium-sized losses 
(analogous to original PT, but mixed results in prior research) 
5. Risk aversion for the special case of low-probability high losses 
(analogous to prior PT observations) 
 
The pilot study gave very clear confirming indications for the first two points. As 
expected, the indication for the other three conjectures was less clear. The main 
study should give evidence about the preferences of trusts in these questions.  
 
The literature review identified ten circumstances that could be responsible for 
deviating risk preferences. They are named in chapter 4 as 
 
1. Size of the trust (measured in terms of asset base) 
2. Age of the trust 
3. Donor and donor´s influence on investment decisions 
4. Type of trust 
  
 
85 
5. Structure of the capital stock 
6. Sources of funding 
7. Expected growth of the asset base 
8. Existence of reserves 
9. Statutes of the trust 
10. Number, gender and age of decision makers 
 
The size of the pilot study was not sufficiently large to determine meaningful 
indications regarding the circumstances. The test for association of variables by 
chi square was not conducted for that reason. A first visual analysis spoke for the 
existence of at least some associations.  
 
The study would also have yielded a substantial contribution to research, if it had 
not found any association between characteristics and preferences. This would 
have shown that trusts were either very homogeneous (for example in the 
domain of gains) or so heterogeneous that no association was possible.  
 
The analysis of the pilot study gave confidence to the researcher that meaningful 
results on the investment preferences of German charitable trusts could be 
generated in the main study. 
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6 Main Study Methodology 
 
6.1 Overview of the Mixed Methods Research Design 
 
The research design followed the path of a mixed methods sequential 
explanatory approach (Creswell, 2003; Ivankova et al., 2006; 
Tashakkori/Teddlie, 1998). The methodology comprised quantitative and 
qualitative elements with a strong focus on the quantitative measurement of 
investment risk preferences and linking them to the characteristics of trusts.  
 
A central methodological question was the measurement of subjective risk 
preferences which was the essential part of the quantitative data collection. Thus, 
the author discusses first and extensively the works of researchers in the field of 
decision theory as a basis for this study. Subsequently, the phases of quantitative 
data collection and analysis are described. The results of the cross-sectional 
internet survey were used to inform the qualitative phase: Interview questions 
were developed and participants were selected on the basis of the quantitative 
data. Qualitative data was then collected by semi-structured telephone interviews 
and analysed in order to triangulate and to explain the quantitative results. 
Finally, quantitative and qualitative results were integrated for interpretation with 
regard to decision theoretical aspects and implications for investment products 
for trusts. 
 
The first research question  
 
“What investment risk preferences do decision makers acting on behalf of 
German charitable trusts exhibit with regard to the features of the 4FP of PT 
and loss aversion?” 
 
was answered by assessing the distribution of the stated answers regarding 
risk-seeking and risk-averse behaviour for the five settings. 
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The second research question  
 
“Are there associations between the characteristics of German charitable trusts 
and their investment risk preferences concerning the features of the 4FP of PT 
and loss aversion?” 
 
was answered by testing for association of the single characteristics of the trusts 
(e.g. in the case of “age” three brackets labelled “old”, “medium”, “young”) to the 
answers to the risk preference questions by a chi square test for each of the five 
settings  and each of the characteristics. 
 
 
Figure 5 gives an overview of the research design. 
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Phase   Procedure    Product 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Overview of research design, analogous to Ivankova et al. (2006) 
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6.2 The Methods of Measuring Risk Preferences in Decision 
Theory  
 
There are several well tested methods to determine risk preferences in the sense 
of decision theory. There is no single best method to choose. All of them have 
their advantages and disadvantages. The author of this study aimed at selecting 
the optimal elicitation method suited for his work and therefore first of all defined 
the following criteria:  
 
1. The method (or variations of it) should have been successfully tested in 
research studies. 
2. The method must be feasible in terms of technical complexity for the 
researcher himself as well as for the respondents. 
3. Applicability both under EUT and PT should be given in order not to be 
restricted to one of the mentioned theories for later theoretical assessment 
 
6.2.1 General Categorisation of Methods to Measure Risk Attitudes 
 
Previous research has proposed a variety of methods for the elicitation of utility 
and later on also for the elicitation of probability weighting functions with regard to 
PT. Farquhar (1984) listed the most popular ones under EUT which was the 
predominating theory at that time. Among the standard gamble methods, there 
are two that have been discussed and used more than others: the Certainty 
Equivalence Method (CEM) and the Probability Equivalence Method (PEM). 
McCord and De Neufville (1986) proposed the Lottery Equivalence Method 
(LEM) and Wakker and Deneffe (1996) came up with the Tradeoff Method (TOM) 
which has been used frequently in the recent past (e.g. Fennema and van Assen, 
1998; Abdellaoui, 2000; Etchart-Vincent, 2004; Schunk and Betsch, 2006; Booij 
and van de Kuilen, 2009). Many other methods in the literature are variations of 
the ones mentioned afore.  
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The CEM and the PEM both compare a lottery with a certain outcome. As far as 
the CEM is concerned, the researcher usually varies the certain outcome until 
indifference is reached in comparison to the lottery. For example, the researcher 
may find that a subject is indifferent between a lottery that promises either GBP 0 
and GBP 10 both with a probability of 0.5 and a certain outcome of GBP 4. In the 
PEM, the analyst varies the probability p until the point of indifference is reached. 
(The researcher may find that a subject is indifferent between a certain outcome 
of GBP 5 and a lottery that promises GBP 0 with p=0.3 and GBP 10 with p=0.7).. 
Both methods were tested in a variety of studies, in particular under EUT. The 
CEM has a big advantage in its simplicity: it is easy for the subject to understand 
that a choice between a preferably 50/50 gamble and a certain outcome shall be 
given as response. The tasks for the subjects are more complex in the PEM, 
where some basic understanding of probabilities is needed. Both methods can 
generally be applied under both theories.  
 
Mc Cord and De Neufville (1986) criticised the conventional methods including 
the traditional CEM and PEM upon several reasons including dependence on the 
probability level, chain responses magnifying potential errors and range effects. 
They proposed the LEM which does no longer compare lotteries with certain 
outcomes, but lotteries with lotteries and therefore claims a significant reduction 
of the certainty effect. The basic idea of the LEM, comparing lotteries in order to 
avoid the above mentioned shortcomings of the traditional methods, is also 
incorporated in Wakker and Deneffe´s (1996) TOM. The authors argue that their 
method is valid under EUT and PT and robust against the issue of probability 
distortions. Despite the fact that the TOM has been used in a multitude of studies 
in highly ranked academic journals, it has some major shortcomings with regard 
to the criteria defined above. First of all, it is harder to understand for the subjects 
which has already been remarked in Wakker and Deneffe´s study. Even though 
they used 14 researchers in finance and 28 undergraduate students in 
economics as respondents for their “monetary experiment“, a rather high calibre 
group of respondents, they had six subjects being discarded for violations of 
monotony (five) and incomplete answers (one) respectively.  
 
 
  
 
91 
A high percentage of discarded subjects reveals that the tasks were complex and 
difficult to understand even for these “educated” groups of participants. It must be 
questioned whether financially rather “uneducated” subjects - like many of the 
decision makers in charitable trusts - would do better. A positive example of using 
the TOM with the broad population is Booij and van de Kuilen (2009) who 
investigated the utility of money for the general public in the Netherlands. 
 
6.2.2 Discussion of Methods used by other Researchers in Decision Theory 
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992), the originators of PT and CPT, used 
simple lottery questions in their studies in order to elicit preferences of subjects 
and find the 4FP. Based on a high number of lotteries, they calculated a utility 
function as well as a probability function. Booth and Nolen (2012) investigated 
risk preferences by using only one gamble question, the “fiver lottery,” with a risky 
option having a higher expected monetary value (50% chance for GBP11 and 
50% chance for GBP 2) than the safe alternative (GBP 5 for sure). Harbough et 
al. (2009) examined the robustness of the 4FP of PT using two different elicitation 
procedures, a choice based gamble to some extent similar to Booth and Nolen 
(2012), and the willingness-to-pay-method (WTP) which asks for a reservation 
price for a gamble. They could show the 4FP only when using WTP. The 
choice-based gamble did not deliver these results. In a prior study (Harbough et 
al, 2001), they already failed to demonstrate existence of the 4FP for high and 
low probability outcomes using a choice-based method. At that time, they argued 
that the WTP was very complicated and hard to understand for participants, an 
opinion that is shared by the author of the present study. 
 
Hartog et al. (2002) who also used WTP describe one disadvantage of WTP as 
the gap between WTP and willingness-to-accept (WTA). They ran a regression to 
link the personal characteristics to the outcomes of the risk elicitation. For the 
elicitation of risk preferences, they used low-probability-questions with p varying 
between 0.01 and 0.2 that would possibly be regarded as speculation by trusts 
and only in the domain of gains. 
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Holt and Laury (2002) proposed a method that was subsequently widely used by 
a number of other researchers in later studies (e.g. Harrison et al., 2007). For 
each question, it involves ten decisions between gambles with probabilities being 
changed and ranging from 0.1 to 0.9 to elicit risk attitudes. The questions are not 
self-explanatory and therefore potentially a challenge to the respondent if used in 
a mail or online survey. Dave et al. (2007) compared it to Eckel and Grossman 
(2002, 2007) who used only a simple single choice among six gambles, all with 
0.5 probability. They found that in the more complex method, subjects exhibited 
noisier behaviour, especially if their mathematical ability was low. The overall 
predictive accuracy was better for the complex method, but not so for the 
subjects with low mathematical abilities.  
 
Burks et al. (2009) measured risk preferences by letting subjects choose 
between fixed payments and a 50/50-lottery with four sets of six choices including 
also loss questions, i.e. another variation of the certainty equivalent method. 
Döbeli and Vanini (2010) used a questionnaire asking subjects to state 
preferences for a 50/50-lottery vs. five predefined alternative choices with certain 
outcomes. Different from most other studies, they used percentage gains and 
losses which was also intended by the author of the present study. 
 
Donkers et al. (2001) analysed which factors influence an individual´s risk 
attitude based on lottery questions. The survey relied on data that was inserted 
by the subjects on their personal computer and no personal interviews were held, 
so that interviewer bias was not possible, a set-up similar to the online survey of 
the present study. A disadvantage was considered to be that no incentives could 
be paid to the subjects as is the case for many other related studies. Beattie and 
Loomes (1997) investigated differences between giving and not giving incentives 
to subjects in lotteries of simple pairwise choices and came to the conclusion that 
differences in results are small. The author of this study did not give incentives to 
the trusts except for sending them a summary of the results of the study after 
completion. 
 
A simple approach to investigate risk attitudes is the one proposed by Dohmen et 
al. (2009). The researchers used the question “How willing are you to take risks, 
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in general?” and asked the subjects to state this willingness on a scale from 0 to 
10. The authors found that this simple question was a reliable predictor of real 
behaviour when they compared the results to those of lottery questions within the 
same study. The authors divided the subjects after their choice for less than the 
fair certainty equivalent (CE) as risk-averse, for choosing the fair CE as 
risk-neutral and for a higher than the fair CE as risk-seeking, found risk aversion 
for an overwhelming majority of individuals and regarded the result as 
comparable to Holt and Laury (2002). A main difference between their work and 
Holt and Laury (2002) is that the former changed the CE in the questions 
whereas the latter changed the probabilities. Due to their use of comparatively 
fine grids, Dohmen et al (2009) needed up to 20 lotteries to elicit this information. 
Daly et al. (2010) examined how attitudes to risk relate to other psychological 
constructs of personality and to debt. They used the single general measure of 
risk taking following Dohmen et al. (2009) arguing that the subjective risk 
willingness question was free from framing effects and numeracy demand of the 
traditional lottery questions which appears as a clear advantage. 
 
6.2.3 Conclusions with Regard to the Research Questions of this Study 
 
The author was faced with a situation different from the above mentioned 
researchers in the field of decision theory. Whereas most studies were based on 
interviewing subjects like undergraduate students at university on campus, the 
access to trusts was much more limited than for this kind of studies. The author 
found in an analysis of potential access that trusts were generally not willing to 
invest one hour or more of their time for an interview which would be necessary 
for a detailed study of the utility curve and probability weighting. Since it was not 
possible to have the experiment with a representative number of trusts at a time 
and at the same place, one more obstacle was the geographical distance to 
overcome. The researcher therefore strived to collect data in a different way from 
the studies above, allowing him to reach a sufficient number of trusts to make the 
study representative of the population of German trusts and to connect 
information about their risk preferences to their characteristics. 
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The author of the present study had to weigh arguments of precision in the 
elicitation of risk attitudes on the one hand versus the issue of feasibility on the 
other hand. As he strived to elicit only the general question of risk-averse vs. 
risk-seeking behaviour of trusts in the domains of gains, losses and loss 
aversion, he could forgo methods that aim at a precise mathematical definition of 
the behaviour. The researcher favoured a data collection method that is robust 
and sufficiently tested by other researchers in the field of trusts. The elicitation of 
a probability weighting function and a utility function for the subjects was beyond 
the scope of this study.  
 
The researcher therefore decided in favour of an online survey for the study in 
order to generate sufficient quantitative data for analysis. This was at the cost of 
precision in the elicitation of risk attitudes because the survey methodology 
lacked the opportunity of giving verbal explanations to the subjects and needed to 
simplify questions in order to be comprehensive and attractive to respond to.  
 
Using a measure that relies only on one general question asking for the 
willingness to take risks like Dohmen et al. (2009) seemed not appropriate as the 
researcher in the present study wanted to investigate the behaviour of trusts in 
different domains. The simplification of Dohmen et al., therefore, goes too far for 
the purpose of this study, especially under the conjecture that risk behaviour 
differs between the domains of gains and losses. 
 
50/50-lotteries compared to certain outcomes are very popular in the literature. 
This may be caused by the intuitive way of understanding these probabilities also 
for subjects with generally limited mathematical understanding. The researcher 
therefore decided to also using simple 50/50-choice questions except for the 
questions where high or low probabilities were explicitly needed to investigate the 
4FP and loss aversion. The type of questions was designed to be intuitively easy 
to understand and not to overstrain participants in an online survey. 
 
The depth of investigation of the five patterns was limited to assessing in a binary 
way whether a subject behaves risk-averse or risk-seeking in the five respective 
task blocks. Subjects choosing the certain alternative in fair gamble questions 
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were labelled “risk-averse,” subjects choosing the lottery were considered 
“risk-seeking” for the respective task. One question concerning loss aversion 
differed from the predominant method and asked for the price of the willingness 
to accept a lottery where a loss was possible. It allowed determining a loss 
aversion coefficient for trusts. 
 
The other questions could not be used to further determine separate utility 
functions and probability weighting functions that would have allowed for a more 
precise description of risk attitudes as conducted in most of the large studies in 
decision theory. Nevertheless, the questions sufficed to answer the research 
questions of this study, i.e. to determine the risk preferences for trusts in general 
under the five settings described above and to test for association of trust 
characteristics to risk attitudes. 
 
The elicitation method could potentially be biased. The author assumed that if a 
bias existed in the elicitation, it would not depend on the trusts´ characteristics. 
Therefore the results of the test for association could be regarded as valid even 
though there was no correction for bias. 
 
6.3 Quantitative Data Collection 
 
Quantitative data for the study was collected by a questionnaire in a 
cross-sectional internet survey. The survey produced numeric data regarding the 
characteristics of trusts and their risk preferences. 
 
The quantitative data collection followed general recommendations of literature 
on the design of surveys (Ghauri/Gronhaug, 2010; Mayer, 2008; Dillman, 2000). 
 
As a main contributor of empirical research on German trusts, responsible 
persons in the association of trusts, Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen (BDS), 
were interviewed and asked for their experiences with methodologies. In data 
collection, BDS have generally switched from previously used traditional mail to 
online for most surveys (e.g. BDS, 2011). Response rates for the online surveys 
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usually were in a range between 15 and 35%. Other researchers in the field of 
trusts (Sandberg, 2007) successfully used a traditional mail survey for data 
collection. As an advantage to traditional mail, online surveys are comparatively 
cheap as no postal charges have to be paid. They are easy to handle with regard 
to the analysis of responses as the data is already in a form to be processed by a 
computer.  
 
6.3.1 Questionnaire 
 
The questions referred to the characteristics of the trusts (e.g. age) and the risk 
preferences of the decision makers when acting on behalf of the trust. Risk 
preferences were measured for various hypothetical returns on the trust´s capital 
in the domain of gains, losses and mixed, using a simple choice-based technique 
analogous to previous research in the field of decision theory. The risk preference 
questions intended to test for the typical characteristics of Kahneman and 
Tversky´s (1979, 1992) fourfold pattern (4FP) and loss aversion, applied to trusts, 
i.e.:  
- risk-averse or -seeking behaviour for gains with balanced probabilities  
- risk-averse or -seeking behaviour for high gains with low probabilities  
- loss aversion   
- risk-averse or -seeking behaviour for losses with balanced probabilities  
- risk-averse or -seeking behaviour for large losses with low probabilities  
 
The answers to the questions could also be used for comparisons to EUT 
prescriptions. 
The questionnaire that was created by the researcher and pilot-tested comprised 
a total of 32 questions which can be classified into five categories: 
 
Cat. A: Questions aiming at gathering information on trust characteristics only 
(13) 
Cat. B: “K.O. questions” to discard trusts that are not in the scope of the study and 
respondents that are considered to be not suited to answer the questions (3: 
intended life time of the trust, charitable status, personal influence of participant) 
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Cat. C: Questions that contain elements of both, A and B, i.e. collect information 
but can potentially be K.O. (2: statutes of the trust and position of participant) 
Cat. D: Questions to elicit the risk preferences with respect to the 4FP and loss 
aversion (11) 
Cat. E: Optional questions asking for contact details for allowing further questions 
via telephone (collection of contacts for the triangulation interviews), comments 
to the study and asking for interest in receiving an executive summary of the 
study after completion (3). 
 
The risk preference questions (Cat. D above) asked for simple preference of a 
safe option versus a risky option with the exception of one question which asked 
for the desired minimum yield for the risky option. The guiding principle was to 
determine risk preferences with respect to the 4FP and loss aversion: 
 
1. Risk preferences for gains with high probabilities were investigated by two 
choice questions: 
a) 3% safe return vs. 50/50 chance for 0% and 6% return respectively 
(“fair game” with equal expected return) 
b)  3% safe return vs. 50/50 chance for 0% and 8% return respectively 
(with expected return > safe choice; chosen parameters equal the 
average risk preference in the domain of gains found by Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992) 
 
2. Risk preferences for high gains with low probability were investigated by 
two choice questions: 
a) 0.25% safe return vs. 2.5% chance for 10% return and 97.5% chance 
for 0% return (“fair game” with equal expected return) 
b) 1% safe return vs. 10% chance for 10% return and 90% chance for 0% 
return (“fair game” with equal expected return) 
 
3. Risk preferences for losses with high probabilities were investigated by 
two choice questions: 
a) -3% safe loss vs. 50/50 chance for 0% and -6% loss respectively (“fair 
game” with equal expected return; parameters chosen to mirror 1.a) 
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b) -3% safe loss vs. 50/50 chance for 0% and -7.35% loss respectively 
(with expected return < safe choice; chosen parameters equal the 
average risk preference in the domain of losses found by Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992) 
 
4. Risk preferences for large losses with low probabilities were investigated 
by two choice questions: 
 
a) -0,25% safe loss vs. 2.5% chance for -10% loss and 97.5% chance for 
0% return (“fair game” with equal expected return; parameters chosen 
to mirror 2.a) 
b) -1% safe loss vs. 10% chance for -10% loss and 90% chance for 0% 
return (“fair game” with equal expected return; parameters chosen to 
mirror 2.b) 
 
5. Risk preferences for mixed outcomes (gains/losses) were investigated by 
two choice questions and one which asked for the desired minimum yield 
for the risky option 
 
a) 0% safe return vs. 50/50 chance for 3% and -3% return respectively 
(“fair game” with equal expected return) 
b) 0% safe return vs. 50/50 chance for 6% and -6% return respectively 
(“fair game” with equal expected return, but higher potential gain/loss 
than 5.a) 
c) 0% safe return vs. 50/50 chance for -3% and X% respectively. State 
what minimum X would make you prefer the risky over the safe option. 
(Question to determine the loss aversion parameter.) 
 
The original questionnaire is in German. The author therefore wants to point out 
the precise wording of the questions that were used. “Safe” was translated as 
“sicher.” For the 50/50 chances, the author used the words “Chance” for the 
favourable outcome and “Risiko” for the negative chance which is commonly 
used for an adverse outcome in German language. 
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6.3.2 Type and Selection of Subjects to Participate 
 
The researcher used a representative sample of German charitable trusts 
generated by Maecenata Institut, Humboldt University, Berlin. Maecenata owns 
the second biggest data base on trusts in Germany and provided the researcher 
with a list of trusts including their e-mail-addresses and contact persons which 
was an advantage over the use of the public registers as the latter did not in all 
federal states contain the e-mail-addresses of trusts.  
 
Maecenata claimed that their data base can be expected to contain more than 
70% of the relevant trusts in Germany. According to the Maecenata official, their 
sample was taken by random choice and with the intended restrictions that were 
set in the above chapter 2.1. 
 
The researcher addressed the questionnaire to the people responsible in the 
trusts for making investment decisions. In order to minimise the impact of the 
potential limitations that were named in the above chapter 4.3, the questionnaire 
contained several K.O. questions to be able to eliminate the answers of trusts 
and persons that were not in the scope of this research. This way, trusts could be 
excluded from the study if they were not recognised as charitable by the fiscal 
authorities or if they had a limited life time or if their guidelines included 
regulations which make redundant any investment decisions. Furthermore, 
answers of persons who were not in a responsible position or who stated that 
they have low influence on investment decisions were discarded. 
 
6.3.3 Size of the Sample and Participation Rate 
 
A sample of 400 trusts were invited via individual personalised e-mails to 
participate in the online survey. 
The respective survey web-page was opened 160 times.  
15 subjects left immediately. 27 were discarded for completely lacking answers to 
the PT questions. One subject was discarded for the K.O. question regarding 
eternal life time of the trust. No subjects had to be discarded for the K.O. 
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questions regarding charitability or restrictive investment guidelines. Eleven 
subjects were discarded for too low influence on the investment decisions in the 
trust. 
106 answers could be used for the purpose of the study which gave an effective 
participation rate of 26.5% relative to the number of trusts invited. 
 
6.3.4 Procedure of the Online Survey 
 
For the online survey, trusts were invited by e-mail to participate.7  Contact 
persons were addressed personally and assured confidentiality. The research 
project was briefly described and the aims were stated. Addressees were 
assured that their participation was very important for the success of the study. 
Participants were offered a free copy of a summary of major findings after 
completion of the study. A link was embedded leading to the questionnaire. The 
addressees were encouraged to ask any questions directly to the researcher 
either by the e-mail address that was provided or by telephone.  
17 trusts responded telling that they would for different reasons not participate. 
No use was made of the offer to assist with understanding of questions.  
Five trusts asked for details on the background of the study. They were sent a 
letter of support from Edinburgh Business School. This letter was intentionally not 
attached to the first e-mail in order to circumvent spam filters.  
 
A reminder e-mail was sent out one week after the initial e-mail. The 
questionnaire was created online on a scientific platform that is free of charge if 
used for scientific research work, https://www.soscisurvey.de. 8  The same 
platform had already successfully been used in the pilot study. Its advantages 
over a traditional mail survey are described in chapter 5.  
 
 
                                                          
7
 The text of the e-mail invitation follows the one used in the pilot study, which can be found in 
appendix A. 
 
8
 The internet survey questions can be found in appendix C. 
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6.4 Quantitative Data Analysis 
 
The data was analysed to determine the overall risk preferences of trusts for the 
five settings and association of trust characteristics with preferences. 
 
6.4.1 Analysis of Overall Risk Preferences 
 
Descriptive statistics were used to illustrate the distribution of preference 
statements regarding the eleven questions. The proportion of risky choices for 
each question was presented in a bar chart. For question 5c), the distribution of 
answers was presented in a bar chart and an arithmetic mean as well as the 
median value was provided. 
 
The results were compared to findings of previous CPT research on private 
individuals and to EUT prescriptions. 
 
Proportions of risky answers were compared for the mirror questions in the 
domains of gains vs. losses and tested for statistically significant differences. 
 
6.4.2 Analysis of Associations of Characteristics with Preferences 
 
For the test of association of trust characteristics, chi square tests and a t-test 
respectively were applied. 9  Hasenpflug (2009) used chi square to test for 
association in his DBA thesis on German non-profit organisations as well. 
 
The chi square tests referred to questions 1a) to 5b), where each of 14 
characteristics was tested for association with each of the 10 binary choice 
questions. A total of 140 tests were conducted on Excel. The confidence levels 
for the tests had been defined in advance as 90%, 95% and 99%. 
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For question 5c) which asked for a percentage value without predefined clusters, 
a t-test was used to determine significance in the difference of arithmetic means. 
 
For characteristics which were found to be associated with risk preferences, the 
proportion of risky choices for each question was presented in a bar chart for 
comparison of clusters. 
With regard to question 5c), for these characteristics the high/low/mean/median 
values were presented in a chart. 
 
6.5 Connecting Quantitative and Qualitative Phases 
 
Due to the sequential design of the study, data and results from the quantitative 
part could be used to inform the qualitative part (Onwegbuzie/Leech, 2006). This 
happened on two levels: the selection of candidates for the interviews and the 
development of interview questions for triangulation. 
 
6.5.1 Selecting Interview Participants based on the Quantitative Survey 
 
The internet survey contained a question regarding the availability of the subjects 
for a telephone interview. People who agreed were asked to leave their names 
and telephone numbers. The personal data could be connected with the survey 
responses in order to allow for a selection of interviewees which was balanced 
with regard to stated characteristics and preferences. Due to the low number of 
subjects, all participants were selected. 
 
6.5.2 Developing Interview Questions based on the Quantitative Survey 
 
After the analysis of the quantitative part, interview questions were developed in 
order to triangulate the main quantitative findings. Following the research 
questions, the areas of general risk preferences of trusts were covered as well as 
                                                                                                                                                                          
9
 Examples for the chi squared tests and the t-tests can be found in appendix D and appendix E. 
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the association of risk preferences with trust characteristics. 
 
6.6 Qualitative Data Collection 
 
In contrast to the major empirical studies in the field of decision theory, the 
researcher strived to triangulate the quantitative results by a qualitative 
assessment. The qualitative data was collected by individual semi-structured 
telephone interviews and generated non-numeric data. 
 
The general theoretical basis for conducting the interviews was given following 
concepts of Kvale (2007), Turner (2010) and Mc Namara (2012). Researchers in 
the field of trusts have used interviews as part of their research methodology in 
order to generate qualitative data (Köszegi, 2009; Lang/Schnieper, 2006, 
Schneider et al. 2010). Opdenakker (2006) compared four interview techniques 
and found that social cues, like body language, were the main potential 
advantage of face-to-face interviews over telephone interviews. This advantage 
can on the other hand be regarded as a potential disadvantage as far as biases 
produced by the interviewer are concerned. 
 
6.6.1 Questions  
 
The questions were based on the results of the quantitative part of the study.  
 
Fields of particular interest were: 
 
- Why is risk aversion clearly more pronounced in the domain of gains than in 
the domain of losses? 
- Why do trusts hardly accept risk in the domain of gains, even if the expected 
return of the risky choice is higher than for the safe choice? 
- What are the reasons for risk-seeking behaviour for losses, especially in the 
domain of low-probability high losses? 
- Comments on the degree of loss aversion 
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- Why are certain trust-specific characteristics associated with risk preferences 
while others are not? 
 
The questions were slightly modified in their wording after a pilot study with one 
person.10  
 
6.6.2 Type and Selection of Subjects to Participate 
 
Due to the small absolute number, all decision makers in trusts who had left their 
contact details in the online survey were selected to be interviewed by telephone. 
The researcher investigated for potential biases in the selection with regard to the 
characteristics and preferences stated in the online survey. The group of 
participants in the interviews contained a higher portion of risk seekers than the 
sample of all trusts that took part in the online survey.11  
 
6.6.3 Size of the Sample and Participation Rate 
 
The sample consisted of 32 persons. Four persons could not be contacted after 
three attempts at different times of the day (morning/afternoon/evening). One 
person could be contacted but decided not participate. One interview was 
temporarily interrupted but resumed later that day. One person took part in the 
pilot study. No interviewees had to be discarded. 26 persons were interviewed for 
the main study. 
 
6.6.4 Procedure of the Telephone Interviews 
 
The interview style was designed to be semi-structured in order to minimise 
potential bias effects emerging from the sequence of questions, omission of 
questions, unrepresentative sampling and uncontrolled over- or under- 
                                                          
10
 The wording of the questions can be found in the text and protocol sheet in appendix F. 
11
 A detailed overview of characteristics and preferences of the interviewees compared to all 
participants of the online survey is provided in appendixes G, H and I. 
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representation of subgroups among respondents (Ghauri/Gronhaug, 2010). 
 
The semi-structured interviews consisted of a set of predetermined open-ended 
questions. The interviewees were free to answer according to their own thoughts. 
The researcher departed from the planned itinerary with other questions 
emerging from the dialogue only in cases where additional information provided 
by interviewees deemed useful for the purpose of the study. All interviews were 
conducted by the person of the researcher. 
 
The interviewees were presented the highlights of the aggregated quantitative 
research results, asked to give statements on the validity of findings and to 
explain the risk preferences stated by trusts.  
 
The researcher prepared an interview protocol sheet as provided in appendix F 
and took notes during the telephone interviews (Hasenpflug, 2009). The process 
of note taking hardly interrupted the flow of the interview (Kvale, 2007). Data was 
entered into a computer and prepared for analysis directly after the telephone 
interview. The duration of the interviews was in a time range between 15 and 45 
minutes. 
 
6.6.5 Ethical Issues in Interviews 
 
In order to protect the interviewees, their data will be deleted after the study and 
subjects will remain anonymous. Participants were informed about the purpose of 
the study and encouraged to ask questions about the research and the 
researcher. Questions were answered correctly and exhaustingly. The 
researcher accepted that one individual declined to participate in the interview 
and a few subjects refused to answer single questions. 
 
6.7 Qualitative Data Analysis 
 
The qualitative analysis phase aimed at structuring the obtained data and set it 
into context with the quantitative results for the purpose of later integration (see 
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chapter 6.8) of the quantitative and qualitative part. 
 
6.7.1 Implications of the Transcription Method for Analysis 
 
The researcher relied on his notes which were taken during the interviews. The 
process of note taking can be considered as a first stage of analysis (Rapley, 
2007). The researcher did not note down the complete verbatim conversation but 
only the general agreement or disagreement of the subject with the quantitative 
findings as well as comments which he considered as key terms, key sentences 
and potentially useful information with regard to the research problem.  
 
6.7.2 Categorisation of Data 
 
The interview protocol sheet which listed the four categories 
“Yes”/”No”/”Ambiguous”/”No Comment” was used to assess systematically 
whether the statement generally supported the quantitative findings. The answer 
to the question was investigated for potential contradictions.  
 
Responses to the open questions were further reduced from the interview 
protocol sheet and sorted into categories and sub-categories (Gibbs, 2007). 
Answers to each sub-category were counted, sorted for their relative importance 
and presented with respect to three domains: gains, losses and mixed. The 
categorisation of data was helpful in the sense of analytic quality to identify the 
main issues articulated by the subjects, to avoid an overweighting of minority 
opinions and to reassemble responses in the context of the three domains. 
 
Regarding the trusts´ characteristics, data was reduced, categorised and 
counted analogously. 
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6.7.3 Interpretation of Data 
 
Beyond the listing of categories that were identified, the researcher strived to set 
the data into context with the research problem and the quantitative results which 
had served as a basis for developing the interview questions. The richness of 
qualitative data was used to critically examine whether the quantitative findings 
can be confirmed and to provide explanations for risk preferences of trusts.  
This can be regarded as the first step of the integration of results. 
 
6.8 Integration of the Quantitative and Qualitative Results 
 
The results of both phases were integrated in the Conclusions section in order to 
develop a more robust and meaningful picture of the research problem (Ivankova 
et al., 2006). The integration enabled the researcher to confirm the quantitative 
results and to provide explanations for risk preferences of trusts reaching beyond 
the original research questions. The integration of results provided a solid ground 
for the discussion regarding decision theory applied to trusts and of implications 
for practical investment policy. 
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7 Results and Analysis of the Survey Data  
7.1 Overall Risk Preferences 
7.1.1 Results  
 
Referring to the questionnaire described in chapter 6.3.1, the eleven risk 
preference questions yielded the results indicated in table 4: 
 
Risk Preference Questions safe risky n conf* 
1. Gains with high probabilities (p=0.5)    
a) (survey: question 7) 88% 12% 106 >99% 
b) (survey: question 10) 82% 18% 103 >99% 
     
2. High gains with low probabilities (p=0.025/0.1)   
a) (survey: question 11) 84% 16% 102 >99% 
b) (survey: question 8) 89% 11% 103 >99% 
     
3. Losses with high probabilities (p=0.5)    
a) (survey: question 13) 65% 35% 99 >99% 
b) (survey: question 15) 72% 28% 96 >99% 
     
4. Large losses with low probabilities (p=0.025/0.1)   
a) (survey: question 14) 48% 52% 99  
b) (survey: question 16) 61% 39% 97 >95% 
     
5. Mixed outcomes (gains/losses; p=0.5)    
a) (survey: question 9) 66% 34% 103 >99% 
b) (survey: question 12) 76% 24% 102 >99% 
  mean X median X   
c) (survey: question 17) 6.68 6 76  
*: level of confidence that the portion of “safe” answers in significantly higher than 
the portion of “risky” answers, binomial distribution, expected value 50%; 
calculation provided in appendix J 
 
Table 4: Answers to the risk preference questions 
 
 
Figure 6 shows that most subjects were risk-averse for most questions. This 
holds true especially for the domain of gains and diminishes significantly for the 
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domain of losses. For one loss question, there was even a slight majority opting 
for the risky choice. 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1a) 1b) 2a) 2b) 3a) 3b) 4a) 4b) 5a) 5b)
Percentage of Risky Choice per Question
 
Figure 6: Portion of risky choices for the respective questions 
 
It is eye-catching that trusts tend to the risky choice significantly more often in the 
domain of losses in comparison to the domain of gains. 12  The bars of the 
respective mirror questions, i.e. the corresponding questions in the domains of 
gains and losses (e.g. 1a and 3a), have the same colour. 
 
7.1.2. Risk Preferences for Gains with High Probabilities 
 
The stated preferences show that risk aversion is predominant with the 
investment behaviour of trusts. The “fair game” risky option was overwhelmingly 
(88%) rejected by participants. Even the risky option with an expected value 
which is 1% higher than the safe option was overwhelmingly (82%) –almost as 
much as the “fair game”- rejected. The point of indifference between the safe 
yield and the risky option must therefore require a higher (presumably much 
higher) expected yield. 
 
 
                                                          
12
 For details on statistical signisficance: appendix K 
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The shape of the value function under CPT can be regarded as concave under 
the assumption that the subjective probability weighting of p=0.5 is higher than 
w(p)=0.375. This figure is derived from question 1b):  
 
If subjects consider  
3 > w(0.5) 8 + (1-w(0.5)) 0        (5) 
Then follows 
w(0.5) > 0.375         (6) 
 
For comparison, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) computed the subjective 
probability weight w(0.5) = 0.4206 on the basis of their data. 
 
Applying the parameters of average risk preferences of individuals found by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), most trusts (82%) behave more risk-averse.13 
 
The result is compatible with classic risk-averse behaviour under EUT. 
 
7.1.3 Risk Preferences for High Gains with Low Probabilities  
 
The stated preferences show that risk aversion predominates. Both “fair game” 
risky options were overwhelmingly (89% and 84% respectively) rejected by the 
participants. Most subjects preferred low (1%) and very low (0.25%) but safe 
yields over low probability high (10%) yields. 
 
Under CPT, the value function is concave and/or subjective probability weighting 
leads to risk aversion for the vast majority of subjects. There are no signs of 
overweighting of small probabilities as suggested by PT literature. If existent, 
which cannot be ruled out, probability weighting does not overcompensate for the 
concavity of the value function.  
 
 
                                                          
13
 For an overview of all corresponding calculations with T&K (1992) parameters, see appendix M 
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Compared to the parameters of average risk preferences found by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992), most trusts behave more risk-averse. Applying the 1992 
parameters, the respective certainty equivalents for the risky choice are 0.66% 
for question 2a) and 1.48% for 2b). The broad majority of subjects in this study 
refused to accept the risky choice even in favour of lower certainty yields of 
0.25% and 1% respectively. 
 
The result is compatible with classic risk-averse behaviour under EUT. 
 
7.1.4 Risk Preferences for Losses with High Probabilities  
 
The answers show a mixed picture of preferences. The “fair game” risky option 
was accepted by 35% of participants which is significantly higher than the 12% 
acceptance for the mirror question 1a) that asks for the respective positive 
outcomes. A portion of 28% is willing to take the risky option for losses even if the 
expected value of the lottery is lower (-3% safe vs. -3.675% expected) than fair 
value.  
 
Under CPT, the value function is concave and/or subjective probability weighting 
lead to risk aversion for the majority of subjects.  
Compared to the average risk preferences found by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992), most trusts (72%) behave more risk-averse. 
 
Depending on the shape of the probability weighting function, which is beyond 
the scope of this research paper, the value function could be convex for more 
subjects than those 35% in question 3a). If w(p=0.5) < 0.5 , the proportion of 
agents with a convex value function could be higher. Convexity can be found for 
those 28% of agents which opted for the risky choice in 3b), under the weak 
assumption that w(0.5) < 0.59.   
This figure is derived from question 3b):  
 
If subjects consider  
-3 < w(0.5) 0 + (1-w(0.5)) -7.35       (7) 
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Then follows 
w(0.5) < 0.5918         (8) 
 
For comparison, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) computed the subjective 
probability weight w(0.5) = 0.4206 on the basis of their data. 
 
The results only partly correspond to the 4FP and previous PT studies which in 
many cases found convexity of the utility curve prevailing in the domain of losses.  
 
The result is for 65% of trusts compatible with classic risk-averse behaviour 
under EUT. This is only partly supportive for EUT as a general theory to be 
prevailing. 
 
7.1.5 Risk Preferences for Large Losses with Low Probabilities  
 
The answers show a mixed picture of preferences. The two “fair game” risky 
options were accepted by 52% and 39% respectively of participants which is 
significantly higher than the 16% and 11% acceptance for the mirror questions 
2a) and 2b) that ask for positive outcomes.  
 
The low probability of a high loss of -10% does not seem to be overestimated by 
a great portion of participants and/or the threat of a high loss not be assigned a 
utility low enough to prevent these participants from choosing the risky option. 
The concept of an insurance premium does not apply to the stated behaviour of 
many trusts. 
 
Compared to 4a), the still low (but four times higher) probability in 4b) of 10% to 
suffer a 10% loss leads to significantly less preference (39% vs. 52%) for the 
risky choice even though the safe loss is also four times higher at 1%.14 On this 
basis, it can be concluded that there is a tendency of increasing relative 
overweighting of the very high probabilities between p=0.9 and p=0.975 and/or 
convexity of the utility curve between the yields of -1% and -0.25%. 
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There is no general evidence of overweighting of small probabilities as suggested 
by PT literature.  
 
The mixed result does not exclusively support classic risk-averse behaviour 
under EUT. This is only partly supportive for EUT as a general theory to be 
prevailing. Given the almost equal distribution of safe and risky choice, linearity of 
the utility function could be assumed. 
 
7.1.6 Risk Preferences for Mixed Outcomes / Loss Aversion 
 
The answers predominantly show risk aversion in the two “fair game” questions. 
This is significantly more the case for the question with the higher potential loss 
(-6%) than for the “-3%-question.” The stated risk aversion of most subjects can 
possibly be a consequence of loss aversion. 
 
The result of 5a) and 5b) is for 66% of trusts compatible with classic risk-averse 
behaviour under EUT. This is only partly supportive for EUT as a general theory 
to be prevailing. 
 
The loss aversion question 5c) finds that trusts require on average 6.68% yield 
for the 50/50 chance, where the potential negative outcome is -3% and the safe 
alternative 0%. Figure 7 shows that the distribution is skewed. The median 
answer is at 6%.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
14
 For statistical calculations regarding neighbour questions: see appendix L. 
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Figure 7: Distribution of stated answers to question 5c); n=76 
 
Defining the loss aversion parameter as 
 
Loss aversion = -U(-x) / U(x)        (9) 
 
according to Bleichrodt et al. (2001) and Abdellaoui et al. (2007), and under the 
assumption of all other parameters equalling Tversky and Kahneman´s data, the 
parameter is 1.875 (mean) and 1.705 (median) respectively.15 
 
These outcomes are within the range of previous research results on individuals 
(Abdellaoui et al, 2008, for an overview). 
 
The answers to question 5c) revealed inconsistencies with the answers to 
question 5a): 
Subjects that opt for the safe alternative (0% yield) in 5a) must be expected to 
state a yield higher than 3% under 5c). Four individuals do not comply with this 
postulation.  
Subjects that opt for the risky alternative (50/50 chance for -3% or 3% yield) in 5a) 
must be expected to state a yield lower than 3% under 5c). 30 individuals do not 
comply with this postulation. 
 
                                                          
15
 Calculation Details can be found in appendix N.  
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Prior studies of Harbough et al. (2002, 2009) which aimed at the 4FP also 
included two methodological approaches (simple choice and “willingness to pay”, 
WTP). They found answers to the simple choice questions delivering results 
significantly different from WTP and only WTP delivered results supporting the 
4FP. Harbough et al. (2009) reason that the WTP method may support extreme 
findings since the “cognitive load” is far higher than with the simple choice based 
questions. Older studies (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968) also found 
inconsistencies between the two methods. An additional issue is the use of the 
“willingness-to-accept” methodology in this study which may also lead to 
“overbidding” according to Harbough et al. (2009). 
 
A practical explanation for the inconsistencies between questions 5a) and 5c) 
could be seen not only in overbidding in 5c), but also in the possibly extremely 
low perceived value of an outcome of 0% which is the safe alternative scenario in 
5a). Many trusts may feel caught in a challenging situation when facing the safe 
option (0%) offering no yield at all to fulfil the purpose of the trust and the mixed 
one (-3%/+3%) which includes a potential loss. The mixed alternative at least 
gives a 50%-chance on a return to finance the trust´s activities whereas the safe 
one would cancel out financing of any activity of the trust immediately. With 
regard to characteristics of trusts, those which source their funding primarily or 
exclusively by returns on the capital have opted for the risky (-3%/+3%) option 
significantly more often which is supportive to the idea of avoiding 0% in order to 
fulfil the purpose.  
 
The participation rate for question 5c) was lower (n=76) than for all other 
questions (between n=96 and n=106). The reason for the lower response rate 
could be the higher complexity of the question which seems more difficult to 
answer than a simple choice question. Six participants gave comments that they 
would not enter an option like the one in 5c), implicitly stating infinite loss 
aversion.  
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7.1.7 Comparison of the Choices for Gains vs. Losses at High Probabilities 
 
For the mirror questions 1a) and 3a) in the domains of gains and losses, figure 8 
shows that most of the trusts (59%) prefer the safe option in the case of gains as 
well as in the case of respective losses. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that 28% 
of all participants opt for the safe alternative in the domain of gains, but choose 
the risky alternative for respective losses. This shows a tendency to riskier 
behaviour in the domain of losses (3a) in comparison to the domain of gains (1a) 
which is statistically significant at the 99% level. 
 
 Gain / Loss Questions ("fair game" 3 vs. 0/6 and -3 vs. 0/-6)
safe/risky; 28%
safe/safe; 59%
risky/safe; 6%
risky/risky; 7%
 
Figure 8: Safe and risky choice for questions 1a) and 3a) 
 
With regard to decision theory, 59% of trusts state preferences in line with classic 
risk-averse behaviour under EUT. 28% of trusts exhibit behaviour supporting 
CPT. 
 
The two questions where the expected value of the risky option does not 
correspond to the safe option support this tendency and show a statistically 
significant result as well. 
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Gain / Loss Questions (3 vs. 0/8 and -3 vs. 0/-7.35)
risky/risky; 8%
risky/safe; 9%
safe/safe; 63%
safe/risky; 20%
 
Figure 9: Safe and risky choice for questions 1b) and 3b) 
 
As shown in Figure 9, 20% of all participants opt in both questions for the 
alternative with the lower expected value: They prefer a safe 3% yield over the 
50/50 chance on 0%/8% in the domain of gains and gamble for the losses even 
though the expected negative value of the risky option is lower than for the safe 
loss. Their preferences reflect the descriptions of typical PT behaviour in a 
particularly strong form. 
 
Only 9% of all participants opt for the alternatives with the higher expected value 
in both cases which would be the only rational combination of answers to 
optimise the expected monetary value (with linear utility and no subjective 
probability weighting). 
 
7.1.8 Comparison of the Choices for Gains vs. Losses at Low Probabilities 
 
For the low probability gains and losses, the picture is mixed as shown in figure 
10: 41% of all participants opt for the safe choice for the low gain of 0.25% yield 
and in parallel they take the low probability risk of losing 10% instead of accepting 
a 0.25% safe loss. The high probability (97.5%) of losing no money at all that is 
connected with the risky option in the loss question looks more appealing to trusts 
than the risky option in the domain of gains, which offers a 2.5% chance on a high 
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yield. For both questions, a majority of subjects prefer the high probability option 
which is not supportive for the overweighting of small probabilities postulated in 
the 4FP. For the gain question, the 0% yield is avoided, whereas it is sought in 
the loss question.  
 
Gain / Loss Questions (0.25 vs. 0/10 and -0.25 vs. 0/-10)
safe/risky; 41%
safe/safe; 43%
risky/safe; 6%
risky/risky; 10%
 
Figure 10: Safe and risky choice for questions 2a) and 4a) 
 
The difference in proportions between the two corresponding questions 2a) and 
4a) is significant at the 99% level with significantly more risk takers in the domain 
of losses. 
 
It is noteworthy that only 6% of the subjects act according to the 4FP, i.e. are 
risk-seekers for the low-probability gain and risk-averse for the potentially high 
loss.  
 
A portion of 43% follows the path of being risk-averse in both situations in 
accordance with classic risk-averse behaviour under EUT. 
 
The second set of low probability questions shows a similar pattern as indicated 
in figure 11, although the observed preference for the safe/risky combination is 
not as high as with questions 2a) and 4a).  
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Gain / Loss Questions (1 vs. 0/10 and -1 vs. 0/-10)
risky/risky; 7%
risky/safe; 4%
safe/safe; 57%
safe/risky; 32%
 
Figure 11: Safe and risky choice for questions 2b) and 4b) 
 
The difference in proportions between answers in 2b) and 4b) is significant at the 
99% level with significantly more risk takers in the domain of losses. 
 
Here, only 4% of the subjects act according to the 4FP.  
 
A portion of 57% follows the path of being risk-averse in both situations in 
accordance with classic risk-averse behaviour under EUT. 
 
7.1.9 Comparison of the Choices for the Mixed Questions 
  
For the mixed questions which included gains and losses of different magnitudes, 
figure 12 shows that most trusts prefer the safe 0% option over a potential 50/50 
chance on a 3% gain/loss as well as over a 6% gain/loss. 89% of the subjects are 
consistent for both decisions. 12% choose the risky option for the lower gain/loss 
but switch to the safe 0% option when higher losses are possible. The difference 
in proportions is significant at the 99% level. 
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Mixed Questions (0 vs. 3/-3 and 0 vs. 6/-6)
safe/risky; 1%
safe/safe; 65%
risky/safe; 12%
risky/risky; 23%
 
Figure 12: Safe and risky choice for questions 5a) and 5b) 
 
 
7.2 Tests of Associations with Trust Characteristics 
 
7.2.1 Results  
 
The tests of association by chi square were conducted for every single pair of 
trust characteristic (14) and risk preference question (10) except for question 5c) 
which has been tested for differences in mean values. Table 5 shows the level of 
confidence for the respective associations tested.  
 
Most associations are found for questions 1a/b, 2a/b and 5a/b, i.e. in the domains 
of gains and mixed results. Fewer associations are found for questions 3a/b and 
4a/b, i.e. in the domain of losses.  
 
The study finds that trusts which invest a portion of their capital in equities are 
significantly more prone to take the risky choice for most of the questions. The 
same pattern is found for trusts that expect an increase of capital by external 
factors like donations in the coming years. 
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Risk Takers are found significantly more often among trusts where the donor is a 
natural and not a legal person and where the donor has influence on investment 
decisions. 
 
The age of decision makers is found to be positively associated with the 
willingness to take risks in the domain of gains. The position of the decision 
makers is associated as well with risky behaviour, i.e. donors and management 
board members being rather prone to risk than others.  
 
Various of the tested characteristics are not associated at all with risk 
preferences. With regard to the literature review, it appears most surprising that 
association is hardly found for the factors “size,” “reserves” and “statutes.” 
 
The loss aversion question 5c) was tested for differences with regard to trust 
characteristics. As shown in table 6, only few statistically significant associations 
could be found: with regard to the characteristics of the person of the donor, “age 
of decision maker” and “size.”  
 
The most influential characteristics shall be analysed in more detail in the 
subsequent sub-chapters. 
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Characteristic / Question 1a) 1b) 2a) 2b) 3a) 3b) 4a) 4b) 5a) 5b) 
Equity Portion 99% 99% 95% 99% - - 99% 90% 95% 95% 
Expected Asset Growth  99% - - 99% - 95% 90% 99% 99% 99% 
Donor natural/legal 99% 90% 95% 95% - - - 95% 90% 90% 
Position of DM 95% 90% 90% - - - - - 99% 95% 
Age of DMs 95% 95% 99% 95% - - - - - - 
Donor Influence 90% - 99% 99% - - - - 90% - 
Sources of Funding - - 90% - - - 95% - 90% 95% 
Size  - - 95% - - - - - - - 
Reserves 90% - - - - - - - - - 
Statutes - - - - - - - - 90% - 
Age of Trust - - 90% - - - - - - - 
Number of DMs - - - - - - - - 90% - 
Sex of DMs - - - - - - - - - - 
Promotional Activity - - - - - - - - - - 
 
Table 5: Association of trust characteristics with risk preferences, level of confidence (90%, 95%, 99%) indicated only in case of statistically 
significant association 
 
The definition of clusters is provided in appendix O. 
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Characteristic / Cluster A vs. B A vs. C B vs. C Description of clusters      
Donor men/rest 99% 99% - A=men, B=women, C=rest 
Age of DMs  99% - - A=young, B=medium, C=experienced 
Size 90% - - A=small, B=medium, C=large 
Reserves - - -        
Statutes - - -        
Donor Influence - - -        
Expected Asset Growth - - -        
Age of Trust - - -        
Number of DMs - - -        
Sex of DMs - - -        
Promotional Activity - - -        
Position of DM - - -        
Equity Portion - - -        
Sources of Funding - - -        
 
 
Table 6: t-tests for differences in the means for loss aversion question 5c),  
level of confidence (90%, 95%, 99%) indicated only in case of statistically significant differences 
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7.2.2 Investments in Equities 
 
The current positioning of the trusts´ portfolio is mirrored by the risk preferences 
exhibited in the survey. Trusts that own equities in their portfolio can be 
considered to have risk preferences different from those trusts which do not 
invest in this asset class.  
 
The tests for association revealed that trusts with an equity portion in the portfolio 
tend to opt for the risky choice in significantly more cases than trusts that do not 
invest in equities as shown in figure 13. This is particularly the case in the domain 
of gains.  
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33%
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24%
34%
39%
69%
31%
50%
25%
48%
15%
36%
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      3a)           3b)           4a)    
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      5b)    
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Questions and levels of significance
trusts NOT invested in equities trusts invested in equities
 
Figure 13: Portion of trusts opting for the risky choice sorted by the criterion of 
owning equity positions in their portfolios 
 
7.2.3 Expected Asset Growth from External Sources 
 
Trusts which expect asset growth in the coming years from external sources have 
a statistically significant tendency to opt for the risky alternative in comparison to 
trusts with no expected external growth as shown in figure 14.  
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Figure 14: Portion of trusts opting for the risky choice sorted by the criterion of 
expected asset growth from external sources 
 
7.2.4 Person of Donor (Natural vs. Legal Persons) 
 
If the donor is a natural person, the trusts are rather prone to risky decisions, 
especially in the domain of gains as shown in figure 15.  
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Figure 15: Portion of trusts opting for the risky choice sorted by the criterion of the 
nature of donors 
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Regarding question 5c), the trusts which have a male donor exhibit loss aversion 
that is significantly lower than trusts that were founded by women or legal 
persons as shown in figure 16. Some extreme votes can have very high impact 
on the overall result given the small number of subjects in each bracket. 
 
Median and Mean Return (X) vs.  -3%; p=0.5
0,00%
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16,00%
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(39)
Mean
Median
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Low
 
Figure 16: Stated minimum returns for X=? with p=0.5, if (1-p) means -3% return, 
sorted by the nature of donors 
 
7.2.5 Position of the Interviewee in the Trust 
 
If the interviewee is the donor or/and a member of the management board, the 
trust more often tends to take the risky choice for gains and also in the mixed 
question as shown in figure 17. It is remarkable that for the loss questions the 
other group of subjects is more prone to take the risky choice, even if not to a 
level of statistical significance. 
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Figure 17: Portion of trusts opting for the risky choice sorted by the criterion of the 
position of the interviewee in the trust 
 
7.2.6 Age of Decision Makers in the Trusts 
 
Figure 18 refers to the finding that older decision makers in trusts tend to take 
risky choices more often for 50/50- questions and low probability gambles than 
their younger peers. This kind of differing behaviour cannot be observed for the 
loss questions. 
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Figure 18: Portion of trusts opting for the risky choice sorted by the criterion of the 
age of decision makers 
 
  
 
128 
With regard to the loss aversion question 5c), figure 19 shows the mean value is 
significantly higher in the medium range than for the young decision makers. The 
youngest group of decision makers exhibits a lower degree of loss aversion. The 
low number of answers to question 5c) gives comparatively high weight to single 
extreme votes. 
 
Median and Mean Return (X) vs.  -3%; p=0.5
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Figure 19: Stated minimum returns for X=? with p=0.5, if (1-p) means -3% return, 
sorted by the characteristic of age of decision makers 
 
7.2.7 Donors´ Influence 
 
Donors´ influence is found to be associated with the willingness to take 
significantly more risk in positive high chance gambles as shown in figure 20. 
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Figure 20: Position of trusts opting for the risky choice sorted by the criterion of 
donors´ influence on investment decisions 
 
7.2.8 Sources of Funding 
 
Figure 21 shows that trusts that source their funding primarily or completely from 
capital returns rather tend to take the risky decision for some questions. 
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Figure 21: Portion of trusts opting for the risky choice sorted by the criterion of the 
sources of funding 
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7.2.9 Size 
 
With regard to question 5c), small sized trusts (< € 500k in assets) exhibit 
significantly less loss aversion than medium sized trusts (€ 500k - € 2.5m) as 
shown in figure 22. Due to the small number of trusts participating in this 
question, the result is strongly influenced by a single subject that stated a figure 
of 20% which is far above the average of 6.68%. If this one subject was 
discarded, the significant difference would disappear. 
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Figure 22: Stated minimum returns for X=? with p=0.5, if (1-p) means -3% return, 
sorted by the characteristic of size 
 
7.2.10 Inter-Correlations between Trust Characteristics 
 
The characteristics found significant with regard to investment preferences were 
checked for correlations between each other. 
 
Trusts with a natural person as a donor hold equities in significantly more cases 
than average (52% vs. mean 42%). In these trusts, the answers were given by 
the donor or a member of the management board in significantly more case than 
the average (75% vs. 61%) and significantly more of the subjects fall in the group 
of older decision makers (48% vs. 35%). 
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In trusts where the respondent was the donor or a member of the management 
board, there was a significantly higher portion of natural person donors than 
average (64% vs. 49%), decision makers were significantly older (43% vs. 35%) 
and the donor had influence in significantly more cases (48% vs. 38%). 
 
In trusts with older decision makers, a significantly higher portion of natural 
person donors was observed (71% vs. 49%) and the respondents were 
significantly more often the donor or member of the management board (74% vs. 
61%). 
 
In trusts where the donor has influence, natural person donors were identified in 
significantly more cases (59% vs. 49%) and the respondent was in more cases 
than average the donor or a member of the management board (74% vs. 61%). 
 
Trusts that hold equities have a natural person as a donor in significantly more 
cases than average (61% vs. 49%). 
 
For the trusts with expected asset growth and those where income primarily 
stems from capital, no correlations with one of the other characteristics could be 
observed. 
 
The analysis gives reason to assume that some of the characteristics do not 
necessarily influence investment preferences as single factors as found in the 
tests of associations (chapter 7.2). They might be influential only in combination 
with other characteristics. Questionable to some extent as single factors of 
influence are therefore in particular the following characteristics: 
 
- Donor: natural person 
- Respondent is donor or member of management board 
- Donor influence 
- Age of the decision makers 
 
In general, it cannot be ruled out that other characteristics which have not been 
investigated in this study could have a meaningful influence on investment 
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preferences and the characteristics found to be significant only accidentally 
heavily correlate with these non-identified characteristics. 
 
Appendix P provides details of the investigation. 
 
 
7.3 Summary of Main Findings from the Online Survey 
 
7.3.1 Findings with regard to the 4FP of PT and to EUT 
 
1. Most trusts are risk-averse for gains with high probabilities which is in 
accordance with the 4FP and with EUT. 
2. Most trusts are risk-averse also for high gains with low probabilities. This 
contradicts the traditional PT phenomenon of risk-seeking behaviour in 
situations where high gains are possible (lottery ticket) but is consistent 
with EUT. 
3. Most trusts are loss averse, i.e. requiring a positive yield that must be 
higher in absolute terms than the potential negative outcome, if they are 
willing to take the risk of a loss at all. The ratio for an acceptable gain/loss 
situation is at around two times. These parameters are comparable to 
those found in other PT studies with private individuals. The result 
accommodates EUT. 
4. The higher the loss potential in a “fair game” option with balanced 
probabilities, the more risk-averse behave trusts. 
5. There is a statistically significant tendency to risk-seeking behaviour in the 
domain of losses in comparison with the domain of gains. This is true for 
high as well as for low probability outcomes. 
6. High losses at low probabilities are accepted by a large portion of trusts. 
The 4FP calls for the concept of insurance premium, i.e. subjective 
overweighting of the small probability leading to risk aversion. This is not 
generally the case with trusts. Classic EUT would also imply the safe 
option which is only partly mirrored by the results. 
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7.3.2 Findings with regard to the Association of Characteristics to Risk 
Preferences 
 
1. The most obvious association is found with effective positioning of the 
trust´s capital. Trusts that are already invested in equities, which can 
traditionally be regarded as carrying risk, state risk-seeking preferences 
significantly more often. 
2. Expected asset growth from external sources is associated with risk 
preferences in all three domains, i.e. gains, losses and mixed. Trusts that 
expect growth of assets are more willing to take risk. 
3. If the donor is a natural person, risk is more easily taken. This holds true 
especially in the domain of gains and for mixed outcomes. 
4. Respondants who stated to be the donor and/or member of the 
management board exhibited more risk preferences in the domain of gains 
and for mixed outcomes. 
5. The age of decision makers is associated with risk preferences, but only in 
the domain of gains. Older decision makers are more prone to take risk. 
6. If the donor has influence on investment decisions, risk is rather taken, 
especially in the domain of (low probability) gains. 
7. Many other characteristics are not associated with risk preferences. This 
partly comes as a surprise because especially the factor of “size” is named 
frequently as a distinguishing feature in the literature. 
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8 Qualitative Assessment of Survey Results by Interviews 
 
Telephone interviews were conducted in order to triangulate the quantitative 
findings of the internet survey. The structured qualitative analysis of telephone 
interviews supports the validity of the outcomes of the quantitative part. The 
interviewees broadly confirmed the findings and gave explanations for the risk 
preferences of trusts. Whereas the picture regarding most of the features of the 
4FP and loss aversion as well as the characteristics of trusts is rather 
unambiguous, the structured qualitative analysis also revealed that others are 
more controversial and call for closer examination and discussion.  
 
One feature of the 4FP, low probability high losses, which already gave an 
ambiguous result in the quantitative part of the analysis, was discussed 
controversially in the qualitative part as well and shall be examined closer below 
on the basis of the qualitative arguments of trusts. 
 
With regard to the characteristics of trusts and their association with preferences, 
most of the quantitative findings could be underpinned by rationales from the 
interviewees. Other findings leave room for further controversial discussion. 
Associations of significant parameters like “age of decision makers” may partly 
have come as a surprise to respondents but could be explained by qualitative 
arguments. 
 
The interviewees were informed about the results of the quantitative analysis 
which was the basis for the questions. The majority of interviewees stated that 
these results were useful for them as responsible persons in a trust. 
 
Table 7 is the aggregated product of the notes taken by the researcher on the 
prepared interview protocol sheets as elaborated in the methodology section 
(chapter 6). It summarises agreement and disagreement of the subjects to the 
main quantitative findings. 
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Table 7: Validation of quantitative results, portion of subjects´ statements categorised by structured assessment 
 
Findings of the quantitative part / Validation Is the quantitative finding confirmed ? 
a) with regard to the 4FP of PT and loss aversion Yes No Ambiguous No Comment 
1. Most trusts risk-averse for high probability gains 92% 0% 8% 0% 
2. Most trusts risk-averse for low probability high gains 80% 12% 8% 0% 
3. Most trusts are loss averse 100% 0% 0% 0% 
4. Risk aversion is positively correlated with loss potential 92% 0% 4% 4% 
5. Trusts rather risk-seeking for losses than for gains 62% 15% 19% 4% 
6. Low probability high losses acceptable for half the trusts 27% 19% 50% 4% 
     
b) with regard to the association of characteristics Yes No Ambiguous No Comment 
1. Equity investors rather risk-seeking than others 100% 0% 0% 0% 
2. Trusts that expect external asset growth rather risk-seeking 42% 12% 31% 15% 
3. Natural person donors rather risk-seeking than legal person 80% 0% 8% 12% 
4. Trusts with donor influence rather risk-seeking 84% 0% 8% 8% 
5. Older decision makers rather risk-seeking 38% 20% 38% 4% 
6. Donors/management board members rather risk-seeking 77% 0% 19% 4% 
7. Size has no significant influence on preferences 65% 8% 19% 8% 
8. Reserves have no significant influence on preferences 46% 19% 23% 12% 
9. Restrictions in statutes have no significant influence  50% 19% 27% 4% 
     
c) with regard to usefulness of findings for the trusts Yes No Ambiguous No Comment 
The results are useful for me as a responsible person in a trust 65% 15% 20% 0% 
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8.1 Overall Risk Preferences 
 
The structured analysis of the telephone interviews yielded categories and 
sub-categories of key terms and issues. The most important categories as 
measured by the frequency of mentions are listed in table 8. Some of the 
categories may be considered overlapping regarding their content. They are 
listed separately for the reason of the high number of mentions of these specific 
key terms. 
 
From the statements of the trusts as shown in table 8, four main categories and 
19 sub-categories emerged. They coincide to a large extent with the contents of 
the conjectures made in the literature review which were leading to the research 
questions.  
 
The category of “safety (in general)” was mentioned by the trusts in particular with 
regard to the questions referring to the domain of positive yields. This outcome is 
supportive for the conjecture made in the literature review regarding risk-aversion 
in the case of gains in general and also for the special case of low-probability high 
gains with regard to the frequent mentions of “speculation.” 
 
The “Purpose of the trust” category collected statements made mainly with 
respect to potential gains or mixed results. Whereas the sub-category “avoid 0%” 
was mentioned as a concern regarding gains and mixed results, “avoid safe 
losses,” which explicitly included achieving 0% as a favourable outcome, was 
named as a major topic concerning the domain of losses. It can be concluded that 
it depends on the reference point whether an outcome is perceived as positive or 
negative which is in line with the conjecture in the literature review. 
 
The justification of results plays a very important role for trusts, especially if the 
domain of losses is concerned. The responsibility of decision makers in front of 
the bodies of the trust was a major issue, but also the supervisory authority and 
the fiscal authorities were mentioned in this context. This supports the 
conjectures made in the literature review with regard to an influence of authorities 
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and their potential actions on the investment behaviour of trusts. 
 
In total, the category of “Preservation of Capital” found most entries. Trusts 
mention most frequently in this category the fear of “dauntingly high losses,” 
which shall be discussed especially with regard to the ambiguous quantitative 
results concerning low probability high losses. 
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Table 8: Categorisation of key terms and issues, number of mentions with regard to gains / losses / mixed outcomes 
Counting of Key Terms and Issues (n=26) Mentions after Questions concerning…  
Categories and Sub-Categories Gains Losses Mixed Total 
Safety (in general)     
Safe outcome generally preferred  16 10 9 35 
Speculation / Gambling 13 6 1 20 
Purpose of the Trust     
Fulfilment of the Purpose / Distributable Returns 11 2 8 21 
Avoiding 0% 7 0 9 16 
(Safe) Calculation Basis  12 1 0 13 
Need to Finance Projects continuously 9 0 4 13 
Minimum Return for Projects 6 0 2 8 
Justification of Results     
Responsibility in front of Bodies of the Trust 9 17 8 34 
Supervisory Authority 6 14 5 25 
Financial Authority / Charitable Status 3 8 6 17 
General Fear to do wrong 3 6 4 13 
Preservation of Capital     
Avoid Dauntingly High Losses 0 12 12 24 
Sitting out Losses   0 10 7 17 
Risk = Potential Downside 0 7 10 17 
Multi-year Horizon 2 6 4 12 
Avoiding (safe) Losses 0 11 0 11 
Hope for Recovery of Asset Prices 0 9 2 11 
Realising / Limiting Losses 0 7 3 10 
Asset Class Dependency 0 5 2 7 
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The analysis in the following sub-chapters will assess the qualitative information 
on the basis of the single quantitative findings and constitutes the first part of 
integration of results. 
 
8.1.1 Risk Preferences for Gains with High Probabilities 
 
The answers of the trusts showed a predominant picture of risk aversion in the 
online survey (as described in chapter 7.1.2) which was confirmed by the 
interviews and is in line with the typical corresponding feature of the 4FP. 
 
Analogous to the analysis of the literature, interviewees stressed that the safe 
choice looked more appealing to them as they generally preferred a safe 
outcome for the trust and strongly favoured a safe calculation basis for their 
planned expenditures. The fulfilment of the purpose in every single year had high 
utility for trusts. Interviewees stated that they needed to finance projects 
continuously and therefore aimed at generating steady investment results. In this 
context, also a constant minimum return was targeted. Following the 
argumentation of interviewees, the risky choice in the online survey, which 
included a 50% chance on a 0% return, was overwhelmingly refused also for the 
reason that 0% was hardly acceptable to trusts because at least a small positive 
contribution from the capital base to the running expenditures was expected by 
the bodies of the trust. 
 
In the online survey, the safe choice was preferred by more than four out of five 
trusts when the riskier alternative offered a higher expected monetary value than 
the safe choice. Even those trusts which stated to have reserves for one or more 
years, i.e. which could “afford” to prefer the mathematically superior risky choice, 
did not exhibit significantly more risk-seeking behaviour than those without 
reserves. This indicates that the continuous fulfilment of the purpose of the trust 
may not be the only reason for risk aversion. 
 
Interviewees gave further reasons for their risk-averse preferences, which can be 
regarded in conjunction with the legal framework as assumed in the literature 
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review analysis. Decision makers in the interviews mentioned the burden of 
responsibility for the trust´s capital. This was especially the case where the 
founder is a juristic person. Interviewees that are the founders and still active in 
investment decision-making were significantly more risk-seeking in their 
decisions. The risk-averse subjects particularly stressed the need to justify 
investment results in front of the bodies of the trusts and in front of the 
supervisory authority. A founder-decision maker may have less a problem with 
these kinds of issues as she possibly still considers the trust´s capital as her own 
money and at least does not need justification in front of internal bodies. 
 
8.1.2 Risk Preferences for High Gains with Low Probabilities 
 
In contrast to the typical 4FP, the answers of the trusts in the online survey (as 
described in chapter 7.1.3) showed a predominant picture of risk aversion which 
was confirmed by the interviews. 
 
The questions in the quantitative part aimed at investigating the preferences of 
trusts in cases where a high return of 10% is offered at a low probability of 0.025 
(risky choice) vs. a safe but low return of 0.25%. The 4FP predicts for individuals 
that people in average strongly overweight the low probability and therefore 
prefer the risky alternative. This is not the case with the majority of trusts. More 
than four out of five decision makers in the online survey preferred the safe low 
yielding alternative. 
 
The interview comments of participants gave rationales why the trusts´ behaviour 
is different from typical 4FP. Decision makers stated that they associated the 
prospect of a 10% yield with a high risk which they did not want to bear. Others 
pointed out that the probability of 0.025 was too low to be taken serious. Both 
issues together, the high yield prospect in combination with a low probability of 
success looked like speculation or gambling to interviewees and were rejected 
for that reason. In this context, subjects named the problem of explaining 
decisions to internal bodies of the trust and the supervisory authority as a difficult 
issue. 
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Interviewees stated that safety was generally preferred in order to have a positive 
return at all, even if it was as low as 0.25%. With regard to the fulfilment of the 
purpose of the trust, the very low return could at least deliver a small contribution 
to finance activities. A return of 0% instead should be strictly avoided for this 
reason. Decision makers also stated that in the worst case the chain of 
consequences could be that 0% investment return led to zero financing of 
activities and finally threatened the charitable status that is granted by the 
financial authorities.  
 
Decision makers pointed to the fear to do wrong which might be much larger than 
the greed for high gains. They argue that persons acting on behalf of a trust 
needed to justify their decisions and were therefore particularly risk-averse. As 
decision makers would on the one hand not personally benefit from an 
extraordinarily high return like 10% but on the other hand have difficult 
discussions in case of zero returns, the decision must be for the safe low yielding 
alternative in the majority of cases. Several interviewees stated that they would 
have decided differently for their own wealth. This line of argumentation coincides 
with Schindler (2003) who criticises the lacking inducement for high returns. 
 
8.1.3 Risk Preferences for Losses with High Probabilities  
 
In the online survey, the answers of the trusts (as described in chapter 7.1.4) 
showed a predominant picture of risk aversion in contrast to the typical 4FP. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that in comparison to the results of the mirror 
question in the domain of gains, significantly more trusts chose the risky 
alternative. The respective question in the interview was built on the latter finding 
and generated mostly supportive comments. 
 
A general objection to the investigation of this issue is that a significant portion of 
trusts may have been confronted with the question of losses for the first time. In 
the quantitative part of this work, only 8.5% of trusts stated that they had suffered 
from losses at least once within the last five calendar years from 2007 – 2011 
which included years of financial crisis and high volatility on capital markets. 25% 
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of trusts did not answer to the question.  
 
In the qualitative assessment of the quantitative results, trusts stated that the safe 
alternative was not unambiguously the superior one. Supporters of the safe 
alternative, who generally tended to favour the safe outcome for all questions, 
pointed out that it would be appropriate for a trust to limit losses and to avoid 
speculation. These interviewees argued that a trust should always take the safe 
alternative, no matter whether in the domain of gains or losses. This philosophy 
appears to be wide-spread among trusts.  
 
Supporters of the risky alternative stated that even though trusts were not 
allowed to speculate, things would be different if the investment result was 
already in the domain of losses (as given by the question in the survey) and the 
decision maker could just opt for the better of two adverse choices. This 
explanation coincides with Thaler and Johnson (1990), who found that people 
strive to break even if decision problems are framed in the domain of losses. 
 
Interviewees argued that sitting out losses, i.e. opting for the risky alternative, 
could be favourable for trusts which state the purchase price and not the current 
market price in their reporting to the supervisory authority. This could be 
acceptable to the supervisory authority especially in cases where losses appear 
to be temporary as with bonds of good quality. The eternal time horizon of a trust 
was also given as an argument why temporary losses were tolerable. 
 
The questions in the survey intentionally did not refer to a particular asset class in 
order to avoid any potential psychological association of risk that could be caused 
for example by naming equities. The interview answers make the important point 
that a loss in bonds could be perceived and treated different from a loss in 
equities of the same magnitude. Interview partners stressed that in general, 
trusts were reluctant to realise losses. 
 
For decision makers in trusts, interview partners argued, reporting losses to the 
internal bodies of the trust could be so undesirable that they would try to take the 
chance to cover the losses, even if this behaviour could result in higher losses.  
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Furthermore, interviewees defending the risky behaviour pointed out that trust 
executives may partly be led by typical human behaviour, i.e. in the case of 
losses, the hope for a recovery of asset prices. Finally, some risk must be taken 
to come back from losses into gain territory, they argue. 
 
8.1.4 Risk Preferences for Large Losses with Low Probabilities  
 
The answers of the trusts in the online survey (as described in chapter 7.1.5) 
showed a mixed picture of risk aversion and risk-seeking behaviour. Typical 4FP 
calls for an overweighting of small probabilities and therefore risk aversion to 
prevent a potential high loss of -10%. The question can be regarded as asking for 
the willingness to pay an insurance premium against high losses. In comparison 
to the results of the mirror question in the domain of gains, significantly more 
trusts (for question 4a slightly more than 50% of all trusts) chose the risky 
alternative. In the interview, trusts were confronted with the quantitative finding 
that about half of the trusts would prefer the risky choice. Comments were 
ambiguous and pointed in a balanced way to the various issues to be considered 
in that difficult decision problem to trusts. 
 
Supporters of the risky option stated that there was always tail risk in all 
investments. They focused on the high chance (p=0.975) of completely avoiding 
losses, which they regarded as an important goal. Realising a loss, even a small 
one, could cause difficulties in explaining this result to the bodies of the trust and 
the supervisory authority. Psychologically, a loss would mean admitting a 
mistake. This argumentation coincides with Thaler and Johnson (1990) who 
found that subjects exhibited a strong tendency to favour risky options that 
offered the chance to break even in the framing of a loss situation. 
 
Supporters of the safe option argued that they could not engage in an investment 
that would offer a downside potential of that magnitude. A loss of 10% would 
threaten the activities of trusts for several years and may also lead to 
consequences not only with regard to internal bodies of the trust but also the 
supervisory authority and the fiscal authority. The charitable status of the trust 
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could be jeopardised. 
 
The controversial discussion mirrors the split result of the quantitative part. It 
points in particular to two main issues that are considered to be of similarly great 
importance to trusts: avoidance of any negative yields on the one hand and 
avoidance of high losses on the other hand.  
 
8.1.5 Risk Preferences for Mixed Outcomes / Loss Aversion 
 
According to the quantitative analysis, trusts in average perceive the negative 
utility of losses about twice as strong as the positive utility from gains (as 
described in chapter 7.1.6). The answers of the interviewees unanimously 
confirmed that loss aversion was predominant among trusts. This is in line with 
what could be expected from Prospect Theory.  
 
Interviewees stated that losses could be regarded as failure of the board or the 
responsible persons. Avoiding losses was a must for trusts. Positive yields on the 
other hand were regarded as self-evident. In case of doubt, they would 
nevertheless generally prefer the safe outcome instead of a potential loss, even if 
it were 0%. 
 
A portion of 34% of all trusts in the quantitative survey stated that they would 
prefer to agree entering an investment that offered either a 3% yield (p=0.5) or a 
yield of -3% (q=1-p) over a safe yield of 0%. The preference of these subjects 
contradicts the assumption of loss aversion. Interviewees gave rationales why 
this behaviour could be reasonable to trusts. 
 
Interviewees argued that a yield16 of 0% implied no possibility for distribution. In 
the long term, 0% could not be an option for trusts. The postulation of fulfilment of 
the purpose of the trust would therefore be led ad absurdum. This explanation 
coincides with Hüttemann/Schön (2007) who claim that there was a duty for the 
trusts represented by their management boards to aim for a yield from 
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investments which would implicitly prohibit any investment strategy that could ex 
ante already be considered unprofitable. 
 
A safe yield of 0% could therefore be regarded as a pain barrier to enter risky 
investments. The risky alternative offered at least a 50% chance for distribution of 
a return and in the worst case the trust would sit out the loss.  
 
The current environment on capital markets must be regarded as challenging 
since also in real life the yields of “safe investments” are close to 0% already 
before adjusting for inflation. (At the time of writing, German government bonds 
with a maturity of two years trade at a yield of about 0.00%.) 
 
The discussion revealed that a reference point of 0% yield plays an important role 
if used as alternative outcome to risky choice.  
 
In the internet survey, when asked the same question as above but with 
increased absolute figures of 6% yield (instead of 3%) and -6% yield (-3%) 
respectively, fewer trusts preferred the risky alternative. Interviewees explained 
that a yield of -6% seemed daunting to trusts. A loss of this magnitude would be 
difficult to catch up in the following years. Furthermore, a yield of -6% was difficult 
to justify in front of the trust´s bodies, the supervisory authority and also the 
financial authority. Interviewees pointed to the issue that legal discharge from 
liabilities must be obtained and that grossly negligent behaviour led to personal 
liability.  
 
Interviewees stated that a yield of -3% could still be justified, whereas -6% was 
“just too much.” More than 3-4% loss would also be psychologically difficult 
because they could hardly be recovered in later years. 
 
Subjects stated that the focus of trusts was on the potential downside and not so 
much on the chance for gains: the higher the absolute numbers were, the less the 
risky option was acceptable.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
16
 In the survey, trusts were told that the yield was up to 100% distributable upon their discretion. 
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8.2 Associations with Trust Characteristics 
 
Analogous to the above analysis regarding the 4FP and loss aversion, the key 
terms with regard to the association of characteristics were analysed as well. 
Table 9 shows the key terms and issues that emerged from the interviews. 
 
The number of categories per characteristic varies. While the finding of 
association regarding equity holdings were explained and commented by 
arguments from two main categories only, arguments regarding other 
characteristics were sorted into more categories and were partly contradictory as 
in the case of “Expected Asset Growth.” 
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Characteristics: Key Terms and Issues (n=26)  
Categories  # of Mentions 
Equities  
equities as a synonyme for risk 16 
equity investments require qualification  8 
Expected Asset Growth  
further donations not usable to cover losses 11 
potential losses can be covered 6 
further donations increase ability to generate returns 5 
Decision Makers´ Age  
wisdom / experience 13 
generally more cautious 12 
relaxed 7 
different from private wealth: eternal life time of the trust 6 
Natural vs. Legal Person  
different type of people responsible 14 
entrepreneurial thinking 11 
balance of powers 9 
Donor Influence / Position of the Interviewee  
donor can inject more money 15 
justifies decisions mainly in front of himself 12 
"my money" mentality 10 
Size  
for percentage gains/losses not important 13 
differences only on single investment level 11 
large trusts have more financial competence 7 
lower costs of investment for large trusts 6 
Reserves  
trusts do not easily change their investment philosophy 11 
type of reserves is important 11 
reserves should allow for more risk 9 
Investment Restrictions by Statutes  
statutes not concrete 13 
statutes are binding 8 
gilt-edged outdated / "safety" difficult to define 7 
 
Table 9: Categorisation of key terms and issues, number of mentions with regard 
to trust characteristics 
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8.2.1 Rationales for the Associations found in the Quantitative Part 
 
The quantitative analysis (as described in chapters 7.2.2 – 7.2.9) showed that 
there are associations between various trust characteristics and investment risk 
preferences. 
 
Interviewees were not surprised to learn that trusts which invest a portion of their 
capital in equities exhibit risky behaviour in significantly more cases than other 
trusts. Equity investing itself was regarded as risky, partly even as a synonym for 
risky behaviour, by trust representatives. Interviewees argued that trusts that 
invest in equities were supposed to be more competent in financial matters and 
therefore rather able to take risk. 
 
The discussion was more ambivalent for the finding that risky preferences are 
found significantly more often for trusts which expect their assets to grow by 
donations, inheritances or other external factors within the coming years. Various 
interviewees stated that they were not surprised by the finding, but it would be the 
wrong approach for these trusts as fresh money was no substitute for potential 
losses or missed out gains. Other subjects supported the finding but were not 
able to give arguments why this characteristic was relevant for risk preferences. 
An interviewee explained that these trusts might want to be more attractive for 
their prospect new co-donors.  
 
The finding that elder decision makers rather tend to take risky investment 
decisions than younger ones was not expected by the majority of interviewees as 
increasing age was connected with cautiousness rather than with risk. 
Interviewees explained that the wisdom and experience would be a very 
important asset for trusts. Qualifications found with elder people would lead to the 
potential to invest riskier. Elder people were supposed to better be able to 
capture investment risk on the basis of their experience. They would be more 
relaxed than younger decision makers. Interviewees argued that age of decision 
makers was not relevant “in the conventional way” because they had to think for 
an eternal life time of the trust, whereas they may personally rather prefer to 
  
 
149 
switch to safer investments the older they get.  
 
The finding that trusts tend to riskier behaviour if the donor is a natural person 
and still active in investment decision making did not come as a surprise to 
interviewees. The contacted trust representatives argued that natural persons 
becoming donors often had obtained their wealth by taking risk and exhibited a 
rather entrepreneurial thinking. The assignment of power in trusts founded by 
legal persons would in many cases be more balanced leading to more risk 
aversion.  
 
Interviewees stated in the same line of argumentation as above that donors that 
are still active in decision making could take higher risks because they must 
justify it mainly in front of themselves, whereas other trusts had bodies that 
created some balance of powers leading to take decisions together as a group 
without much risk. Donors would also not fear not to be re-elected into a body of a 
trust. Interviewees also argued that a donor could cover losses himself by 
injecting more money if necessary. The difference between a trust which was 
founded by a natural person vs. trusts established by legal persons would be the 
“my money”-mentality.  
 
8.2.2 Rationales for Non-Association of Characteristics 
 
The quantitative analysis (as described in chapters 7.2.2 – 7.2.9) showed that 
there are no associations between some trust characteristics and investment risk 
preferences in contrast to the conjectures made in the literature review.  
 
In the quantitative part, the size of a trust was found to have no significant impact 
on risk preferences. Interviewees explained that the absolute size of a trust was 
irrelevant as the questions in the survey concerned the whole capital which gave 
comparability on a relative level. Small and large trusts had the same general 
aim, which is to finance their projects, and therefore the same general needs with 
regard to investment preferences. Differences may be observed on the level of 
single investments, where large trusts were better able to diversify their portfolio 
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risks. Interviewees also pointed at potential differences of investment 
competences between large trusts which could afford to employ investment 
professionals and the majority of laymen in small trusts, where in many cases 
only one person was involved in financial decision making. Expenses that are 
associated with investments would also be lower for the large trusts. 
 
Following from the literature review, it was assumed that the existence of 
reserves could play a role with regard to risk preferences. The survey could not 
evidence that to a degree of significance. Interviewees were partly surprised by 
this finding as they expected trusts with some reserves being able to absorb more 
risk than others. On the other hand, trusts that had built high reserves may have 
done so because of particular risk aversion and were reluctant to change their 
investment behaviour. Subjects added to the discussion that the type of reserves 
would be of importance as not all reserves would be easily available for 
distribution.  
 
In the literature review, it was conjectured that the statutes might have significant 
impact on risk preferences, especially if they contain the restriction of gilt-edged 
investment only. The survey did not find a significant association. 
Interviewees argued that the statutes of trusts were in most cases not concrete 
enough to derive actual behaviour that would be mirrored in the preferences to be 
measured in this study. The question of gilt-edged investment was regarded as 
outdated as the current situation on capital markets showed that with regard to 
the sovereign debt crisis in Europe no investment can be considered as 
completely safe. 
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9 Integration of Results and Conclusions  
 
The study yielded conclusions with regard to the applicability of the theoretical 
framework and also with respect to the practical questions concerning 
appropriate investment products for German charitable trusts.   
 
9.1 Answers to the Research Questions 
 
Research Question: 
 
1. What investment risk preferences do decision makers acting on behalf of 
German charitable trusts exhibit with regard to the features of the 4FP of 
PT and loss aversion? 
 
Research Hypotheses: 
 
Hº: Decision makers acting on behalf of German charitable trusts do not 
exhibit investment risk preferences analogous to the 4FP and loss aversion 
typically found with natural persons by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
Hª: Decision makers acting on behalf of German charitable trusts exhibit 
investment risk preferences analogous to the 4FP and loss aversion typically 
found with natural persons by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
 
The five features are: 
1. Individuals exhibit risk aversion over high-probability gains. 
2. Individuals exhibit risk-seeking behaviour over low-probability gains 
3. Individuals exhibit loss aversion, i.e. losses loom larger than respective gains 
4. Individuals exhibit risk-seeking behaviour over high-probability losses 
5. Individuals exhibit risk aversion over low-probability losses 
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Hº is rejected for features 1 and 3. For these features, Hª is not rejected.  
Hº is not rejected for features 2 and 4. For these features, Hª is rejected. 
Hº and Hª are both not rejected for feature 5.  
 
Overall result: 
The research hypothesis Hº is not rejected. Hª is rejected. 
 
 
Research Question: 
 
2. Are there associations between the characteristics of German charitable 
trusts and their investment risk preferences concerning the features of the 
4FP of PT and loss aversion? 
 
Research Hypotheses: 
 
Hº: The investment preferences of German charitable trusts are not 
associated with their characteristics. 
Hª: The investment preferences of German charitable trusts are associated 
with their characteristics. 
 
The tested characteristics are: 
- Size of the trust (measured in terms of asset base) 
- Age of the trust 
- Donor and donor´s influence on investment decisions 
- Type of trust 
- Structure of the capital stock 
- Sources of funding 
- Expected growth of the asset base 
- Existence of reserves 
- Statutes of the trust 
- Number, gender and age of decision makers 
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Hº is rejected for the following characteristics: 
- Structure of the capital stock 
- Expected growth of the asset base 
- Donor and donor´s influence on investment decisions 
- Age of decision makers 
- Sources of funding 
 
For these characteristics, Hª is not rejected. 
 
Hº is not rejected for all other characteristics named above. 
Hª is rejected for all other characteristics named above. 
 
 
Overall result: 
The research hypothesis Hº is rejected. Hª is not rejected. 
 
9.2 Conclusions with Regard to the Applicability of PT and 
EUT to the Preferences of German Charitable Trusts 
 
9.2.1 Conclusions with Regard to PT, the 4FP and Loss Aversion 
 
There is evidence that a yield of 0% plays a particular role as a reference point as 
suggested by PT. The reference point is strictly avoided in lotteries in the domain 
of gains, even where the alternative positive yields are tiny and hardly 
contributing to financing the purpose of the trust. The reference point is 
increasingly sought after when losses are the only alternative, for more than one 
fourth of trusts even in a situation where the expected monetary value lies below 
the monetary value of the safe loss. The reference point is also sought after in 
situations with mixed potential outcomes. Preference for the reference point is 
positively correlated with the potential loss potential, signalling loss aversion in 
accordance with PT. 
 
  
 
154 
The basic PT feature of distinguishing between positive and negative yields 
instead of looking at absolute wealth can be considered to be the suitable 
approach in describing trust preferences. The significantly different distribution of 
safe vs. risky behaviour in the domain of gains vs. the domain of losses supports 
the feature. 
 
Concavity of the utility function in the domain of positive yields can be regarded 
as given under the assumption that the subjective weight of p=0.5 is higher than 
w(p)=0.375. Risk aversion for gains in general is found also without that 
assumption. 
 
There is no evidence of overweighting of small probabilities as postulated by PT. 
This pattern can neither be confirmed for gains nor for losses. If small 
probabilities were overweighted by agents, this would imply concavity of the 
value function in domain of gains which is strong enough to overcompensate the 
subjective probability effect.  
 
For trusts, there are indications that the opposite effect is in place: In the 
qualitative assessment, subjects stated that they regarded a low probability for a 
high yield as a form of gambling that should be avoided. In the domain of losses, 
the slight majority of trusts accepted a low probability high loss. The telephone 
interviews supported the willingness to enter investments with this kind of tail risk 
in order avoid (small) losses. These findings point to an overweighting of high 
probabilities, the opposite of the PT postulation. 
 
Depending on the shape of the probability weighting function, which is beyond 
the scope of this research piece, the value function could be convex for more 
subjects than those 35% in question 3a). If w(p=0.5)< 0.5 , the proportion of 
agents with a convex value function could be higher. Convexity can be found for 
those 28% of agents which opted for the risky choice in 3b) under the weak 
assumption that w(0.5) < 0.59.  
 
The significantly higher portion of risk-takers in the domain of losses speaks for a 
different shape of the value curve in comparison to gains. The value curve may in 
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the case of losses in average tend to be closer to linear with a substantial portion 
of subjects having a convex curve. 
 
9.2.2 Conclusions with Regard to EUT 
 
29% of trusts behave in accordance with risk-averse EUT for all the single 
questions 1a) to 5b). Answers to question 5c) were not considered because the 
question type is different. 
 
When dividing the utility curve into several sections like under PT above, the 
analysis shows for all but one (4a) section that the preferences of the majority are 
compliant with EUT. The significantly increasing portion of risk seekers for the 
loss section is a strong indication that the average curvature could be different 
between the sections. Following this line of thought, no simple concave utility 
function like the logarithmic function proposed by Bernoulli is to be expected. If 
the utility curve were concave and could be described by a single function like 
Bernoulli´s between the yield points of -6% and 6%, it would be expected that a 
similar portion of subjects opted for the risky choice in mirror questions 1a) and 
3a). This is not the case. The current asset base seems to play a role as a 
reference point.  
 
The analysis suggests strong concavity for gains but in average a curvature 
closer to linearity for losses. As the analysis showed, the utility curve may 
partially even be convex such as in the case of small losses. 
 
The low portion of trusts exhibiting risk-seeking behaviour in the domain of gains, 
which is deviating from classic risk-averse EUT, can be explained as noise. The 
significantly higher portion of risk-seekers for losses and for the mixed questions 
challenges the general validity of EUT for trusts. 
 
More than one fourth of all trusts in loss question 3b) aggressively violate 
risk-averse EUT by accepting the risky choice even at a lower expected monetary 
value than the safe choice. 
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A yield of 0%, as the analysis revealed, could be a reference point for decisions, 
a concept which is unknown in EUT. The level of absolute wealth is not important 
for trusts in decision making, contradictory to EUT. Trusts are only able to fulfil 
their mission if they generate sufficient income under the restriction of 
preservation of capital.  
 
9.2.3 Adapting the Existing Theories to Trust Preferences 
 
The potential utility curve that could be expected on the basis of the above 
analysis may show some striking points as indicated in figure 23.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Potential shape of a “typical” utility curve for German charitable trusts 
 
The reference point R is located in the centre of the chart. On the abscissa, R 
divides positive (gains) and negative returns (losses), whereupon R does in 
practice not necessarily equal 0% investment return. The location of R could as 
well be determined by the concept of inflation adjusted preservation of capital. 
Only for reasons of simplification in the study, zero inflation was assumed. On the 
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ordinate, R divides between positive and negative perceived utility, a scale 
chosen according to the distinction between gains and losses on the X-axis. 
 
M represents the point of the minimum return that is absolutely needed to cover 
administrative costs and other recurring expenses. As trusts stated in the 
interviews, they consider it very important to reach at least some return as a safe 
calculation base to cover their basic expenses. A potential yield of 0% is hardly 
acceptable to trusts, if alternatively (small) safe gains are possible. The utility 
curve in the zone RM can therefore be expected to show a particular steepness in 
comparison to most other zones. 
 
T represents the point of targeted return which is desired for the intended 
realisation of the trust´s purpose. Every additional unit of return in zone MT will 
increase the utility for the trust, but with a decreasing marginal utility. This 
accommodates the idea that the importance of projects can be ranked und the 
most important ones will be followed first. 
 
Any additional investment return beyond point T, in the zone T+, will create 
additional utility. Due to the definition that all intended projects have already be 
financed, the returns could be used for the promotion of more projects, which are 
considered less important than the originally intended ones, or for the building of 
reserves. It can be expected that the marginal utility decreases again in 
comparison to zones RM and MT. This implication is supported by trust 
comments considering the prospect of high returns as inappropriate risk and 
gambling. Furthermore, decision makers in trusts have no incentive for greed as 
they usually do not have personal benefits from high returns. 
 
The shape of the trust in the domain of losses is harder to describe and vague as 
trusts generally lack experience with negative returns and have in seldom cases 
or not at all been confronted with this kind of question before.  
 
The interviews showed that an “always safe”-philosophy is wide-spread among 
trusts. However, its applicability for losses seems more questionable when only 
negatively framed outcomes are at choice and trusts strive to break even. 
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In the domain of losses, the curve can be expected to be about twice as steep 
due to loss aversion. For slight losses, the study pointed at indications for 
convexity as complete avoidance of losses is regarded a more important issue 
than a reduction of small losses. Trusts have named “sitting out” as an 
appropriate strategy. A represents the point of a harmful but still acceptable loss. 
The interviews gave indications that for many trusts this point could be found in 
the area of about -3% to -4%.  
 
S marks the point that is considered a substantial loss. In zone SA, the shape of 
the curve can be expected to be concave as the definition of substantial losses is 
a scenario which is to be avoided including not only the potential loss of the 
tax-exempt status and a temporary stop of charitable activities but even 
potentially questions the further existence of the trust and personal liability of its 
decision makers. After having passed point S, in zone S-, any further percentage 
point loss does not seem to loom as much as before, indicating convexity of 
utility. 
 
The researcher does not extensively comment on the potential shape of a 
probability weighting function. The analysis pointed at a high subjective weighting 
of high probabilities and found no evidence for overweighting low probabilities. 
The probability weighting function could possibly be slightly s-shaped. 
 
9.3 Conclusions with Regard to the Suitability of Investment 
Products 
 
The study yielded general criteria for investment products that reflect the special 
needs of trusts. They will be discussed with regard to the historic and current 
capital market environment, modern portfolio theory, asymmetry of the 
risk-/return profile, institutional risk factors and the principal-agent problem and 
finally provide an outlook. Furthermore, the study revealed that the preferences 
of trusts may vary depending on their specific characteristics.  It shall therefore be 
discussed what this could mean for their investment strategy. 
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The general preferences for investments as derived from the analysis of the 
quantitative and qualitative part of the study can be summarised as follows: 
 
- Positive (real) yields 
- Steady returns to provide a safe calculation basis  
- Sufficient returns to sustainably fulfil the purpose of the trust 
- Returns must be distributable 
- Avoid losses 
- In case of losses, provide arguments to sit out losses 
- Avoid dauntingly high losses 
- Easy to justify in front of bodies and authorities (comprehensible also to 
laymen) 
 
9.3.1 Investment Preferences and Evidence of the Past  
 
In the quantitative part, trusts were asked to state the asset allocation of their 
capital base.  
 
Asset Class This study H. (2005) S. (2007) B. (2011b) 
Cash equivalents 12%  14%  
Bonds 56% 58% 38% 55% 
Equities 11% 16% 8% 7% 
Real Assets (RE, Art) 13% 12% 10% 14% 
Shareholdings 5%    
Other 3% 14% 30% 24% 
 
Table 10: Average composition of trust portfolios by asset classes 
 
Table 10 shows that most of the capital is invested in bonds and in cash 
equivalents. The asset allocation is similar to the averages of previous research 
(Heissmann, 2005; Sandberg, 2007; BDS, 2011b) in former years.  
 
The holdings in bonds may have met the above investment criteria in the past 20 
years. As a proxy for top quality issuers´ bond yields, figure 24 shows how yields 
of German government bonds with a 10 year maturity have developed since 
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1992. For simplification, inflation is measured by the official German consumer 
price index that is calculated by the German Federal Statistical Office. The figure 
also shows the real yield at the respective time of a potential investment decision 
under the assumption that inflation would have remained the same for the whole 
period.17 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Nominal and real bond yields and inflation for German 10-year 
government bonds 
 
The expected real bond yield at the time of investment ranged between 1% and 
5% until 2010. For Buy-and-hold investors, the returns stemming from coupons 
can be regarded as steady and distributable income in the sense of a safe 
calculation basis, meeting trusts´ general preferences. With regard to market 
price fluctuations, due to sharply rising yields in single years like 1994 and 1999, 
the change of the net wealth position would have temporarily been negative, 
even if the payment of the coupon was taken into account. In most of the years 
nominal yields were falling and provided additional valuation gains. Realising 
                                                          
17
 Data source: Bloomberg; German government bond yields are the generic rates (Bloomberg 
function: GDBR10 Index) on a month end basis from 09/1992 to 09/2012, the consumer price 
index (GRCP20YY Index) is published monthly for the respective past month and refers to annual 
rates of change in the consumer price index in the period from 09/1992 to 09/2012. The expected 
real bond yield is calculated as Nominal Bond yield – Inflation rate. It represents the information 
available to decision makers at the respective point of time between 09/1992 and 09/2012 and 
assumes that inflation was expected to remain at the level of purchase of the bond for the whole 
period until maturity of the bond. 
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these gains, for example annually, and reinvesting into a new 10 year bond would 
have been a successful strategy in most of the years. The gains from price 
appreciation could be used to provide for inflation and the coupon could be 
distributed for the purpose of the trust. The sufficiency of returns depends on the 
trust-specific targets. In the rare case of single years of losses by price 
depreciation, the quality of the bond issuer provided good arguments to sit out 
losses and wait for the outstanding coupons and redemption payment. 
Dauntingly high losses could only incur temporarily if the bond was priced at 
market value in times of sharply rising yields. Finally, bond investments with top 
quality issuers appear to be justifiable both in front of internal bodies and in front 
of the authorities as well. An investment strategy that was predominantly or even 
fully based on bonds within the past 20 years can ex post be considered 
appropriate to suit the identified investment preferences of trusts. Decision 
makers who have to decide on the investment strategy in 2012 are confronted 
with negative expected real yields on bond investments.  
 
In the average of trusts, other asset classes are considered less in the overall 
asset allocation. In the case of equities, reasons can be the higher volatility of 
stock prices compared to bonds, the fear of (dauntingly high) losses and the 
question of justifying potentially negative results for an asset class without 
guaranteed payment of dividends and without a redemption date for the 
repayment of the initial investment. Additionally, equities measured by the 
German blue chip index DAX could for most of the period not deliver dividend 
expectations that compare to the coupons of bonds.18  Decision makers who 
have to decide on the investment strategy in 2012 face a dividend yield of 
equities which is higher than the coupon of a bond investment as shown in figure 
25. 
 
 
                                                          
18
 Data Source: Bloomberg; German government bond yields are the generic rates (Bloomberg 
function: GDBR10 Index) on a month end basis from 09/1997 to 09/2012, Equities dividend yields 
refer to the DAX (DAX Index) and represent the sum of DAX-weighted dividends paid within the 
past 12 months divided by the DAX index level at the respective point of time 
(EQY_DVD_YLD_12M) on a month end basis in the period from 09/1997 to 09/2012. The Excess 
Distribution is calculated as Nominal Bond Yield- Equities Dividend Yield. 
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Figure 25: Bond yields vs. dividend yields 09/1997 – 09/2012 
 
Other asset classes in trust portfolios are more heterogenous and evidence on 
their ability to fulfil the trusts´ criteria is therefore difficult to generalise. Real 
estate can in some cases play an important role, especially for trusts which use 
their premises to fulfil the mission of the trust, e.g. as hospitals.  
 
9.3.2 Investment Preferences, Risk Management and Modern Portfolio 
Theory (MPT)  
 
Markowitz´ (1952) idea of portfolio diversification, still predominant in portfolio 
theory and practice, in order to optimise the risk-/return-profile of a portfolio and 
to adjust it to the preferences of individuals must be considered under the 
constraints of trusts. Markowitz defines risk mathematically as the standard 
deviation of returns (δ) around an expected mean return (µ). He assumes a 
Gaussian distribution as shown in figure 26 which is generally questionable for 
capital market returns (for critique, e.g. Rom/Ferguson, 1994).  
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Figure 26: Probability density of returns following a Gaussian distribution 
(Wikipedia, 2012) 
 
The distribution can be used by practitioners to approximate the risk of portfolios, 
e.g. by value-at-risk models. Trusts may use it in the sense of the above identified 
investment preferences in order to estimate the probability of falling short of a 
certain minimum yield, falling below 0% yield or suffering from a “dautingly” high 
loss. The validity of the calculation depends on the quality of forecasts 
concerning the expected mean return (µ) and the portfolio´s standard deviation of 
returns (δ). Practitioners often refer to historic data to make (best guess) 
predictions of the future.  
 
The correlation of assets in the portfolio is of major importance as the magnitude 
of the diversification effect relies on that variable. It is as hard to predict as the 
other variables concerning the future, not stable over time and may move to an 
adverse direction, i.e. complete positive correlation, for investors in times of 
crises.   
 
For decision makers, it could generally be difficult to explain the methodology to 
laymen in the bodies of trusts and the supervisory authority. This may especially 
be true, if losses are suffered in the portfolio. Despite its shortcomings, MPT 
provides a powerful tool to describe the estimated risk-/return-characteristics of a 
portfolio and could therefore be used by trusts to develop an understanding of 
their risk positions and potential returns. 
  
 
164 
 
As far as risk management in trusts is concerned, the results of this study help to 
understand that only a diversification of risks will create a portfolio that meets the 
long-term needs of trusts. Trusts should not evaluate the inherent risks of 
investments separately with a sole focus on loss avoidance. Risks need to be 
evaluated in a portfolio context as the single risks do not simply sum up but can 
be diversified in a portfolio and contribute to a higher expected return. 
 
9.3.3 Asymmetric Risk-/Return- Profiles  
 
The classic MPT approach to optimise the expected risk-/return- profile of a 
portfolio is the diversification of assets. This must also be advocated to trusts. 
From the results of the study, the identified preferences of trusts call for a 
distribution of returns which is different from the assumed bell-shaped one in 
MPT. Beyond the strive for diversification, trusts may seek for paths that lead to 
asymmetric risk-/return- profiles, i.e. to increase the probability for moderate 
gains at the cost of giving up the chance of very high yields. Referring to the 
illustration of the bell-shaped distribution of returns in figure 26, trusts would 
generally prefer a distribution which is more leptokurtic and left-skewed. A 
leptokurtic form mirrors the demand for a steady return and left skewness 
accommodates the abandonment of high returns in favour of a higher mode 
value. 
 
Taking these theoretical ideas into consideration, a trust may in practice use 
derivatives to manipulate the risk-/return profile of the portfolio. Trusts may follow 
the well-established principle of covered call writing which is popular especially 
among equity investors. The trust can sell call options on asset holdings which 
has the consequences that potential gains will be limited but the option premium 
received will add to the yield of the underlying asset and also buffer any adverse 
price movements meaning that the probability of a loss for the combined position 
will be lower than that for the pure underlying. This principle can be applied not 
only to equities but to bonds as well. In the latter case, it will usually require a fund 
solution for the trust as the strategy cannot be implemented with low volumes in 
  
 
165 
assets and without financial expertise. As far as equities are concerned, the 
direct implementation of the strategy also requires a minimum volume which 
should in practice exceed € 1 million. For lower volumes, mutual funds can be 
used as vehicles. 
 
Another well-known strategy to protect assets by derivatives is the purchase of 
put options. Protective put options are used to protect the investor from adverse 
price movements of the underlying security. The main disadvantage of the 
strategy is that a premium for the option is to be paid. The study reveals that 
many trusts are not willing to pay an insurance premium to prevent from losses. 
 
Guaranteed investment products which promise to at least repay the invested 
capital and additionally offer a certain participation rate with capital market 
movements, are popular investment vehicles in the German market. Although 
offering a capital guarantee, they do not comply with the preferences of trusts 
stated in this study. Trusts would prefer even very low yields to the chance of 
potentially high yields. The general concept of guarantee products usually works 
just the other way round: The interest for the life time of the product is invested 
into call options that will lose their complete value in case of adverse movements 
of the underlying security. 
 
9.3.4 Investment Preferences and Institutional Risk  
 
Charitable trusts have an important role in the society. In fulfilling their purpose, 
they contribute to the social and cultural well-being of the people which is 
increasingly important in times of austerity of the state and public institutions.  
Trusts face the risk of not being able to fulfil their purpose, if they do not generate 
sufficient funds which are stemming mainly from capital investments.  
 
The study revealed that supervisory by the federal states is a major topic for the 
trusts regarding their investment decisions. The state as a legislator sets a 
regulatory framework and provides supervision by the respective authorities of 
the federal states. Chapter 1 discussed the wide room for interpretation of the 
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applicable laws. By its activities of regulation, the state creates institutional risk 
(Rothstein, 2006; Rothstein et al., 2006). The main risk that emerges from 
regulation is that trusts may be misguided in their investment decision making 
towards suboptimal decisions. The influence of authorities can be negative if 
investment decisions are impacted in a way that is leading to irrational risk- and 
loss aversion, reduced potential for returns and therefore hindering the optimal 
fulfilment of the purpose which is the original and socially desirable aim of a trust.  
 
 
The definition of risk by the authorities is of essential importance to trusts. 
Problems may arise if trusts anticipate the perception of risk by the authorities 
defined as the loss potential of investments. If trusts state the subjective 
impression that they have to defend their investment decisions in front of 
authorities and fear potential consequences arising from losses, supervision will 
incentivise risk aversion at the cost of investment strategies that are appropriate 
to ensure the long-term fulfilment of the purpose. Authorities should be aware of 
their responsibility and make clear to trusts that they will explicitly tolerate 
temporary losses and concentrate their assessment on the eternal life-time 
horizon of trusts. 
 
Trusts should be encouraged to use the wide room for interpretation of the legal 
texts and concentrate primarily on the target of the fulfilment of the purpose. This 
may lead to higher volatility in returns, but increases the ability of trusts to 
optimise their investment strategies towards the generation of returns which are 
needed instead of focusing on capital preservation which limits the return 
potential and should be regarded as a secondary aim to the fulfilment of the 
purpose. 
 
9.3.5 The Importance of Trust Specific Characteristics and Agency Theory 
 
The analysis of trust characteristics in association with their risk preferences 
signals that a “one-size-fits-all” investment approach will not succeed in meeting 
the needs of trusts. Even though there are a lot of commonalities, trusts that meet 
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certain characteristics identified in the study can be expected to be prone to 
accept investment solutions which offer higher yield prospects at the price of 
higher risk.  
 
The study revealed that trusts with legal person founders and no influence by the 
donors are significantly more prone to risk-averse behaviour than those which 
were founded by private individuals who are active in investment decision 
making. This finding can be regarded in parallel to Agency Theory (AT), where 
agents are risk-averse whereas principals are considered to be risk-neutral 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The trusts that are subject to this study are all independent 
legal entities without an owner. The classic principal-agent conflict between an 
owner and the top management of a company (Jensen/Meckling, 1976) is 
therefore formally not applicable to these trusts. Fama and Jensen (1983) state 
that in absence of alienable residual claims, which they define as the difference 
between inflows of resources and promised payments to agents, board members 
of non-profit organisations were protected against ouster by outside agents.  
 
Despite the formal missing of an owner, trusts with natural person donors who 
are involved in decision making rather behave in a more risk-seeking way. The 
study found that founders of trusts can be inclined to behave like owners in the 
sense of AT and consider the assets of the trust independent of the legal status 
as their property. Under this assumption, there exists no agency problem for 
these trusts. This in turn stands in stark contrast to the aforementioned category 
of trusts which are dominated by risk-averse agents. Their tendency to take risky 
decisions will be limited due to lacking incentives (Wiseman/Gomez-Mejia, 
1998). The main long-term risk for these trusts is that their agents are reluctant to 
take investment risks to generate income. Since it is hardly possible to give 
further positive incentives on risk taking beyond the legal postulation of the 
fulfilment of the purpose, this issue could possibly be overcome by reducing the 
negative prospects for decision makers in the case of losses, e.g. supervisory 
which prioritises the generation of income and not the preservation of capital in 
each calendar year (compare 9.3.4, institutional risk). 
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9.3.6 Consequences for Future Investment Practice  
 
The current low yield environment exerts tremendous pressure on trusts. 
Investments like bank deposits and investment grade bonds which have in the 
past considered to be safe and therefore highly appropriate for trusts offer a yield 
potential for the coming years that will hardly suffice to cover inflation. A portfolio 
strategy that consists only of these traditional safe assets with an expected yield 
lower than expected inflation is implicitly set to subsequently destroy parts of the 
real capital base of the trust. This is even the case if no distribution of returns 
takes place. This unfavourable scenario has already become reality for many 
trusts but it seems that it has partly not yet been detected by them, e.g. because 
of rising bond prices resulting from decreasing capital market yields which 
simulate satisfying returns especially if disguised in investment products like 
mutual funds.  
 
Taken strictly, the legal framework does not support a “safe” investment strategy 
as the one described above. It does neither comply with the postulation to 
preserve the capital base nor does it support the criterion to fulfil the purpose of 
the trust. The responsible members engage in a strategy that can already ex ante 
be regarded as capital destructive.   
 
The question of “safety” must be asked anew and regarded from a different angle 
than in former years of splendid income from bonds. Given that trusts claim to 
have an eternal time horizon as stipulated by the law, they have reason to 
orientate their investment strategy towards assets that promise to equally exist 
for long time, deliver steady income and are prepared to endure also periods of 
war, changing currency systems and high inflation. Paper money in form of bank 
deposits, bonds and alike does not comply with these criteria. Blue chip equities 
can be expected to serve these criteria better. The question of longevity can 
practically be answered very easily even for small trusts, e.g. by investing in 
exchange traded funds which are based on blue chip indices like the German 
DAX or the EuroStoxx 50 index. These funds automatically replace constituents 
following predefined criteria. Companies pay dividends which can completely be 
used for distributions to fulfil the purpose of the trust as inflation provisioning does 
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not seem necessary for real assets like equities. At the time of writing, the 
dividend yields of the above mentioned indices are between 3 and 5% whereas 
“safe” AAA-rated bonds yield between close to 0% and 2% (see figure 25) 
depending on their maturity and the specific debtor. 
 
It has to be considered that dividends can be reduced or in the worst case 
completely cancelled depending on the economic situation and the dividend 
policy of the company and therefore provide only limited visibility of future income 
streams for trusts. Nevertheless, a well-diversified portfolio of blue chip equities 
can ex-ante be expected to deliver higher distributable returns than a AAA bond 
portfolio within coming years. Diversification across asset classes will be the key 
to investment success.  
 
In the low-yield environment of recent years discussion of the costs of 
investments gains importance. This is particularly the case when external asset 
managers and brokers are involved in the management of trust assets and 
execution of orders. Commonfund Institute (2005) recommend trustees to 
continuously ask the question of getting the same investment results at less 
costs. This is strongly connected to the question of active versus passive 
investing (Guardian, 2013). The fund industry provides exchange traded funds 
which replicate indexes of the major asset classes like equities and bonds at 
costs that are usually much lower than the charges of traditional mutual 
investment funds. These financial instruments provide a cost-efficient way to 
invest in diversified securities portfolios and are accessible also for small trusts.  
 
The community of German charitable trusts has discovered two new and partly 
related topics that are widely discussed in the literature: Sustainability and 
Mission Investing (e.g. Schneeweiß/Weber, 2012). These topics are also valid for 
equities as trusts can support “good” behaviour of companies beyond the scope 
of the original purpose of the trust by investing in their equities. Mission Investing 
can be regarded as an alternative school of thought which takes into 
consideration not only the traditional yield on assets but in particular how the 
capital itself is used to serve purpose. In the United Kingdom, the Charity 
Commission dedicates a separate chapter to programme related investment 
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(PRI) in their guide to trustees (Charity Commission, 2011) describing how trusts 
can use their funds to invest directly in projects that are related to their mission. 
On the international level, the related topic of ethical investments is widely 
discussed. Kreander et al. (2009) state that almost two thirds of the charities in 
their UK sample had an ethical policy which was typically limited to the use of 
negative ethical screens like the avoidance of tobacco and weapon producing 
companies. They postulate that charities should further align their aims and their 
investment practices. These alternative approaches may also gain further 
attention in Germany especially from trusts that are indeed able to realise a part 
of their purpose by the investment activity itself. 
 
In these times of low yields from traditionally safe investments, German 
charitable trusts will be forced to envisage a changing paradigm. They will have 
to redefine their investment strategies taking into consideration that the 
combination of sufficient income from high quality debtors has virtually 
disappeared from the market. These sources of income can subsequently be 
replaced by investments that offer the advantage of being real assets at the price 
of higher fluctuations of the market price and less visibility of future distributions. 
 
Finally, also the supervisory authorities need to be convinced to accept 
temporary volatility in portfolios in order to enable trusts to fulfil their purposes 
which are important not only to the direct beneficiaries but also and increasingly 
to society as a whole.  
 
9.3.7 Summary of Contributions and Limitations of the Study 
 
The author uses decision theory to analyse the investment preferences of 
German charitable trusts. This approach allows for an addition to the literature on 
decision theory as well as to practical knowledge in the field of investment 
preferences of trusts.  
 
As a contribution to decision theory, the author proposes a utility function 
representing the preferences of trusts based on decision theoretical 
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backgrounds. Unlike previous studies, this research does not refer to the 
preferences of private individuals for their own wealth but extends the knowledge 
base to the preferences stated by people acting on behalf of German charitable 
trusts.  
 
As a contribution to practical investment implications for trusts, the author 
analyses the legal framework and risk preferences and puts both into context with 
the current capital market environment. As a result, the study proposes to 
redefine the question of “safe investments.” In spite of the current capital market 
environment with negative yields on traditional safe assets, the author proposes 
that trusts use the wide room for interpretation granted by the legal and 
supervisory framework and focus on distributable yields generated by a higher 
equity portion in trust portfolios. Additional income could be generated by a 
risk-reducing and at the same time income-generating derivatives strategy, the 
so-called covered call writing. Both measures would help to correspond to what is 
implicitly and explicitly postulated by the law: real capital preservation and the 
durable fulfilment of the purpose of the trust. The author argues that the 
prevailing investment strategies of trusts which heavily focus on high quality 
bonds at low nominal yields and negative real yields do neither serve the purpose 
of generating sufficient income nor do they protect the real asset base of the trust. 
 
The author proposes that legislators and supervisory authorities encourage trusts 
to invest in real assets like equities and real estate. It can be argued that the 
current framework already leaves sufficient freedom to trusts for applying the 
instruments proposed above. The study revealed that nonetheless trusts 
seriously take into consideration potential negative consequences by authorities 
resulting from price fluctuations that might arise due to volatile assets. The same 
phenomenon of fear of trustees to defend adverse outcomes was found with 
regard to the internal bodies of the trust. For the benefit of optimising the financial 
resources in the German trust sector it is time to proceed in a direction of a 
greater general acceptance of potentially volatile real asset strategies among all 
stakeholders in German charitable trusts and to reduce the fear for losses that 
systematically dampens investment returns. Important steps could be to help 
trusts and authorities in building financial expertise and to clearly focus on long 
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time horizons for investments and strategies that are well-aligned with the 
purpose of the trust and which may include ethical as well as mission investing. 
The supervisory authorities of the 16 federal states could help to overcome 
irrational risk aversion of trusts by concretely guiding them in investment matters 
in a document analogous to that published by the authority in the United Kingdom 
(Charity Commission, 2011). This would ideally result in one document for all 
German charitable trusts but requires a joint effort of all federal states.  
 
There are several limitations to the study. Chapter 4.3 extensively discusses 
shortcomings yielding from collecting data from individuals rather than from 
groups of decision makers. Another limitation in the methodology is that the 
simple lottery questions used to elicit risk preferences are not a perfect substitute 
for the complexity of real behaviour. Furthermore, they cannot give a complete 
picture of risk preferences as they only capture the areas that were considered 
most important by the researcher based on the literature review and the pilot 
study. Due to the limited number of eleven questions on preferences, there is no 
precision in computing a utility curve and a curve for probability weightings. 
 
It cannot be ruled out that other characteristics which have not been investigated 
in this study could have a meaningful influence on investment preferences. The 
characteristics found to be significant could accidentally heavily correlate with 
these non-identified characteristics. 
 
In order to ensure the validity of the quantitative results and to mitigate potential 
weaknesses, the researcher implemented the qualitative stage in the design of 
the study. The quantitative data was supported by the qualitative analysis which 
leads the researcher to the assumption that the answers to the questions in the 
quantitative part are a sound surrogate for actual investment decisions.  
 
Bias may arise from selecting only participants with an e-mail address. The 
researcher had no direct control of subjects filling in the online questionnaire and 
could only offer assistance via telephone and mail which was both not used by 
the participants.  
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Bias may as well arise from non-respondents. This group of the sample could not 
be analysed for their characteristics as the data was not available to the 
researcher. 
 
In the telephone interviews, participants were exclusively volunteers who had 
stated in the online survey that they were available for further questions. Their 
characteristics and risk preferences differed from the average of all subjects in 
the online survey as shown in appendixes G. H and I. The questions may have 
been leading participants in their answers, even though it was explicitly made 
clear to the subjects that there are no “right” and “wrong” answers. 
 
9.3.8 Ideas for Future Research 
 
Further research may focus on the following topics: 
 
From a decision theoretical point of view, it would be valuable to determine 
mathematically precise utility and probability weighting functions within a study 
analogous to for example Booij/van de Kuilen (2009). The results of the present 
study provide a basis for a more detailed investigation by giving indications on the 
critical points. 
 
Furthermore, the results of this study raise questions regarding the influence of 
the organisational structure in trusts on decision making and the balance of 
powers. Trusts stated to be concerned about the justification of results in front of 
internal bodies. Further research may look close into board decision processes, 
building on the respective basic results of Then et al. (2012) regarding the 
composition of bodies, internal and external financial experts and mechanisms of 
control. Particular reference could potentially be made to Fama and Jensen 
(1983) regarding ouster and managers in trusts. 
 
From a methodological point of view, the knowledge gained in this study could be 
supplemented by studies conduced in a phenomenological paradigm using case 
studies in order to generate in-depth knowledge of decision making processes in 
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trusts. 
 
With respect to institutional risks in conjunction with the supervisory authorities, 
future research may address the question of how to optimise state supervisory 
with regard to the fulfilment of the trusts´ purposes for the society. 
 
The present study is intentionally limited to Germany because of its particular 
legal framework. Later studies could replicate the methodology but focus on other 
countries in order to compare the results. This could be particularly insightful for 
countries with a less restrictive legislation than Germany. 
 
Financial researchers may be interested in optimising the proposals for a 
strategic asset allocation on the basis of the results of the present study. 
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